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PREFACE
This monograph describes and analyzes the management of the formative years of the space station
program (1982-1986) in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The time period
covered begins with the :iuccessful initiative for program approval launched by Administrator James
Beggs, through the initial program structure with the lead center at Houston, Texas, and culminates in
the decision to bring program management to Reston, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C.
By the term "management history" we mean a chronicle of the challenges faced by NASA managers
and the processes used to meet those challenges. Since companion works dealing with the history of
constituency building (authored by Howard McCurdy) and international participation (by John Logsdon)
in the space station program are under way, we have placed greater emphasis on internal management
issues related to the implementation of the various phases of the program from 1982 to 1986. Although
we have tried to minimize overlap, some discussion of key external factors is necessary in order to place
NASA's management chzllenges in their proper context.
We have invoked the: metaphor of "an experiment," as provided by John Hodge, director of the
Space Station Task Force, during our interviews with him, to describe NASA's efforts to arrive at a
viable management struc! ure for the space station program. We believe this term accurately captures
the thinking of the key decision makers. The main players understood that the major program
management decisions made in 1984 would be evaluated at the end of the detailed definition period in
light of their experiences during that time. Only after such evaluation would the program move to the
design and development phase.
We structure our narrative around four interrelated themes: the problem of bringing programmatic
and institutional interests together and focusing them to forward the program; centralized versus decen-
tralized control of the program, and how each option was affected by the requirements of technology
and the program, the environment within NASA, and the budgetary constraints under which NASA was
operating at the time; how the history of NASA and the individual centers affected the decisions that
were made; and the pressure from those outside NASA (the external constituencies). The monograph
is divided into four section s that are chronologically overlapping in some aspects: 1) the decision to build
the space station, 2) the design of the management experiment, 3) the experiment comes to life, and 4)
the decision reversal.
Part I presents the process by which NASA gained Presidential approval for the program. In chapter
1 a new Administrator (James Beggs) viewed the space station initiative as a means to revitalize NASA's
technical and scientific competence. Only after revamping the reporting relationships between the field
centers and headquarters 3id he openly work on the space station initiative. He wanted the space station
to be an agency-wide program, have more than one prime contractor (unlike the shuttle where only one
had been used), and be I:uilt "by the yard" (starting with an initial capability and adding onto that as
funds became available). And during this early period he identified the key individuals who would
spearhead the space station initiative. In chapter 2 we cover the four major organizational entities that
were involved in this phase.• of the program: the Space Station Task Force, the Space Station Technology
Steering Committee, the l_etcher Committee, and the Office of Space Science and Applications. Over
time the task force becaJne the focal point for delineating the details of the program. The unique
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managementofthetaskforce,anditslocationatheadquarters, promoted program integrity and mini-
mized decentralizing forces within NASA. Frequent interaction among those in key leadership positions
at all levels allowed the integration of both programmatic and institutional perspectives into the
management and technological guidelines of the program. (Proponents of the institutional perspective
focused on NASA as an ongoing organization, whereas program proponents viewed the organization as
an instrument to accomplish major projects.) From a management perspective, the leadership style of
Beggs and the management of the task force enabled NASA to win Presidential approval of the
program.
Part II deals with how NASA arrived at the original program structure. The initial decisions and
consideration took place at headquarters and within the Program Planning Working Group of the Space
Station Task Force. As the prospects for approval improved, NASA included institutional elements at
the field centers through meetings at Wallops and Langley, which are covered in chapter 4. These two
meetings endorsed the lead center form of organization for managing Phase B of the program. Based
on NASA's recent experience in the shuttle project, the lead center approach was the first attempt to
find a balance between centralization and decentralization for the space station. In chapter 5 we begin
the discussion of division of responsibilities among the centers, in the form of work packages. This
process took much longer than had ever been anticipated. The ever-present need for sustained con-
gressional support and institutional considerations made this decision quite difficult and the decision was
finally made at headquarters.
In Part III we analyze the management of the program at headquarters and at the program
management level. Included in this section is a discussion of the skunk works (chapter 7), formation of
the headquarters program office (chapter 8), the formation of Level B (chapter 9), and the Phase B
studies (chapter 10). During this period the resource and time requirements of the complex management
structure became more apparent.
Part IV considers the evaluation of the lead center organization structure and the associated work
package decisions. Chapter 11 deals with the turbulence caused by the departure of key space station
program officers (including Administrator James Beggs, Deputy Administrator Hans Mark, Program
Manager Neil Hutchinson, and the lead field center director Gerald Griffin) and the effect the
Challenger accident had upon NASA as a whole and the space station in particular. Chapter 12 considers
then Acting Administrator James Fletcher's decision in May 1986 to bring management of the space
station program to headquarters, abandoning "the experiment" for a more traditional NASA form of
management.
This narrative addresses an audience far broader than management professionals. We have made
every effort to simplify our treatment of complex management issues so that the immense management
challenges NASA faced can be appreciated by a greater number of people. We have analyzed documents
from NASA's archives, although we have given great importance to oral sources of information. We have
benefitted from many hours of interviews with NASA personnel, both at headquarters and at the field
centers, in our reconstruction of the management story. The story is multifaceted. We have striven to
represent the differing, sometimes divergent, perspectives. We have also tried to elucidate the
perceptions of the players in the decision process. We owe an enormous debt of gratitude to those
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NASA personnel who h_lve given freely of their time; we hope we have represented their accounts
accurately. Those who generously shared their insights and opinions are listed in appendix A.
We would especially like to acknowledge the following people for their contribution to the
completion of this project. We thank Philip Culbertson, John Hodge, Robert Dotts, and Sylvia Fries
for their comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. We also appreciate the continuous
encouragement given by James Begs, Robert Freitag, Lee Tilton, Neil Hutchinson, Jerry Craig, William
Raney, Terence Finn, Jo_m Aaron, and Aaron Cohen. We are indebted to the archival support from
Manfred _Dutch" von E_renfried, Lee Saegesser, Adam Gruen, and the NASA History Office in
Washington, DC; Mike Wright at Marshall Space Flight Center; Donald Hess, Joey Pellarin, and Janet
Kovacevich of the Histoq, Office at Johnson Space center; and Lee Tilton for his copious personal fdes
on the space station prob,'am.
Administrative suppc.rt for the contract was provided by the Institute for Public Policy and Business
Research at the Universily of Kansas. Anthony Redwood and his capable staff at the Institute were an
important factor in completion of this project. We particularly acknowledge Mary Brohammer for her
dedication, patience, and ingenuity in bringing this monograph to publication.
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PART I
THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP

CHAPTER 1
KEEPING THE DREAM ALIVE
I guess if I wrote my epitaph, I would write, 'He tried to keep the dream alive.'
--James Beggs
NASA Administrator, 1981-1985
The concept of a sp_.ce station has been around for more than 100 years, but always as something
that would happen in th_ future, never in the imaginer's lifetime. However, after the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) was established in 1958 and the agency's leadership con-
templated a plan for its first decade, a space station was one of the top choices as a post-Mercury
program. Indeed, in the first half of 1959, NASA's Research Steering Committee on Manned Space
Flight had placed a space station ahead of a lunar expedition on its list of priorities. In 1961, however,
President John F. Kenm;dy made a lunar landing the major NASA objective. Despite this change of
priorities, the dream of the space station was kept alive throughout the 1960s through various
engineering and design studies. 1 Under the coordination of the Advanced Missions Office of the Office
of Manned Space Flight at NASA headquarters in Washington, these early in-house and contractor
studies were managed by three NASA field centers, the Manned Spacecraft Center (Johnson Space
Center) in Texas, the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, and the Langley Research Center in
Virginia. 2 Work on the shuttle dominated the 1970s, despite the launch of Skylab in 1973, which was a
"quasi-space station" effort, and space station-related studies continued, primarily at Johnson and
Marshall. 3
NASA had tried several times over the years to win Presidential approval for the space station and
had failed each time. With Kennedy's decision to go to the Moon, the chances of developing a space
station in the 1960s vanished. Efforts to gain approval for station development from the Nixon
Administration failed, and the Ford and Carter Administrations rejected funding requests for the space
station as well. By the late 1970s it was clear that any substantial money for a space station would have
to wait until the agency demonstrated success with the shuttle, but the shuttle was then experiencing
technical difficulties as well as cost and schedule overruns. 4
It was left to James M. Beggs, the agency's sixth administrator, to make the next attempt to win
presidential approval for the space station program.
Administrator Beggs
James Montgomery Beggs, a Peunsylvanian by birth, was not a newcomer to government service,
the space industry, or NASA. He had served in the Navy, been with NASA and the Department of
Transportation (DOT), and had worked in the private sector before returning to NASA in 1981 as the
new administrator, s Ronald Reagan nominated Beggs to that post soon after he himself took office.
Beggs had a numl_er of assets that could serve NASA well. He was closely connected to the
Republican political eslablishment, and he understood Washington political life, given his previous
tenure with NASA and DOT. His time in private industry also gave him an extensive familiarity with
the aerospace industry. Even though he had left NASA in 1969, he had kept himself abreast of the
IPAG_INIENTIONALL_ BLANI
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agency's developments. Indeed, in 1977 he had chaired a panel of the National Academy of Public
Administration that concluded that NASA was the operational home of the shuttle unless the economics
of the shuttle changed drastically. 8
Reagan also appointed Hans Mark to be Beggs' deputy admlnL_trator. Mark had served as
Undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force during the Carter Administration and had known Beggs since the
late 1960s7 He was widely believed to be affiliated with the Democratic Party and had excellent creden-
rials as a scientist. He had previous experience with NASA (having served as center director at Ames
from 1969 to 1977) and was well known in the Washington environment. Beggs and Mark would
spearhead the attempt to win approval of the space station.
The Confirmation Hearings
Mark visited Beggs as soon as he was selected to be the deputy administrator. This meeting gave
them the opportunity to establish the priorities for NASA that they would present at their confirmation
hearings, and the space station was one priority they agreed on. 8
Although Beggs was committed to gaining approval of the space station, he chose to downplay his
commitment during the confirmation hearings because he did not think NASA had the broad support
needed at that time to establish a new major manned space program. This support would have to be
created from industry contractors and the political and scientific communities. It was not likely that a
major program such as the space station would be approved without support from these groups, 9 and
this may have been why Beggs chose to de-emphasize the space station initiative during the hearings.
As a NASA associate administrator under Administrator James Webb in 1968, Beggs had had the
opportunity to observe a superb administrator in action in a public agency. During his tenure, Webb had
emphasized three key themes: 1) the importance of flexibility and adaptability in the organization; 2)
building external constituencies; and 3) shared decision-making at the top. 10 During his confirmation
hearings, Beggs expressed several themes of his own management philosophy, and they sounded much
like those of Webb. First, Beggs emphasized the need for fast organizational responsiveness. Second,
he underscored the importance of external constituencies. Third, more by implication, he suggested the
need for a collaborative relationship with his deputy.
Beggs also portrayed his internal management philosophy in concrete terms. He planned to operate
NASA in a decentralized fashion, as he was used to doing in private industry, but also planned to have
adequate controls to determine early on if anything was amiss. 11 He would stay personally involved in
the organization so he would know what was going on at all times. 12 Beggs was emphatic about which
organizational form worked best. "[T]he organization that works best is one that is well decentralized,
where the guy who has to do the work has the resources and the responsibility and the authority to get
the job done. "13 He also described his external role. In research and technology, the user was impor-
tant, and he intended to work very closely with industry as well as the academic community, since this
is where many new ideas originate. 14 He also felt that the astronauts were very important in gaining
public support for the program. 15
In addition to his management philosophy, Beggs brought a set of priorities to NASA. The shuttle
program needed attention, and the space science program had to be revitalized. But beneath these
priorities Beggs believed the manned space station was "the next logical step" for NASA. Many in NASA
supported him in this, of cx_urse, since the space station had long been a cherished dream. 16 Therefore,
in his confirmation hearings, he committed himself to undertake a permanently manned space station. 17
Mark endorsed the "hands-on type of management" Beggs advocated. However, Mark was also
keenly interested in persorLnel matters. He was convinced that the key in any organization was to pick
good people, and that the success of the organization was based on the success of that selection. 18 Mark
also echoed space station _hemes remarkably similar to those of Beggs. "I fully concur with what Mr.
Beggs has said. I think that is the natural next step, the establishment of a permanent presence in
space. "19Thus, the Beggs/Mark team pronounced space station as NASA's long-range goal.
Despite their agreemeat on the space station, neither Beggs nor Mark would commit to a specific
timetable for the program. In fact, both were very careful not to do so. Beggs was aware of the work
that needed to be done I_.'fore NASA would be ready to place a space station initiative before the
President for approval, and a specific timetable could interfere with getting the job done properly.
Beggs' First Priorities for NASA
When he took office, Beggs did not push for immediate approval of the space station program.
NASA's credibility was on lhe line because the delays and overruns of the shutde had fostered a public
perception of careless management practices within NASA. 20 Although previous NASA executives had
begun to turn the shuttle project around, 21 NASA had not yet conveyed to the public their success. As
a result, Beggs' first priority once he took the reins was to make the shuttle operational. At the same
time, he gave top priority t,:_revitalizing NASA's space science and applications programs. Over time,
payloads were scheduled for the shuttle and other NASA programs, and Beggs repeatedly endorsed the
long range planetary goals of NASA's Solar System Exploration Committee. 22
As Beggs had promised in the confirmation hearings, he set out to revitalize NASA's scientific and
technical talent. He felt thai the agency had "grown old," hanging onto older employees who had retired
and then had been rehired. He felt this destroyed the morale within the agency and insisted that NASA
hire younger people. 23 By doing so, Beggs wanted to create an attitude in the field centers that
encouraged risk taking. He wanted leadership at the center director's level that was willing to motivate
and get things done. He didn't feel this attitude existed when he took over as administrator. 24
Beggs and Mark also Imdertook a major reorganization at headquarters. They consolidated the
Office of Space Sciences and the Office of Space Applications into the Office of Space Science and
Applications. Historically, space sciences and space applications had been a single office and had been
split in 1978 when Robert Frosch became administrator. Mark felt the division was awkward because
the same technologies and people were involved in the two offices, so this part of the reorganization was
done simply to correct what Mark felt had been a mistake in the first place. 25 As a part of this top level
reorganization the Office ef Space Operations was folded into the Office of Space Transportation
Systems and renamed the Office of Space Flight. Since the Office of Space Operations had just come
into existence, this was regarded as renaming rather than consolidation. 2s
The third aspect of the reorganization pertained to the reporting relationships between the field
centers and headquarters. Although NASA had been through several realignments of the headquarters-
field center relationships in '.:he 1970s, Beggs chose to reorganize the agency once again. Under Frosch
(1977-1981) the program ofl_ces and field centers reported directly to the administrator. After Beggs'
reorganization the centers once again reported to the program offices for which they performed the bulk
of theirwork,ashadbeenthecaseduringtheApollo Project. This meant that the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory and Goddard Space Flight Center reported to the Office of Space Science and Applications;
Ames Research Center, Langley Research Center, and Lewis Research Center to the Office of
Aeronautics and Space Technology; and Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, John F. Kennedy Space
Center, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, and the National Space Technology Laboratories to
the Office of Space Flight. In addition, two centers, Dryden Flight Research Center and Wallops Flight
Center, were renamed facilities reporting to, and managed by, the Ames Research Center and Goddard
Space Flight Center respectively. This reorganization reduced the span of control of the administrator
since the centers reported to associate administrators, rather than to the administrator's office. _
At this same time Beggs began to take the first steps toward gaining the space station program's
approval. To the outside world the space station was kept in low prof'de. Internally, however, Beggs
began organizing for its approval. The space station was not just another program, but one that might
have a major impact on NASA. _ Therefore, the new space station initiative had to be carefully thought
out and presented.
Beggs had committed to neither the shape nor form of the station during his confirmation hearings.
He seemed to hold two basic beliefs, however, but beyond these beliefs there was no distinct
commitment to program specifics. First, he believed the space station initiative should enlist the
cooperation of international partners. 29 Second, this initiative was to be user-sensitive.
The station's management issues were not trivial, however. The agency was called upon to marshall
its energies to win approval of a program which both the administrator and the deputy administrator
had left undefined, perhaps deliberately. A process had to be managed, a process that yielded answers
to crucial questions such as: What kinds of information needed to be generated to give the space station
a concrete form? What principles should guide and what policies should shape the program? How
should one organize to win approval? How should the institutional elements of other programs be linked
into the effort?
All these questions had to be answered without a specific budget allocation to support the program
because the program did not exist at this point. It was an extremely uncertain but challenging
managerial task because the new initiative might fail, and all efforts might be for naught. Yet NASA's
top executives made the decisions and set policies that established the course of the program. There was
the opportunity to be involved creatively, to contribute, and to be part of the realization of a long-held
dream of the agency. This was a time for the adventurous, not for those accustomed to routine life.
In the past, NASA headquarters had directed efforts to win approval of major programs. Over time,
the roles of the field centers and headquarters had evolved to a point where the engineering and
scientific expertise lay with the centers and the policy and liaison expertise was at Washington.
Headquarters won program approval and field centers implemented. Following this tradition, Beggs
chose to direct the effort to win the space station from headquarters. 30 There were several program
offices that could have logically housed the space station efforts. The Office of Space Flight was perhaps
ideally suited--given its oversight of the shuttle project. Beggs decided, however, that the space station
effort was to be managed separately from these offices.
There are several plausible reasons for this decision. F'trst, since Beggs had given priority to
improving the shuttle's management practices and building the space sciences programs, he may not
have wanted the respective program offices to take on a major effort such as the station. Second, Beggs
may have had a vision of a manned space station as a multipurpose entity serving scientific and
industrial commun]tes. Third' Bcggs may have wanted many constituencies to support the effort;
locating it within the Office of Manned Space Flight or the Office of Space Science could have alienated
personnel in other program offices.
Although there was nothing formal at this stage, this decision resulted in what was later to become
the Office of Space Station. Beggs picked Philip E. Culbcrtson to act as the primary link between the
administrator's office and NASA's new space station initiative. 31 Within the headquarters organ_ation,
Culbertson thus became the focus for organizing and managing the space station initiative. He was also
the key tie to Beggs and Ivlark.
Culbertson assessed the circumstances in which he had to organize the space station initiative. First,
as the future of the agency itself was believed to reside with the space station, the extreme importance
of this initiative was not lo:_ton the headquarters program offices. Second, specific technologies for the
station would need to be developed at other program offices. Since there was little money to start with,
the space station had to rely on other programs for technology development, and other program offices
had to take into accoun_ the station's technological needs when preparing their own advanced
development programs. Tlfird, Culbertson had to depend on other offices for budgets and personnel.
To some extent, the institutional administrators themselves were infected with enthusiasm for the
station, and the backing of Beggs and Mark helped create a spirit of cooperation among the programs.
Culbertson, nonetheless, was sensitive to the need for maintaining his working relationship with other
associate administrators. _ Fourth, he had to accomplish all of this without impairing program goals and
integrity. Thus, a new program had to take shape amid the push and pull of other programs, and at the
same time had to rely on others' personnel and budgets.
Beggs and Mark laurlched the space station initiative by forming the Space Station Technology
Steering Committee (SS_C) to assess technologies already available within the agency. Established in
1981, the SSTSC was composed of NASA personnel only. It was headed by Walter Olstead, and
operated under the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST). The Fletcher Committee was
established simultaneousl), under the chairmanship of Jame,s C. Fletcher, to consider related issues. The
Fletcher Committee was composed of people outside the NASA organization.
The first issue to be looked at was the station's technological feasibility. An agency-wide assessment
of the technologies already available and currently developed within NASA (and the aerospace
community) was essential. The job of the SSTSC was to fmd out if any new technology was needed for
the space station program. 33 If the SSTSC could ascertain any gaps in the technology base and see that
they were fdled" the appr,)priate technologies would be av_filable when the program was approved. 34
Although the SSTSC operated until after the Space Station Task Force was formed' early delibera-
tions indicated that different concepts of the station could not be reconciled on technological grounds.
Perhaps more important to the top administrators, the SSTSC concluded that the technology issue in
the space station prograJn was relatively less complex than the technological problems NASA had
confronted with Apollo aad the shuttle, as
While the SSTSC wa_;exploring technology needs, the Fletcher Committee was looking at program
alternatives. There were differing programmatic recommendations from Johnson Space Center and from
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Marshall Space Flight Center. The Fletcher Committee was a means to sort out those alternatives. _
The Fletcher Committee was not affected by the parochial interests of the individual centers and could,
therefore, be relied on to be objective or neutral in sorting out the various alternatives offered.
kat_ Strate_
Beggs' primary interest as it evolved over the first few months of the task force was institutional.
He wanted to revitalize the scientific and technological capabilities of NASA. He believed the space
station program, once approved, was the way to accomplish that goal. Although Beggs and Mark were
both committed to the program, they initially had differing priorities. One major difference concerned
the involvement of the Department of Defense (DOD). Mark wanted DOD to be involved in the
program. Beggs felt it should be a civilian station and that if DOD wanted a space station, they should
take NASA's technology and build one of their own. He also felt that DOD involvement would make
it more difficult to have international participation in the program because of security restrictions, az The
differences between the two over the question were settled, however, when DOD proved uninterested
in NASA's civilian initiative.
The first guiding prindple of Beggs' space station initiative that emerged from the deliberations of
the SSTSC and the Fletcher Committee was that NASA would undertake a relatively major space
station program rather than a smaller one. He felt that the smaller station would not hold much credi-
bility and would be rejected by the Office of Management and Budget before it ever got started. He
explained:
[The small station] was a strategy that we considered, but I didn't think it would be fair to the
agency if we were to dump this, give them this wet leafy bag when we left, because I knew I
would be gone before the thing really got under the peak-except I didn't think I was going to
be gone as soon as I did-and I felt we should be more responsible, that's why we took the $8
billion. The $8 billion was not a slimmed down esth_te, it was an unembelfished number that
the guys in the Task Force thought was reasonable. _
Although NASA would start with an $8 billion station, Beggs felt the agency should be able to add
more money and technology over the years; NASA would build a station "by the yard." (_By the yard"
meant that the station would meet the basic requirements of a permanently manned presence in space
and could be expanded depending on the amount of money NASA received in the future.)
Beggs' second principle was to involve the entire agency. He felt that agency-wide involvement
would motivate the agency by getting more than one center involved. He was also aware that involving
several centers would make it more dLfficult to manage, but Apollo had been a multi-center program,
and he felt the agency was up to the challenge. If they stuck to the fundamentals, Beggs felt that NASA
could manage very complex and widely spread programs. _
He chose not to commit NASA to a single prime contractor, however, as had been done with the
shuttle, and a third principle was formulated. "I guess my feeling was that this was different than any-
thing we've done before. The station is not an airplane, or even a space shuttle. "4° This gave him the
option of changing some aspects of the program, rather than following the example of other programs
(such as Apollo or the shuttle).
Finally, he felt it was advisable to have international partidpation. The support of the international
community was needed from a financial point of view, and their involvement would be beneficial for two
reasons. 41 First, of course, it would spread the cost, and help leverage the $8 billion so more could be
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done.Second,Beggsbelievedthatwhentheinternationalpartnersenteraprogram,theyalwayscommit
tothefullprogram.Involvinginternationals in the program would add stability because other countries
generally make longer commitments than the U.S. budgetary cycle allows and because Congress is
normally reluctant to cut _)ff programs that have international participation. 42 Based on these beliefs
Beggs launched prelimin_y negotiations with international partners: the European Space Agency (ESA),
Canada, and Japan.
NASA, therefore, pla]med an agency-wide program without a single prime contractor, a program
to be built by the yard over the years. The contours of the initial strategy were dearly laid out by Beggs
and Mark. It was also cle_- that the space station initiative needed an organization to provide focus and
direction for its planning aLctivities.
Field Center leadership
By 1981 the centers had become aware of the new initiative. A Space Station Projects Office was
created at Johnson following a visit by General James Abrahamson. Christopher Kraft, the center
director at Johnson, chOS4:Robert Piland to be the project officer. _ At Marshall, the new initiative
echoed in the Advanced Programs Office, with Luther PoweU initiating the space station effort at that
center. The other centers were not yet involved.
Several of the field centers had established leadership with William Lucas at Marshall, Donald
Hearth at Langley, and Richard Smith at Kennedy. At other centers Beggs made key appointments.
Andrew Stofan was selected to be center director at Lewis. '14He was from Lewis originally and had a
good reputation as an administrator. Noel Hinners was chosen to head Goddard. Hinners' youth was
to his advantage, _ and Bt'.ggs felt he was creative, good with people, and a top motivator. 4e Lew Allen
was chosen to lead the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 47 and Gerald Griffin was selected to replace Chris
Kraft at Johnson. Culbertson recommended Griffin very highly, 48 and Beggs felt Griffin was a good
administrator and a good people manager. 49
Under Griffm's direction, Johnson underwent a major top-level reorganization. Kraft had functional
and project heads reportiltg directly to him, and Griffin felt that this span of control was too broad. He
reorganized the functional and project heads to be members of his executive committee and readied
himself to undertake a major new program for Johnson Space Center: the space station, once it was
approved. _
In sum, this very early phase of the space station program was a period of genesis. Formal
organization did not exLslland much of the activity was informal and exploratory. The policies and
principles that would gui_e the space station effort were beginning to create the structure that would
be needed once the space :_tationinitiative received Presidential approval. The new center directors were
selected by Beggs and Mark in consultation with Culbertson. They deliberately built a strong top
management team, people aligned with the space station program, and particularly with Beggs' new style
of leadership.
From a management perspective, this was an important era. The space station was to be an agency-
wide initiative which, onct: approved, would stand as a unique program in spite of its interdependencies
with other programs. One: key player, Phil Culbertson, had been chosen. A key information-gathering
mechanism--the SSTSC--was in place. Efforts to forge institutional arrangements between the space
stationandotherprogramofficeswithinNASAhadalreadystarted,and preliminary negotiations with
potential international partners had begun.
Institutionally, the Beggs/qk4ark era was under way. Although NASA, on the whole, exhibited
organizational continuity, four field centers had undergone leadership changes. At headquarters a new
organization had been established.
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CHAPTER 2
MANAGING THE CONSTITUENCIES
Recognizing the budget constraints on NASA, 1 the agency's top executives decided to gather both
internal and external support for the program. As a first step toward building an external constituency,
James Beggs hired John Hodge, 2 a former NASA employee, from the Department of Transportation.
Hodge had heard that Beggs had returned to NASA, and he had written asking for a job. Beggs
suggested to Phil Culbertson that Hodge be interviewed to work on the space station program.
Culbertson interviewed Hodge and decided to bring him on board.
Beggs had already chosen Culbertson for a leadership role in the program, but Culbertson had other
responsibilities as well. He was in charge of the task force that was created to provide a commercial
poficy for NASA and was also the number three man in the administrator's office, a Culbertson needed
help and Hodge was the ;mswer. According to Beggs, this was a perfect match of two individuals with
differing areas of expertise: the institutional acumen of Culbertson and the creativity of Hodge.
Culbertson knew NASA imd understood the people and the organization. 4 Hodge, on the other hand,
seemed to think differently and was very innovative. Beggs commented, "If you can't get one guy who
is both a good people manager and creative, you get two, one creative and one a good people
manager. "5
When Hodge returred to NASA he joined Terence Finn, who at 39 had a doctoral degree in
political science from Gec rgetown University, and, as a former NASA head of congressional liaison, had
a tremendous knowledge of what made Congress work. Daniel Herman, who in eleven years at NASA
headquarters had helped develop major planetary missions while also maintaining close ties with the
scientific community, also joined the group. 6 Hodge was not familiar with either Finn or Herman when
he was recruited, having; spent twelve years with the Department of Transportation. He had no
involvement in their appointments, but he came to admire them: they were the "mavericks" that he
needed for the space station initiative, z
The three were joined by Robert Freitag, probably the most knowledgeable person on space station
issues and a well-known figure among the field centers. 8 Hodge and Freitag knew each other weU from
the Apollo days. Hodge, Freitag, Finn, and Herman deliberated issues such as policies, cost, interna-
tional partners, DOD participation, and the impact each issue could have upon the program. 9 Although
Beggs was not involved ht these discussions, Hans Mark was, often arguing against positions he didn't
like. 10
This group, which eventually formed the task force, also held informal meetings at their homes.
Hodge recalled that Culbertson was at one meeting. Mark attended another one. 11 Beggs, of course,
did not attend. He let the; task force work, refine its options, and consult him.
I deliberately stayed away from that [the informal meetings], partly because I didn't want them
to try to tailor whatever they were doing to what they thought I wanted. My style is to try to
give a group a challe age, an objective, and then to let them go get it. People are the same the
world over. If they think they have discerned what it is that you're after, they'll give it to you.
If you want to enhance creativity and innovation you've g_! to be very careful that they don't
get the impression t_at you want it to go in a certain way. 2
Of course, Hodge kept Eeggs and Culbertson informed of the task force's progress. 13
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As they bounced their ideas around, however, it became clear that Beggs and Mark needed a larger
group to help promote the station. At the end of March 1982, Freitag made a formal presentation to
Culbertson in which he recommended, with the concurrence of the other members of the team, that
NASA create a Space Station Task Force. 14
The Space Station Task Force
On May 20, 1982, Beggs announced the establishment of the Space Station Task Force, to be
directed by Hodge and reporting to Culbertson. Hodge chose Freitag as his deputy, and they were joined
by Finn and Herman. 15 Beggs authorized the task force to develop the programmatic aspects of the
space station. The task force would run for 12 to 18 months, through the awarding of the Phase B
contracts. The task force's responsibilities would include the development of the space station program
plan and the organization of a constituency.
Hodge saw himself as a catalyst for change within NASA. The task force could be a forum in which
new ideas could be tested.
... [T]he goal of the Space Station Task Force was not simply to get a space station sold. Jim
Beggs was using it to test thoughts and ideas about what NASA was going to be when it grew
up. So you found yourself making decisions that were not 100 percent consistent wi_ the space
station itself, but in relationship to what NASA might become as a result of that. "_
Hodge was familiar with task forces from his work as part of the Apollo project. He worried, of course,
that bureaucratic pressures might defuse the purpose of the Space Station Task Force. 17 Hodge, unlike
Beggs, had acquired a programmatic perspective. He felt that NASA should exist because it has the
programs, not exist for its own sake. The key to the system should be the program manager and the
institution should provide the support function. 18 He was aware, however, that some might argue that
the institution should be the operational focal point, and that when the program was gone, the institu-
tion would still be there. 19
Over the next several months, Hodge assessed the factors, which he called "boundary conditions,"
that affected the task force's initiatives. One of these was Beggs' management style, which Hodge
characterized as "permissive." Beggs did not get involved in delineating the alternatives, and thus Hodge
was free to pursue the task force's objectives. 20
This leadership style, called "crescive" by management scholars, emphasizes the development of what
the organization should look like and encourages individual creativity and risk-taking in the process. 21
The leader can then approve alternatives conforming to the mission that he has articulated for the
organization. This style of leadership encourages entrepreneurship within large organizations, often
referred to in management literature as "mtrapreneurship."
The second boundary condition pertained to the reporting structure of the task force. Hodge felt
that the task force could both report to the administrator's office through Culbertson, and
simultaneously to another NASA program office such as the Office of Space Flight. 22 Mark, in Hodge's
recollection, did not approve. "With his sort of Teutonic background, the concept of having more than
one master was just anathema to him. "23 In the end the task force reported to Culbertson at the
administrator's office.
The associate administrators needed to be involved in the task force, so the Space Station Steering
Committee was established. This move was enthusiastically endorsed by the task force members. 24
Herman remembered this idea as Finn's contribution, 25 although Culbertson also claimed the idea as
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his own.2e According to Hodge, the steering committee should keep the institutional elements in NASA
informed of the task for,_e's activities. Since Hodge did not believe in secrets, the associate
administrators were briefed once a month. "It was a sort of _m advise and consent kind of process--as
open a communication pro_:ess as possible. "27
Howard McCurdy has told the story of how the Space Station Task Force helped build the
constituency for the space s:ation program. 28 NASA had a historical legacy of task forces and the 1980
version was a continuation of that legacy. The Space Station Task Force was patterned loosely after the
Space Task Group of the 19:_8-62 period which had formulated the manned space program, and was also
influenced by a 1970s version of the task force. 29
As the Space Station Task Force began work in earnest, several other boundary conditions that
affected the task force became evident. One pertained to technological concerns. The task force had to
incorporate the recommendations of the Space Station Technology Steering Committee (SSTC), as new
technology development was essential to realizing the station's growth potential. 3°
Another boundary condition concerned the architecture of the space station itself. NASA had a long
list of options advocated by the different field centers: examples included the manned orbital research
laboratory, Saturn IV-B wol kshop, the manned orbital systems concept, the space construction base, the
space and application matured space platform, the space operations center, and Spacelab. 31 In addi-
tion, the Fletcher Committee had completed its work, recommending a $2 billion space station, an
amount far below what Be_;gs had expected. 32
These boundary conditions set the stage for the Space Station Task Force. In addition, however, the
Space Station Task Force would have to work in an environment where the field centers advocated
different options, and a cor,sensus did not exist within NASA as to the kind of space station that was
to be built. This was a problem, since if one field center felt left out, this could jeopardize the prospects
of getting the program approved. The need for external constituencies and internal consensus was
mutually reinforcing. Accordingly, the task force began to outline some of the guidelines of the space
station program.
Two of these guidelines are especially significant: NASA-wide involvement and an emphasis on
missions. Institutional and t_olitical considerations led the task force to adopt the stance that the space
station program would involve the entire agency. To build as wide a constituency as possible, the centers
were involved in both the a_;ency-wide initiative and the planning process. Programmatically, of course,
Beggs had advocated the space station as the next logical st_',p for the whole agency; these guidelines,
therefore, were consistent _th Beggs' intentions as well. Bringing the centers into the process had
ramifications, however, which the members had deliberated earlier. NASA's field centers had evolved
over time, both culturally a1_d organizationally, into entities very different from each other. There were
development centers, Mars_ all and Johnson; technology centers, Langley, Ames, and Lewis; and a major
science center, Goddard. Each had a different background. The development centers were adept at
cutting metal and working with the manned programs. The technology centers worked with advanced
technology development; they were interested in research rather than development work (conceptual-
ization rather than construction). And the science center, Goddard, had a history of responsiveness to
the major user constituen¢¢, the space scientists. 33 NASA'.,_ planning activity also implied that both
manned and unmanned elements of the programs would have to be brought together in the space
station. Because of the diversity among the centers, the space station program served as a melting pot
of the cultures and backgrounds of those centers.
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The second important guideline was to emphasize missions, not a specific space station design.
Based on the earfier fmdings of the SSTSC, it was dear that an internal consensus with respect to the
nature of the space station did not exist. Absence of such a consensus could have a devastating effect
on the program. Each of the centers could implicitly refrain from participating in the advocacy process
that was essential in gaining the station's approval. Marshall had always wanted to build the space station
incrementally, whereas Johnson wanted a space station to be built all at once. The controversy between
the two was averted by the task force's focus on missions to drive the space station; engineering
considerations would come later after the missions had been understood. This controversy was one of
the reasons why Hodge would not let a picture of the space station be drawn until considerably later in
the program. Hodge also knew from his experience with the shuttle that any premature design of the
space station could be criticized by NASA outsiders. 34
Eight mission analysis studies, funded by the Office of Space Flight, kicked off the task force
activities. Two objectives lay behind these studies: first, to establish the needs of the station (i.e., user
requirements), and second, to build a constituency. _ At Mark's urging meetings were also held with
DOD officials to determine whether the Pentagon would be involved in the program. 3s
Staffing
Hodge and Freitag quickly recruited personnel for the task force once it was decided that there
would be one. Freitag estimated that between 25 and 125 people a year would be needed to serve on
the task force. 37 They would be drawn from headquarters and field centers. Hodge visited all the
centers, looking for a lead person in each institution. 38 In addition to Finn and Herman, two others had
joined Hodge's group. One was Francis T. (Frank) Hoban _ from headquarters and the other was Brian
Prichard from Langley. Walter Olstead had suggested that Hobart get involved in the space station
program. Hoban talked to Hodge, who suggested he join the task force, and he did.4° Prichard managed
the contractors for the mission analysis studies.
The group of five (Hodge, Finn, Herman, Hoban, and Prichard), of course, was too small a group
to handle a job the size of the one facing the Space Station Task Force. So additional recruiting from
headquarters and the field centers took place. The task force recruitment employed unconventional
means. Hodge explained:
The way we collected the task force was not by advertising, but by people popping in [to
Hodge's office] and sitting and saying, what the hell is going on here? And I'd say, well, I don't
know if it's real. I'd always try to persuade people not to join, because I'd say the chance of
selling the space station are less than 50 percent and if you've come to join us you're joining
a bunch of mavericks. The organization you leave is going to ask why you left, and trying to get
back if we fail will be difficult. So I always stressed the negative side. And I guess a third of the
people said, I don't care, I'm still coming to work with you if I can.41
This process allowed many field centers to be involved. Detailees came on 30, 60, or 90 day tours,
some even longer. They came from all the centers and were loyal to the project. This was assisted by
Hodge's philosophy of little formal management. One day a person would be supporting another
individual and the next day, on a different problem, the positions would be reversed. Even contractors
were involved. 4:' As Freitag recalled, "They didn't care if they were working for Marshall, Houston,
headquarters, a contractor, or who. [And] we were able to get a lot of excellent people. "43
Agency reorganization of the Office of Manned Space Flight and the Office of Operations had
created a surplus staff which enabled the task force to recruit at headquarters. 44 No associate admin-
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istrators interfered during this selection process because the task force was tied into the administra-
tor's office, and no one wanted to "make waves." There also seemed to be a very good chance that the
program would ultimately be approved, so everyone kept their hands off. 4s
There were, however, some glitches along the way. The manned space flight centers were slow to
respond. Hodge and Bill Lucas of Marshall had worked together on early space station studies in the
late 1960s. 4e Lucas and Hodge had corresponding jobs at Marshall and Johnson, and although they held
differing points of view, they respected each other. Because of their previous relationship and mutual
respect Hodge persuaded Lucas to send detailees to headquarters. As Hodge saw it, "We agreed that
we had to amalgamate the centers .... So I got a lot of people from Marshall. "47 Johnson was slower to
respond, perhaps because of resentment of headquarters' control of the task force. So, in the earfiest
days, very few Johnson people were involved with the task force. This changed later, of course, when
Houston learned that Marshall personnel outnumbered Johnson personnel on the task force, and
Johnson was "losing out. _'gs
The people that the tz.sk force attracted were, in Hodge's words, "mavericks." They stuck their necks
out, dedicated themselves to the program, and cast aside institutional identities, at least for a time. Most
loved working in an unstructured environment, and those that did not went home. 49 At any rate, the
majority became closely i6entified with the program. According to Freitag, once everyone joined the task
force, they worked shoulder to shoulder and quickly became loyal to the project organization. S0
The task force eventtally included detailees from all the field centers, including the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory. Hence, a space station program, if approved, would allow every field center to contribute
its unique expertise and capabilities. Hoban wrote:
The mixture of headquarters and field center employees was quite necessary: the headquarters
employees were skill,:d in dealing with the bureaucracy and Congress, while the field center
employees had idea] expertise Io conduct engineering studies and cost estimates. This mixture
proved to be very synergistic, s
Although it had not beex_ planned, the task force attracted many people who had been involved in at
least one of the earlier sp ace station studies, or had participated in the Space Station Technology Steer-
ing Committee. This too contributed to the agency-wide experience base.
Task Force Organizatio_
The Space Station Task Force was organized into a number of working groups. Working groups
were task oriented, and a_ new tasks emerged, new groups were formed, s2 Over time the task force had
five major working group:t: the Mission Requirements Working Group, the Systems Working Group, the
Program Planning Workiag Group (PPWG), the Operations Working Group, and later on, the Concept
Development Working Croup (CDG). All of them reported to the Director of the Space Station Task
Force, John Hodge. In a_ldition, there was a Program Review Committee, chaired by Robert Freitag,
consisting of representalives from headquarters and the centers. It monitored the progress of the
working groups and servzd as a forum for bringing institutional concerns into the task force. _
Several conditions er abled the loosely structured task force to function well. First, the Space Station
Task Force was generally considered to be temporary. It would end once the program was approved and
the program plan was worked out. Second, the task force had a unifying mission; issues of how to
allocate resources among programs and eight field centers were not important to the members in the
early stages. Hence, parochial priorities of other programs or the centers were not prominent during this
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period. Third, compared to the centers' ongoing programs, the Space Station Task Force was relative-
ly small, enabling a common goal to develop. Fourth, since the program had not been approved, the task
force's resources were relatively minor compared to other programs. Thus, the task force was perceived
as relatively insignificant by much of the agency. Finally, both Hodge and Freitag sought to encourage
participation among their staff in the total job. _
Despite the task force's looseness, there was a method to the evolution of the working groups. A
conscious effort was made to balance the working groups in such a way that most of the centers were
represented without any one dominating, f_ The leadership of the major working groups was also
balanced across the field centers. For example, the Mission Requirements Working Group was headed
by Brian Prichard from Langle_ the PPWG was initially chaired by Lee Tilton from the Space
Technology Laboratories, and later by Jerry Craig from Johnson; the Operations Working Group was
chaired by Frank Bryan from Kennedy; and the CDG was led by Luther Powell from Marshall.
Job assignments within working groups were not rigidly specified, and more often than not people
just chose what they wanted to work on. 5e This organization, as Hoban has written, allowed for a great
deal of staffing flexibility, s7 New members could work in any or all functions for upwards of thirty days
before committing to a single job. In the process, individuals received an overview of most of NASA's
activities. This was, of course, partly driven by necessity, since the task force required skilled personnel
which in sheer numbers exceeded the agency's capability. After a while task force members with little
or no previous experience in varied areas were soon fully participating in the management of those func-
tions. "NASA employees had frequently demonstrated flexibility, but this trait was never more in demand
than during the operation of the task force. "58
With so much flexibility a sense of integration had to be developed among the various working
groups. Daily staff meetings conducted by Hodge and Freitag created this integration and became a
forum for the exchange of information across working groups and maintained a unity of purpose. 59 In
addition to the staff meetings, Hodge established a number of other mechanisms to foster integration: s0
an open door policy, whereby anyone was free to visit him and discuss matters of importance; open
meetings that anyone could attend; and open communication between the leaders and staff.
Not all the working groups had been formed at the time Beggs officially announced the
establishment of the task force. The Mission Requirements Working Group and the Systems Working
Group were the first ones created. In September 1982 the PPWG was created. Then, in April 1983,
when it became obvious that the task force would be unable to integrate much of the information
generated from other sources, the CDG was established. At this time a support contractor familiar with
NASA programs was brought on board to assist with the increasing administrative and documentation
load. sl
The creation of working groups paralleled the significant tasks of the task force which were
identified as the work proceeded. Early on it was decided that this phase of the program should
emphasize missions instead of space station architecture. This precipitated the mission analysis studies,
and its working group synthesized the results of those studies. The PPWG had the responsibility of
orchestrating a management and procurement strategy, e2 The CDG grouped the data from the trade
studies (and other sources) into sets of functional capabilities to be used in defining potential archi-
tectures. It was also influential in arriving at a cost figure for the space station program.
The task force's decision process can be defined as participative: management and staff were
allowed input on decisions that directly affected their jobs. s3 The sense of participation and individual
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involvement created withirt the task force spilled over into the senior management ranks: the task force,
through the Space Station Steering Committee, brought the associate administrators into the process and
enlisted the cooperation of the center directors.
Experiences in the ta_;k force were not uniform across the working groups. Due to the unavail-
ability of office space, the CDG, one of the last groups established, was housed a block away from the
rest of the task force. Luther PowelL its leader, had the responsibility of designing a functional capability
consistent with the $8 billion space station that had been decided upon. Although the CDG was
considered to be a remarkable success, Hoban remarked that, "many of its members did not share the
same experiences as other task force members _4 because of the physical separation of the CDG from
the rest of the task force.
The Space Station Task Force, despite its participative, open culture, was not without its problems.
The unstructured approach of the task force was not hospitable to those who could not function well
without structure. Even so.me very competent people, accustomed to working with def'med responsi-
bilities and reporting relationships, occasionally found it difficult to adjust to the dynamics of the task
force setting.
Since many of the delailees in the task force were drawn from the field centers, the task force
suffered from a constant Sauffle of personnel and the accompanying loss of continuity in its delibera-
tions. _ Some detailees also faced the problem of reentry into their respective field centers once they
left the task force, as Hodge had warned many before they joined, se
Most of the activity ot the task force centered in the PPWG and the CDG. As time went on, it
seemed that some of the i:atergroup relationships were tinged with a spirit of competition, especially
between the PPWG and thl_ CDG because the PPWG was led by Craig from Johnson and the CDG by
Powell from Marshall. 67
Accomplishments of the Task Force
The task force operated until April 6, 1984, a period of two years. (On April 6th Beggs established
the Interim Space Station Program Office.) During this period it obtained administration and
congressional approval of the space station program, completed the comprehensive mission analysis
studies, and initiated international participation. It also established several of the premises of the
program's management structure, s°
Of all its achievement_, two particularly stand out. First, consistent with Beggs' theme of space
station as the next logical step for NASA, the Space Station Task Force brought the entire agency
together and involved all the centers in the definition of the space station program. 69 For a while
parochial interests were pul aside, allowing the task force to function as a single trait for the common
good of all the centers. This helped create an internal constituency for the space station that was
essential because this progr_tm needed all of NASA behind it to make it work. Second, the Space Station
Task Force established the planning guidelines for the station for both management and engineering.
The task force accomplished several other things as well. The relationships between headquarters
and centers for managing the program were formed during this time. r0 The informal working
relationships created through the task force were the basis for other working relationships established
as the program progressed.
At the time the task force came into existence, there was internal disagreement over the
technological aspects of the _,pace station and the relative involvement of the field centers. NASA needed
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to present a unified front. 71 In order to send a co .ns_tent signal to those outside NASA, the task force
began coordinating its external presentations through viewgraphs identifying a common set of themes.
This effort was spearheaded by Terry Finn. Individuals speaking to these constituencies used many of
the same viewgraphs and very similar presentations, maintaining a consistency in what all groups were
told. Thus, consistency in external presentations was achieved during the Space Station Task Force
period, r2
The task force determined that NASA should be user-responsive both in general and in particular
in terms of hardware development. 73 Although Goddard had always been aligned with the scientific
community (as a user), the major development centers, Marshall and Johnson, underwent an educational
process, shifting the focus of their engineering talents to the users' needs rather than their own.
On the engineering side, a permanently manned presence in space meant that the station had to be
continuously habitable and should be able to grow and evolve as needed. This was an innovative idea
for NASA. It meant that once the space station had come into existence it would require not only
innovative elements for growth, but operational responsibilities such as maintenance, service, and
repair, z4
Finally, the task force assisted in the negotiations with Canada, Japan, and ESA to build the space
station. International involvement had been limited in many of NASA's previous programs, especially
in hardware development, so the fact that the internationals would be involved in developing hardware
for the space station program was to be a new experience, z5 The task force, in its two-year existence,
put in place the major management pieces of the space station program (including congressional
approval) and assured a future for the program.
Involvement of the Office of Space Science and Applications
As we have seen, Beggs was committed to rejuvenating NASA's scientific and technological
capability. Astronomers, planetary scientists, and field particle experts-'a major scientific constituency
that depended upon NASA--considered the late 1970s to be a "f'mcalpurgatory. "7¢ They blamed this
condition, in part, on the delays and cost overruns during the development of the shuttle. Beggs,
therefore, gave a high priority to revitalizing NASA's space science and application programs, a step that
was necessary in order to have this key scientific constituency back the space station program.
In chapter 1 we noted that part of the reorganization undertaken after Beggs and Mark took over
created the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) from two existing offices, the Office of
Space Science and the Office of Space Applications. For a short time in 1978 Andrew Stofan was the
associate administrator for OSSA. When Stofan became center director at Lewis in 1982, Beggs invited
Burton Edelson, a long-time friend, member of the Reagan transition team, and a former senior ,rice
president of Communications Satellite Corp. (COMSAT), to head up OSSA. rt
Burr Edelson knew he was perceived as a NASA outsider when he took over at OSSA. He believed
that his engineering background would be viewed with suspicion by NASA's scientific community. How
could an engineer, dedicated to the development and design of hardware, fully appreciate the scientists'
long-term research interests? He quickly realized that he would have to build his own credibility within
NASA and with the external scientific community.
Edelson was keenly aware of the commitment of Beggs and Mark to build the space station. He had
to help rally the agency, especially the scientists, behind this initiative. According to Edelson, Beggs'
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concept of the space staticn lacked specificity, but this was an opportunity for the scientists to become
involved in an important initiative. When Edelson took over, however, all indications were that the scien-
tific community was unfavorably disposed toward the space station. Edelson himself had to campaign
to convince the scientists to support the station7 8
Edelson's work ran parallel to the Space Station Task Force's activities. As soon as he became
associate administrator, h,z wrote to the center director at Goddard and the director at JPL to solicit
their opinions on the spac_" station program. How could it be used to further the interests of the space
science and applications group? Shortly after he wrote, however, both men resigned their positions and
left the agency.
Edelson's next mow was to involve the science community outside NASA. The older
disciplines--astronomy, sir,ace physics, and earth sciences-were independent. Scientists from these
disciplines viewed the spa_:e station as a fairy tale. By contrast, scientists in the younger disciplines (i.e.,
the life sciences and microgravity) seemed to enjoy a relatively higher degree of success with the space
shuttle and were more fa,lorably disposed toward the station7 9
In his effort to win the external scientific community, Edelson wrote to the chairmen of the Space
Science Board (SSB) and the Space Application Board (SAB), inviting them to study how the space
station could be utilized. Their initial responses were mixed. The Colorado meeting of the SSB, in
October 1983, could not determine users for the space station. The participants indicated that none of
the scientific projects that they had planned for the shuttle was planned for a space station. 80
Consequently, as far as the SSB was concerned, there was no need for a space station. The SAB was
more forthcoming. In Edelson's words, "they did a real study, produced a brochure, and built on the idea
of the polar orbiting and unmanned platforms. "81
Meanwhile, the Space Station Task Force had taken shape under Hodge, who had earlier paved the
way for user involvement by emphasizing missions and restricting task force members from delineating
design details of the station. As the task force went to work, a set of mission analysis studies looked at
how the space station coald be used. But what were the needs of the users? Edelson had written to
Hodge, noting that the mission analysis contractors should not just be aerospace companies, and Hodge
agreed (he did not want _o exclude anyone desiring to be involved). As the various studies were con-
ducted, therefore, Hodge included TRW, one of Edelson's recommendations, to be a contractor. In
addition to influencing the contractor studies, OSSA was also involved indirectly in the task force:
members from Goddard and JPL participated in its deliberations. Edelson was officially a member of
the Space Station Steering Committee, composed of associate administrators, which served as a
reference point for agency-wide concerns on the task force's progress. 82
The SSB's lukewarm response did not deter Edelson from pursuing scientific constituencies for the
station. He developed four studies, which formed a foundation on which to base further constituency-
building initiatives. Edelson then invited a committee, headed by Peter Banks of Stanford University,
to review the four studies and make recommendations on how the station could be utilized for scientific
purposes. The Banks Committee conducted a number of additional studies with subgroups drawn from
various disciplines and over time was instrumental in developing concepts for effective scientific use of
space station architecture and in publicizing the benefits of platforms and modules in the station. 83 The
idea of polar platforms subsequently caught on with the earth sciences community, which began to see
the synergy that could b_ built into missions and instruments.
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Enthusiasm over the polar platforms was not confined to scientists in the United States. The
international scientific community also became avid supporters, due in part to the international
collaboration that Beggs had strongly advocated. Domestically, organizations such as the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) understood that the space station could perform the
tasks of more expensive weather satellites in a more cost effective manner. Other agencies, such as the
United States Geological Survey and the Environmental Protection Agency, also became interested in
using the orbiting platforms.
Over time Edelson's job became easier, as he succeeded in getting the budget increased for such
programs from $900 million to over $1.5 billion. He believed that this was a way to convince NASA's
scientific community that he was enthusiastic and committed to their programs, especially in light of the
perception that he was an outsider. 84 The media noticed Edelson's success in promoting NASA's science
budget. In late 1982, various articles suggested that NASA's planetary sciences were on the rise after the
dwindling science budgets in the 1970s. 05
The Spacelab missions in 1983, which demonstrated to the microgravity and life scientists the
benefits of conducting research in space, also facilitated Edelson's job. Spacelab dramatized the poten-
tial for solar observation as well. Such successes, carefully noted by the scientists, gave the space station
a measure of acceptance in the scientific community.
Of course, the space station initiative remained uppermost in the minds of Beggs and Mark. So, as
Edelson nurtured NASA personnel, he had to do so within the framework of their initiative. Thus, the
scientific programs that he helped establish had to be developed within this major NASA initiative. For
example, within OSSA, an ongoing study focused on combining LANDSAT, SEASAT, and
WEATHERSAT into a single operation. Edelson's presentation to Beggs and Mark, describing the
potential of the combined operations, took place in 1983. This combined operation would have cost $1
billion in the 1990s. According to Edelson, it was a brilliant presentation, but at the end Beggs and Mark
privately counseled him not to undertake any major initiatives that might hinder the approval of the
space station program. _ As it turned out, Edelson turned the initial disappointment over the SAB
studies into an opportunity. The elements of the study he had advocated were later incorporated into
the station plan.
Edelson himself communicated with the Space Station Task Force in an attempt to increase the
representation of the scientific community. Perhaps more important, Edelson established close working
relationships with both Culbertson and Hodge. Formally, he transmitted SAB reports, Banks' committee
deliberations, and results of the Spacelab in memos to Culbertson and Hodge. Despite their differences,
their contacts during the constituency building days, on the whole, went smoothly. 8z
Edelson's biggest impact on the space station program was through building external scientific
constituencies. He influenced task force deliberations primarily through the communication channels that
he established with Culbertson, Hodge, and the members of the NASA scientific community represented
on the task force. Most of the external committees were funded by OSSA, which helped create a climate
for the station's approval. Edelson blunted the criticism of the space science community and enlisted the
assistance of some within that community. This was undoubtedly the major accomplishment of his
initiatives.
Edelson also worked to bring NASA's scientific community into the space station program, but had
only mixed success. There was some support, but NASA's premier scientific centers felt that more could
have been accomplished. Kenneth Frost, then deputy center director at Goddard, for example, noted
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that enthusiasm over the station was confined to the associate administrator's office, and that many at
Goddard had a relatively herd time adjusting to it.so Noel Hinners, the director at Goddard, felt that
Goddard's involvement was not nearly what it should have been. s°
OSSA also played a pa_'t later in detailing and prioritizing the space station requirements for the
requests for proposals (RFPs) during the detailed def'mition phase (Phase B studies). These
requirements ranged from :_ervicing and maintenance capabilities to polar platforms, life and micro-
gravity modules, attached payloads, and co-orbiting platforms. According to Edelson, however, the role
of OSSA in defining the stal ion's requirements was less than what he would have preferred, 90 although
OSSA did contribute to several concepts used in the station. The idea of the unmanned platforms,
especially the polar orbiting platform, can be attributed to OSSA's initiatives and were also advocated
in the Banks Committee's studies.
Finally, OSSA's key rol,_ was not confined to early space station initiatives. Subsequently, when the
Phase B RFPs were debated, OSSA contributed its own point of view, which we will explore later. In
short, one of OSSA's lasth_g contributions centered upon its activities, in conjunction with those of
Beggs, to convince an initially lukewarm scientific community to support the space station program when
it was presented for approx al to the White House and the congressional committees.
Presidential Approval
When President Reagan gave his State of the Union Message on January 25, 1984, he said, in part:
America has always been the greatest when we dare to be great. We can reach for greatness
again. We can follow our dreams to distant stars, living and working in space for peaceful, eco-
nomic, and scientific gain. Tonight I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned
space station, and to do it within a decade. 91
Now NASA could build the station.
How, in 1984, did NASA get Presidential approval for the space station program when so many
previous attempts had failea? The economic climate of the 1980s was no better than that of the 1970s.
Intensive congressional oversight persisted. The scientific community was skeptical at the outset, and the
DOD had chosen not to participate with NASA in this venture. And no one could accuse David
Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, of generosity toward NASA. Against such
formidable odds, the agency had won a major victory, one that NASA would cherish for years to come.
From a management point of view one can find four key reasons for the success of the initiative:
the role of the President, B::ggs' strategy for the space station, the role of the Space Station Task Force,
and OSSA's management of external committees.
Historically, President.,. of the United States, with few e_ceptions, have not been comfortable with
science and technology. As a consequence, most presidents since John F. Kennedy have not had science
advisors in the White House. Was Ronald Reagan different? According to Jim Beggs, indeed he was.
Reagan quickly grasped the significance of the space station program, and Beggs interpreted for him the
importance of the initiatiw;. 92
Beggs' style and strategy, and that of his deputy, Hans Mark, also played a role in the success story.
Both had excellent political connections, formal and informal, in Washington. Externally, Beggs adopted
a low key style, patiently waiting for his constituencies to support the program, and quietly explaining
the program's importance to the President. Beggs was thus able to counterbalance the space scientists'
initial hostilities. Under his leadership, NASA invited Canada, Japan, and ESA to join the program,
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although the programmatic specifics were left unclear. When DOD parted company with NASA, BeRgs
did not hesitate to go to the President. 0o Approaching the President directly was a strategy that had
failed once before, and carried with it the risk that influential government agencies would disapprove
and withhold support for NASA. In retrospect, the risk was well worth taking.
Perhaps Mark's greatest contributions to the approval of the space station was that he backed Beggs
(through effective lobbying in Washington) in making the station their number one priority. Mark also
helped set up the initial structure for the space station program at headquarters through Culbertson, the
Fletcher Committee, and the Space Station Steering Committee. 04
Beggs' leadership style permitted the Space Station Task Force to operate as a vibrant part of the
effort to win the program's approval. The task force's location at headquarters minimized NASA's
intercenter rivalries. Under Hodge's democratic leadership, the Space Station Task Force projected the
appearance of unity to outsiders. As we elaborated earlier, the task force's emphasis on missions and
agency-wide involvement helped keep the internal struggles (among the centers) in check. Further, with
external representation coordinated through both NASA personnel and the task force an image of
internal harmony was projected.
Finally, NASA's external committees became effective advocates of the program. The Fletcher
Committee, the first such committee to be appointed, recommended a subtle approach to "selling" the
program. The external committees of OSSA reduced the initial antagonism of the scientific community.
Edelson, for example, argued that the Banks Committee eventually became a more effective advocate
of the program among the space scientists than NASA itself. 06 Despite significant opposition from space
science, a group of scientists came to support the space station program. This in itself was an impressive
achievement.
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PART II
DESIGN OF THE MANAGEMENT EXPERIMENT

CHAPTER 3
MANAGEMENT AND PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES
Even in early 1982, deliberations had begun at headquarters regarding the management and
procurement strategies ol the space station program once the initiative was successful. Management
strategy referred to orga_ization structure, allocation of work and responsibility, and phasing of the
program. Procurement de'_lt with issues of contractor involvement. The early discussions focused on the
diversity of the field cente:rs, management structure, NASA's experience with the location of program
management in the Apollo and shuttle projects, and the recommendations of the recently completed
Hearth Committee Repo_ t. These four factors also affected the deliberations held within the Program
Planning Working Group a part of the Space Station Task Force.
The Centers
Since its creation in late 1958 NASA has evolved into a complex organization with multiple field
centers, each with its own unique expertise, organizational heritage, and way of conducting business.
NASA's predecessor was the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). NASA inherited
from NACA the premier aeronautical research and technology centers of Langley, Ames, and Lewis?
After NASA was formed, Goddard Space Flight Center was added, focusing on scientific research,
particularly space astronomy and space physics. The von Braun rocket team in the 1950s had been
housed at Redstone Arseaal in Huntsville, Alabama, a part of which later became the Marshall Space
Flight Center. Marshall later won acclaim as an engineering center. With the big thrust of the Apollo
project during the Kennedy era, NASA built up two development centers, Marshall and Johnson Space
Center. Because the astrc.naut contingent was located in Houston, Johnson became the flagship center
for the manned elements of the space program. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the technology and
research centers were seen as centers for unmanned programs and the development centers were
viewed as the centers for manned programs. 2
Although each center worked on development as well as research, each had its own areas of
expertise. Langley, Ames, and Lewis focused on the development of advanced technology and became
advocates for continuing innovation of the technology available to NASA's major programs. The
development centers, Man,shall and Johnson, were engineering oriented, focusing on the deployment of
existing technologies for r_aannedelements of the space programs. The leading science center, Goddard,
was involved with the scientific community, responding to scientists' needs rather than only focusing on
operations. 3
NASA Management Structure
Over the years, NASA had evolved a three-tiered structure for managing significant programs within
the agency. The first tier, which might be described as the institutional tier, was responsible for general
oversight, directing studies, and performing the functions required by NASA in its interface with
Congress, the White House, and the Office of Management and Budget, and insulated program manage-
ment from the political p_essures of Washington. 4 The second tier, program management, coordinated
the projects carried on in the various field centers. The third tier, the project offices, were usually
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located at the field centers and managed the contractors who did the development work but fell outside
the boundaries of NASA's organizational structure.
Apollo and Shuttle Projects
NASA's missions expanded during the 1960s and 1970s, and the diversity of the field centers
increased as well. Before the Apollo Project, NASA's primary focus was on research in science and
technology. With Apollo NASA became intimately involved in major development work in a manned
program. Developing the Space Transportation System (STS), with its shuttle orbiter, brought
operational involvement to NASA. Although there have been selected efforts to fmd outside organi-
zations (private sector or joint, as in the case of COMSAT in its early days) to take over the operations
of the shuttle so that NASA engineers could concentrate on innovating, rather than operating, such
efforts have been largely unsuccessful, s These changing missions have meant that NASA has moved from
its original NACA tradition of research in technology and science into development work and, finally,
into operations.
NASA employed different management structures in the Apollo and shuttle orbiter projects.
Although the major programs all consisted of three tiers, there were differences in terms of relationships
among the tiers and their locations within the agency. Apollo was managed from headquarters. This
meant that the Washington office had not only responsibility for the first tier, interfacing with Con-
gress and the White House, but also for the second tier, i.e., program management. 6
After 1969, following the Apollo project, the economic climate became increasingly austere, and
NASA's labor force decreased significantly. It was difficult for headquarters to carry out political leader-
ship and program management functions simultaneously. 7 In addition, increasing congressional oversight
throughout the 1970s meant that headquarters had to focus more and more on politics and less on
management. As a result, program management functions began to be delegated to the field centers. 8
In the shuttle project the lead center concept was employed, with the program management function
located at one of the centers. Application of the lead center concept also implied that one field center
would direct the activities of other centers with respect to the program at hand.
The use of a lead center in the shuttle project was a matter of expedience and necessity rather than
the belief that it was the ideal form of organization. 9 The shuttle project involved major development
work, did not have much user interaction, and had what came to be known within NASA as clean
interfaces. Clean interfaces meant that the work could be split into more or less self-contained units that
could be handled at separate centers. 10 Furthermore, in a time of tightening budgets, it seemed more
efficient to put field center people to work on the systems engineering and integration task, those tasks
for which the development centers of Marshall and Johnson were very well suited. The lead center
concept seemed appropriate for the changing circumstances of the shuttle project and the environment
in which NASA operated. 11
In 1982 NASA consisted of a relatively mature work force, and many remembered the Apollo days.
The shuttle, of course, was also fresh in their minds because it still involved the agency's developmental
and operational activities. As a result, two alternatives of organizing a program were known to NASA
employees. 12 These options were 1) the Apollo model of organization, whereby headquarters had the
role of program management in addition to its political tasks; and 2) the shuttle model of the lead center
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concept, whereby the progr._m office was separate from headquarters and managed out of a field center
(in this instance, Johnson).
With budget overruns and schedule delays in the shuttle project, many Apollo veterans looked back
to Apollo as an example of the "good old days .'13 To these individuals the direction from headquarters
was a necessary prerequisite._ to effective program management because intercenter coordination cannot
be accomplished by any one center alone. To others, who had observed the increasing political pressures
on NASA and the reduced budgets that went along with it, the decentralization via the lead center
concept represented the best way of managing multicenter programs. 14They believed that technical work
could not be performed effectively in Washington, D.C. At the beginning of the space station program,
the lead center idea was widely accepted at Johnson, which had accumulated "suffident" experience in
the application of this concept in the shuttle. 15
Although the shuttle contractors were not involved in resolving management issues with respect to
the lead center approach, they felt that the way the lead center had been assigned for the shuttle had
affected their chances to w_n hardware contracts. 16 For exaraple, the detailed definition (Phase B) for
the shuttle was conducted before the lead center was designated. As a result, when a single contractor
was chosen for the shuttle's development at the conclusion of the definition phase, many contractors felt
that Rockwell won because it had worked closely with Johnson. Contractors such as McDonnell-
Douglas, therefore, were always concerned that postponement of the lead center decision until after the
definition studies would adversely affect their contract's chances of acceptance. _7
The Hearth Committee Report
The space station initiative was affected by another major event at NASA, the Hearth Committee
Report. 18This committee, which was formed in response to congressional concerns regarding cost and
budget overruns in NASA programs during the late 1970s, was headed by Donald Hearth, then center
director at Langley, and consisted of personnel from through NASA. The Hearth Committee investigated
fifteen projects (not including the shuttle) and concluded that as the management interfaces within
programs increased in complexity, the tendency for budget and schedule overruns increased corres-
pondingly. 1° The Hearth Committee recommended that a detailed definition phase (Phase B) be
included in any major program. Prior to this, the Phase B studies had been conducted in a short period
of time, and had sometimes led to multiple def'mitions, often extending into the design and develop-
ment stage. As the Hearth Committee recommendations were introduced in 1981, they provided a
backdrop to space station program deliberations.
Program Management Decisions
The diversity of the field centers, the three-tiered model of organization, the memories of the Apollo
and the shuttle program m_nagement, and the Hearth Committee recommendations all influenced the
members of the Space Station Task Force as they began to deliberate the management and procurement
strategies for the station in early 1982. The deliberations were conducted in an atmosphere of
uncertainty. No program existed because presidential approval had not yet been given. John Hodge had
directed the members of th_ Space Station Task Force not to draw any pictures of the space station so
no one would attempt to design the space station prematurely, g0 The mission analysis studies had just
started, and the system requirements were being refined by one of the working groups associated with
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the task force. Even though management deliberations occurred during this period, nobody knew the
nature of the program they were going to manage.
Although it was not directly obvious to many members of the task force, the convictions of several
top NASA officials had already been formed. These became crucial factors in major management
decisions later on. Deputy Administrator Mark had been a center director at Ames, was extremely sensi-
tive to the changing political circumstances, and believed that much of NASA's technical expertise lay
in the centers. He preferred that the program management be located at one of the field centers and
felt that headquarters' real function was to persuade the other centers to work with the lead center, not
manage the program itself. He also believed that headquarters should represent NASA in Congress and
with other governmental agencies, and should also develop and formulate programs. Once the decision
had been made to go ahead with a program, according to Mark, then the centers should be responsible
for actually managing the project. 21
In retrospect, it is apparent that Mark's convictions were not shared by Hodge as the task force was
formally organized in May of 1982. As a result, as Hodge began to consider program management, he
thought several alternatives needed to be developed and debated. In July 1982, just two months after
the formation of the task force, Hodge identified the major management issue confronting the space
station program: to develop procurement and management strategies. _"
Even in these early days most NASA personnel accepted the three-tiered concept envisioned for the
program. The first tier, looking out and directing, would be Washington's job. The third tier, in charge
of directing the work of the contractors, would be located at the field centers. However, there were
questions about the location of the second tier--to be called Level B--which was to take charge of pro-
gram management. 23 Should it be located in a science center, a technology center, a development center,
or at headquarters? If it was to be a science center, then it would be Goddard. If it was a technology
center, then it had to be Langley. If it was a development center, then it could be either Marshall or
Johnson. Or perhaps program management could be at a new center, or at headquarters itself. Hodge
felt that if the lead center concept was chosen, the centers would not work for each other. They would
say they would, but they really wouldn't. And he believed that NASA's previous experiences indicated
that he was correct. 24
In early 1982, the media had hinted at major changes in NASA's organization. The problems with
shuttle and the space telescope had drawn particular attention, and the task force members considered
this when they discussed the organizational structure for the space station. 25 First, they explored the idea
of creating another center. That didn't seem like a good idea, so they then looked at creating a sort of
"center within a center." That idea was also rejected. "And then we sort of came up with the idea that
we would take a neutral center and put the program office in that center but have it report to
headquarters. _6 According to Hodge, it did not matter which center housed the program office as long
as it reported to headquarters. "We could have it in Houston at Level B. To me it would have been
perfectly okay if it reported to headquarters. _7
During these early discussions, Culbertson, Hodge, Robert Freitag, and several other task force
members, including Terry Finn, were involved. Although Hodge had not taken a position on the location
of program management, by September 1982 some in the task force believed that Culbertson had
decided to put Level B at Johnson Space Center in Houston. 28 The political fallout of such a move was
not lost on the task force members. Finn argued that it would be premature to cut Marshall out of con-
tention for the lead center. If the Alabama Congressional delegation learned about this decision, they
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might withhold support for the space station initiative. In a memo that came to be known as "Don't Deal
Marshall Away," Finn stressed that Marshall personnel should have an opportunity to present their
reasons why the assignment should not go to Houston, to respond to what were perceived as Marshall's
shortcomings, and to tell why Marshall should be assigned Level B responsibility for the new space
station program. _
The Program Planning Working Group
The task of detailing the procurement and management strategies for the space station program fell
to the Program Planning Working Group (PPWG), one of the subgroups within the task force. Because
of the importance of pro_;ram planning, this working group was chaired initially by Freitag, Hedge's
deputy. He later delegated this responsibility to Lee Tilton, reserving for himself the chairmanship of
the Program Review Corn mittee.
Tilton had not partici pated in any of the earlier discussions concerning organizational structure,
including those on the lead center concept. As a result, when he took charge of the PPWG he did not
ask if the lead center would be at Houston, but whether there would be a lead center at all. And he
dealt with other major management issues as well. "One was the lead center issue, that was a big one.
Another one was the way to divide the program. The third was how the program should evolve over the
phases. "30
The PPWG under Tilton consisted of personnel from headquarters and all the field centers except
Langley and Ames. The I?PWG did not report directly to Beggs, but instead interacted with Hodge,
director of the task force, who had frequent contact with Beggs. Hedge interpreted Beggs' thinking for
the PPWG. Accordingly, even though the PPWG did not communicate with Beggs directly, Beggs' Views
were known and influene,_d many of their decisions. It was clear to the PPWG that the major tasks of
the space station program required a combination of NASA personnel and contractors. Thus, by
specifying the functions o;f the program office it also identified the activities of the contractors, and vice
versa.
Two other factors also had to be considered: the guidelines under which the management and pro-
curement strategies had t :_be orchestrated, and the timing of these strategic decisions. 3_ By September
1982, the guidelines had already been defined by Hodge, Beggs, and Mark, and Hodge had
communicated them to the PPWG (see figure 1). They included the program's characteristics, the evolu-
tionary capability of the $15-10 billion limit, and the specific budget constraints for the three ensuing fiscal
years. 32
The Space Station T_tsk Force had assumed that it would be out of business by September 1983, and
the definition contracts would begin by November of that year. This was not to be the case. 3'3
Nevertheless, the PPWG began its deliberations based on this early approval date. If the program was
to be approved in a year, internal management decisions had to be made by the time the definition
contracts started. This lent urgency to the PPWG's activities.
Since the constituency-building for the station paralleled the PPWG's deliberations, the PPWG did
not have the benefit of a configuration on which to base the program's definition phase. Tilton explained:
In the requirement .,.tudies Hodge forbade contractors to draw a picture of the space station.
Nobody was to do anything or say anything about what a space station was. The only issue was
why do you need to have people permanently in orbit? What are they going to do? What would
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the facility do that _vould serve them? What kinds of functions would it perform? What
products, what activities? That was all. Nobody could draw any pictures of any space stations
because as soon as yc,u draw a picture you could start to conjure up in your mind what the thing
is and you revert back into the engineering situation where we say we're goin,_ to build that neat
looking thing there, ;rod we will figure out later what it is supposed to do."
The PPWG deliberations reached several conclusions. First, the management strategy would affect
the role of the field cent¢rs and headquarters and the way they related to each other. Second, an early
launch option was not feasible because it would mean that the contractors would have to be brought on
board prematurely. If that happened, the Hearth Committee's recommendation for the detailed defini-
tion period would have been disregarded, and NASA might revert back to its old way of conducting
business, which the Hearth Committee had roundly criticized. Third, the systems engineering and
integration function was important in the management strategy. 3s These deliberations raised more
questions relating to the systems engineering and integration (SE&I) function than they answered,
however. Where should this function be located--at headquarters or the field centers? Should a
contractor assist the program office in this function? Should the function be performed primarily in
house or be contracted cut entirely?
The PPWG was concerned with alternatives for staging the program over phases. 36 Although four
different options for space station program phasing were considered, the option including an expanded
definition phase was preferred. This decision was an outgrowth of the Hearth Committee's earlier
recommendations.
One of the major factors affecting the discussions of procurement strategy was Beggs' decision that
any strategy that focused on a single prime contractor wa:; unacceptable. Beggs reasoned,
When you build a building or build a house you have a general contractor. The general
contractor in this case was going to be NASA [because] NASA knows better than anybody we
could hire what should go into the space station and what its requirements should be. Then we
hire the subcontractors, in effect, to come in and do that work. I felt sooner or later we would
have to take on a sy.,tems contractor, somebody outside who would be able to do the systems
design and system conceptualization activity, because, while NASA is pretty good overseeing
work done, complex things, they are not terribly good at the detailed system analysis or design
work. So I felt that sooner or later we would take on a systems contractor, but first I wanted
to get the thing off the ground. 37
Beggs did not want only one contractor for another reason. He had always maintained that NASA
would build the space stlltion by the yard. It was important, therefore, to keep NASA's constituencies
on its side for a considerable time. If one contractor was selected quite early in the program, then some
of the constituencies (otLer contractors, for example) might show little interest in supporting the space
station over the program's later phases. As Beggs explained, "I certainly was not unaware of the poli-
tical power of the geographically spread contractors. "38 Beggs felt it would be advantageous to main-
tain the interest of a larg_: group of contractors rather than commit to only one early in the space station
program. This was especially important if the station wits to be constructed by the yard. Thus did
programmatic reasons complement constituency concerns:
[In the case of the shuttle project[, there is no alternative source. Therefore the administrator
cannot threaten Rockwell. No one else could .... [This means] there is no other source of infor-
mation: if you ask a question, if somebody within NASA doesn't know the answer, there is no
place to go ]except the contractor]. So we've got no alternative information source. You've got
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no way of knowing whether it is a carefully thought out answer, a hasty answ.a_r, or even an
outright lie. You've got no choice but to believe what the contractor tells you.--
Systems Engineering and Integration
In his confu'mation hearings Beggs had indicated that his goals for the agency included revitalizing
its engineering capabilities. Unlike the shuttle program, the station program's systems SE&I function
was to be performed in-house, possibly with the help of a support contractor. This underscored Beggs'
goal of revitalizing the technical capabilities of the agency as well.
The job of outlining the SE&I function was given to Jerry Craig, a member of the PPWG from the
Johnson Space Center. 4° He could not help but be influenced by the Apollo and shuttle projects,
although SE&I functions in these two had been performed differently. In the case of the Apollo project,
a single SE&I organization was responsible for the total system and was completely within the program
office at headquarters. In the case of the shuttle, the SE&I organization was part of Level B (located
at Johnson), and, therefore, SE&I was primarily conducted and managed by Johnson personnel. The
shuttle project involved three field centers, Marshall Johnson, and Kennedy. The hardware development
took place at Marshall and Johnson, while Kennedy launched the shuttle.
The systems engineering function in the space station program was anticipated to be more complex
than the earlier projects. As envisioned, the station would incorporate manned and unmanned elements
and would have a capability to grow and evolve. The international involvement significantly added to the
complexity of the SE&I job.
Craig delineated two options for SE&I. In the first, headquarters managed and conducted the SE&I
function; in the second, the center with the lead center responsibility managed SE&I. At this stage he
assumed that in either option a support contractor would be hired, as had been the case in Apollo,
where Bell Communications had supported the SE&I function. 41
Although the PPWG was not authorized to make any decisions, it stressed the difficulty of locating
the SE&I function at headquarters. If SE&I were located at headquarters for the space station program,
the number of technical personnel located there would have to be increased significantly. To do this,
NASA would have to move qualified civil service personnel from the field centers to headquarters.
Systems engineers were among NASA's most prized talent. 42 Since all the field centers were
involved in ongoing programs, the systems engineers at each center were valued quite highly. If these
civil servants were brought to headquarters, it could only be done with the cooperation of the center
directors, who would have to relinquish their most valued resources to the space station program. Thus,
the internal political question remained: would the center directors give up their systems engineering
talent to benefit the space station during the definition phase?
Advanced Development
As a part of the space station program management, the PPWG deliberated over the role of the
space station advanced development. In 1982 the SSTSC had developed a position on the station's
technological development. Advanced development of technology had to be an integral part of the entire
program. 43
The problem of addressing the management of advanced development was given to Ron Thomas,
a member of the PPWG from Lewis, one of the technology centers. Thomas presented three options:
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1) the Space Station Task Force would manage the program by itself; 2) the task force would share the
management with the Offi,:e of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST); and 3) OAST would be
responsible for meeting the; station's advanced development requirements. Thomas apparently favored
the third approach. 44
In early 1983, Tilton h tnded over chairmanship of the PPWG to Jerry Craig. Craig had been sent
to Washington to lead the Johnson detailees and to take a stronger position for Johnson in the task
force. 45 A perception existed that Johnson was not participating in the task force, and Craig hoped to
change it. He was quite successful, bending over backwards not to be too opinionated in favor of
Johnson's position. Before long others came to him "asking for advice and counsel and how should we
do this, can you get the guys down at Houston to help us with this and so on." This was entirely different
from when Craig first went to Washington. 4¢
Under Craig's stewarciship, the PPWG produced a white paper exploring NASA's organizational
choices with respect to fae SE&I function. 47 Beggs' earlier decision not to have a single prime
contractor had eliminated Ihe option of relegating SE&I to an outside contractor. Therefore, NASA had
to locate SE&I either at headquarters or at one of the field centers. If the SE&I function was located
at one of the centers, then that center de facto would be the lead center.
Accomplishment of the Program Planning Working Group
The PPWG focused exclusively on the programmatic aspects of the space station to the exclusion
of institutional factors that later dominated the decisions related to organization and management. How-
ever, in presenting the pr,:_grammatic perspective, the PPWG accomplished several things. 4a First, it
identified the guidelines for engineering and program management. Second, the various phases of the
program were identified, iacluding requirements and analysis, definition, development, and operations.
The PPWG emphasized the need for an extended definition phase for the program.
Third, the PPWG outlined options for resource management--how the budget could be allocated
across various levels of the: program and over the phases. Although some options were discarded later
on, these became the basis on which judgments could be made. Fourth, a number of acquisition
approaches were identified for the three program phases. The advantages and disadvantages of four
basic approaches were studied and evaluated, and narrowed to two. The first option was similar to the
one employed in the space orbiter project. In the second option NASA kept systems engineering and
integration and definition :)f development level requirements in house. NASA subsequently adopted the
second approach.
And finally, the PPWG clarified the activities involved in the management of the program, including
SE&I. The PPWG refin_d the management options confronting NASA, one with headquarters in
control, and the other the lead center concept.
Although the PPWG did not have the authority to make decisions, it influenced the program for
years to come by its work in selecting and refining options and presenting them to the institutional
leadership for adoption. I)ecision-making is often characterized as selecting from a set of alternatives.
The process, in reality, is far more complex and involves setting up premises, defining, comparing, and
choosing alternatives, and implementation. Viewed in this context, although the PPWG did not adopt
a specific option, its legacy to the space station program consisted of refining the alternatives that would
be debated by NASA's institutional leadership.
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CHAPTER 4
BROADENING INVOLVEMENT IN SPACE STATION PLANNING
As the Program Plan:_ng Working Group (PPWG) explored options for managing the space station
program, other discussio)_s were taking place at headquarters and the field centers. These discussions
dealt with the part NASA's leadership-the administrator and field center directors-'would play.
Although the program had not yet been approved, the agency's leaders began to see how important their
management decisions gould be. The center directors were very aware that with management came
decision-making authority and control of resources.
As we have seen in (:hapter 3, the viewpoint of the deputy administrator, Hans Mark, had already
been formed, although it was not immediately seen by the task force. At headquarters discussions
regarding program management initially took place between John Hodge, the director of the Space
Station Task Force, and Phil Culbertson, the associate deputy administrator.
It was apparent by this time that Culbertson preferred the lead center option? From the
programmatic point of view, however, Hodge felt that Washington should be in charge of the program
management during the definition period? Culbertson pointed out the lack of essential technical
resources at headquarters, while Hodge maintained that it was impossible for a lead center to be
objective because there _,:as likely to be a conflict of interest?
Hodge had at one time proposed other options for program management. One was to locate the
program management at Goddard Space Flight Center. Since the program was to be user-driven, and
since Goddard was closer to the scientific community, the choice of Goddard made programmatic
sense. 4 Hodge had approached Noel Hinners, the center director at Goddard, to discuss locating the
program management function there. Hinners discouraged the idea because physical space was limited
at Goddard, and the spa(:e station program was considered, at least by Hinners, to be "aminor element
of the work at Goddard, not a major onef s
As Culbertson and I-lodge wrestled with the question of where to locate program management, they
first tried to find a comp_omise. One option offered was to locate the function at a center which did not
have development responsibilities. Such a center would not be perceived by other field centers as having
a bias in decisions invol'_ing the development of the space station. If this option were to be adopted,
Culbertson and Hodge _kgreed that Langley Research Center would be the logical choice. Culbertson
talked with Donald Hearth, Langley's center director. Culbertson noted that Hearth was not particularly
eager to have Langley h:)use Level B, "but he said he would do it if the agency asked him to. "e
Langley seemed to be an ideal place to locate the program management. There would be no
development responsibilities assigned to Langley, and the center had a longstanding and excellent
technological reputation that dated back to the NACA days. It was not clear, however, whether program
management would remain at Langley for the duration of the program. It was generally understood that
the program management office would be located there for at least the length of the extended defini-
tion period, or 18 months to 2 years?' It was not clear what would happen after the extended definition
period. Langley would have some 50 to 100 of its staff involved, however, and if the lead center were
moved after the extended definition period, then Langley might lose those employees, s That would be
disruptive at Langley and cost them personnel as well.
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In addition to the instability that might be created by smiling personnel, it seems that Langley's
background may have influenced Hearth as well. Langley's capabilities lay primarily in technology
development, and only secondarily in development activity. In addition, some of Langley's previous
experiences in development work did not make Hearth eager to take on any more such work. 9
Other center directors were also defining their positions at this time. As soon as he became the
director of the Lewis Research Center in 1982, Andrew Stofan instituted a center-wide planning process
to lay the groundwork for Lewis' involvement in the space station program. Strategic planning at Lewis
had been completed by the beginning of 1983. l° Lewis personnel wanted the center to be involved in
space station development work. According to Stofan, Lewis would bid for development work related
to power in the space station program. 11
Stofan knew Lewis was not perceived in Washington to be a development center. This perception
persisted despite Lewis' involvement in the development work on Atlas and Titan (major Air Force
programs). In his opinion, the assignment of space station power systems to Lewis could do the most
to change this perception. He didn't feel Lewis could handle the lead center job, especially with little
support in Washington, so he chose not to pursue that assignment. 12
As discussions about space station management continued, Gerald Griffin, 13 the center director at
Johnson, considered that center's involvement. Johnson was, at that time, heavily involved in the shuttle.
NASA personnel had always considered the "five barons" of Johnson Space Center to be powerful
figures, TMand in order not to upset the institutional power base at Johnson, Griffin first needed to assess
the reactions of these five men before he bid for the lead center assignment. They all met with Griffin
to discuss whether they felt Johnson should compete for lead center or not. There was some reluctance
and concern, but they all decided that they wanted Johnson to be the lead center. 1_ With the
institutional support of Johnson behind him, Griffin then bid for the lead center assignment.
Enlisting the support of the organization, however, was different from actually securing the lead
center assignment. He needed support in Washington as well. Griffin was not a novice in this and was
cognizant of the political pressures within the Beltway. He kept open his channels of communication
with Jerry Craig, head of the PPWG. In fact, whenever he went to the Capital, the two met informally. 16
Griffin recognized that either Marshall or Johnson could handle the lead center responsibility, and
either could do it well. He thought Johnson would be the better choice because it had manned system
experience and housed the astronauts. During this time Griffin worked around the agency and at head-
quarters to establish support for Johnson as lead center. 1;' Meetings at Wallops and Langley took place
while Hodge and Culbertson were trying to decide the appropriate location for the program
management, and the center directors staked out their positions on the management of the space station
program.
During 1983 the task force continued to function as a promotional organization as well as one
dedicated to charting out the preliminary details of the space station program. The task force was
insulated from institutional concerns and had adopted an exclusively programmatic perspective, although
members passed information on to their respective superiors at headquarters and the field centers.
Hodge continued working to build the rationale for the station on missions. The mission analysis
contract was awarded, and the contractors completed their mission analysis studies by the start of
1983.18
By April of 1983 Beggs, with the help of the CDG, had arrived at an $8 billion estimate for the
initial operating capability of the space station. 19 This $8 billion figure meant additional problems for
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NASA. 2° The station thai Beggs wanted, and as Poweil had costed it at that time, was already over the
$8 billion figure. This left no room for error or adjustment. Because there was no flexibility, costs would
have to be tightly controlled during the design and development phase of the station, and only the
slightest deviations from cost estimates could be tolerated in the future.
To identify the cost drivers (the few elements of the program contributing the largest share of the
costs) for the CDG, Frank Hoban, a member of the task force, felt that the program management
community--the real program managers--ought to get together at Wallops and discuss the matter. Once
the cost drivers were identified, then the CDG could tackie what should be done about them. 21 At le
insistence of Freitag and Hodge, Hobart enlarged the agenda for the meeting to include management-
related issues. _
In early 1983, Hodge and Culbertson were still not in agreement whether the program management
should be at headquarters or one of the field centers. By that time, of course, the task force was begin-
ning to see indications treat the program might finally be approved by the White House, and the need
for institutional involverrent in the program was becoming crucial. Hodge was aware of this fact and
delegated the recruitmen': of institutional leaders to Hoban. 23 The task force members, including Hobart,
were quite concerned abi:_utthe perception of personnel in some centers that they had little to do with
the station. Internal con,fituency building was still needed as well.
Hoban took responsibility for planning two meetings with the help of Louis DeAngelis, who headed
the Office of Human Re,;ources and Development in Washington, D.C. The first meeting would involve
the deputy directors front the centers and personnel working on various projects and be held at Wallops
Island Flight Center in August. The second meeting would involve the center directors and associate
administrators and be hc:ld at Langley Research Center in September.
The Meeting at Wallops, August 1983
The Space Station Management Colloquium was held from August 29 to September 1, 1983 at
Wallops. The main purpose of this meeting, as presented in the briefings, was to determine major cost
drivers that could be anticipated, conditions that create those cost drivers, and options available and
their implications for m_,naging effectively. 24 The meeting was attended by key members of the project
management community at NASA, deputy center directors, Associate Deputy Administrator Culbertson,
and the director of the ,';pace Station Task Force, Hodge.
Culbertson posed several questions to the group. How could the costs of the space station program
be contained? Did NASA have the in-house capability to handle the SE&I job in the program? How
could the agency maximize its resources? What was the most effective interface between headquarters
and the centers? What ,,/ere the implications of user interface and operational considerations? 25
Management considerations, not cost drivers, came to the forefront in the discussions, however. Part
of the reason Hodge had agreed to hold the management colloquium was to gauge the mood of the field
centers. This came ou! loud and clear in the meeting. The clearest recollections of this meeting
remaining today is the discussion of the location of program management (Level B). _ Most participants
believed that the locating of management at headquarlers, and the major SE&I function included
therein, was inadvisable because the technical expertise required did not exist there. The consensus of
those present was that SE&I could effectively be assumed by the civil servants without having a major
contractor. No center, however, would be able to provide: all the SE&I personnel. 27
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Astheworkshoprogressed,thelikelymagnitudeoftheprogrambecameapparent. 28 However, by
the close of the workshop it was clear that the center representatives felt that Level B functions should
be located at a center. Im
The issue of reporting relationships between program management and headquarters was not
cleared up at the colloquium either. Although no final decisions were made at Wallops, the preference
for lead center for the space station program seemed to have gained widespread acceptance. 'They were
saying we would rather not work under technical direction from headquarters and the way to make sure
that we don't is to do it [the lead center way]. "3°
From headquarters' point of view, however, the lead center concept also posed problems. If the
program office were located at one of the centers and reported to headquarters the center director's
responsibility for the program would be diffused; he could not be held accountable for the resources that
were allocated to program management. 31 The center director could also withhold resources from the
project, arguing that it was headquarters' responsibility. It was not clear how the field centers would
cooperate with one another, especially when one center controlled the program office. Headquarters,
therefore, faced a dilemma: whichever option it selected had severe restrictions.
The Wallops meeting set the tone for the Langley meeting which followed. As.the leaders of the
field centers also began to understand the magnitude of the problem, lobbying for the lead center took
place in earnest. Ames and Kennedy never wanted the lead center role, and Langley, Goddard, and
Lewis had decided not to compete for the lead center. That left Marshall and Johnson to compete for
the lead center assignment.
Two factors affected the resulting alliances among the center directors. First, three of the center
directors--Andrew Stofan, Noel Hinners, and Gerald Griff'm--were Beggs' appointments. In addition,
seven of the eight center directors had served time in Washington, understood it, and didn't want pro-
gram control to be located there. 32 Second, the current projects at the field centers influenced the
positions of their directors. By 1983, Stofan had decided to bid for the power system in the space station
program. Thus, Lewis would be in direct competition with Marshall for the power module. 33 Goddard
and Marshall shared responsibility for the Hubble Space Telescope, which was at the time experiencing
serious problems, and Hinners may have been concerned that locating the lead center at Marshall would
hurt that program.
As the perception was created that the lead center was the way to manage the program, it also
became apparent that there would be only two contenders, Marshall and Johnson. By then Griffin had
rallied Johnson behind him in his bid for the assignment. As Griffin surveyed the participants, he con-
cluded that Lewis was likely to support Johnson. Hinners may not have been as strongly supportive, but
"since, in some respects, he [Goddard] and Marshall were in competition," Hinners was seen to support
Johnson also. 34 Dick Smith from Kennedy had personal connections to both Lucas and Griffin, and
could go either way. This left Hearth of Langley, who could be a very important person in deciding
where the lead center would go. So Griffin began to talk with Hearth about the lead center assignment.
Although prior to these meetings Stofan had established a forum for the center directors, historically
they did not often have a place where they could develop positions on issues of common concern. Stofan
and Hinners, the directors at Lewis and Goddard, realized the importance of such a forum. 35 The
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stability of NASA lay at the centers since the turnover in Washington often created instability there.
Stofan, therefore, argued tllat since the directors represented 20,000 people and Washington represented
only 1,600 people, the centers ought to have major input into the decision-making process. This was
achieved by the center directors meeting independently in a process established by Stofan. These were
"meetings where just the center directors would get together to talk about common problems."
Headquarters did not dis(x)urage these gatherings because it was the general feeling that "the center
directors couldn't get along with each other because they were all trying to get the same piece of the
pie." Stofan knew this was not the case, though, because they had a common "foe," Washington. 3e
The center directors had two broad issues to tackle. The first concerned relationships among the
centers themselves. Since _:he major NASA programs involved cooperation among several field centers
and the directors had differing perspectives on the matter of intercenter cooperation, this issue was not
satisfactorily addressed in the forum that Stofan and Hinners had created. The second issue before the
center directors concerned the relationship of the centers to headquarters, an issue common to all.
Because it was a common problem, the center directors spent most of their time discussing this second
issue. Stofan noted, "It w_ts very obvious once we had a couple of meetings that the common things
became far more important. _r If this pattern were repeated at the Langley meeting, it would be an
opportunity for the directors to make their views known regarding the lead center decision.
The Meeting at Langley, September 1983
Phil Culbertson and the center directors met at Langley Research Center on September 22 and 23,
1983. Culbertson opened the colloquium by telling the group that James Beggs and Hans Mark wanted
their collective advice and opinions on the major management issues involving the space station program.
Although they were not a decision-making body, Culbertson wanted them to identify the major
management issues on which they agreed and disagreed and to make recommendations to Beggs and
Mark, who were to join the meeting later. 38
As part of this process, Hodge presented a program update, outlining the deliberations of the
PPWG. Later on, Paul Holloway, deputy director of Langley Research Center, summarized the meeting
held at Wallops. _ At the ¢:nd of the first day the center directors announced that they planned to meet
separately before they me_ with the main group the following day. 40 To Stofan and Hinners this was
merely a continuation of the forum they had earlier established, but it came as a surprise to others
attending the colloquium. 'tl Some thought the center directors had assumed control of the meeting.
Hodge perceived it as the center directors making a deal among themselves based on how they wanted
the space station to be mar, aged. 42 Some interpreted this separate meeting to mean that Culbertson had
been removed from the decision-making process. 4"3Most of these people, however, were not aware of
the previous meetings of the directors without the associate administrators or anyone from headquarters.
According to Stofan, the separate meeting was requested so that the center directors could carry
on a coherent discussion, one that was not possible in the larger group of at least 30 people. 44 Since the
centers were likely to be i_1charge of implementing the program, they needed to be in agreement on
how they were going to handle that implementation.
To the authors' knowledge, no formal records were kept of the meeting's proceedings. However,
from comments of some of the major players, a number of issues seem to have been discussed
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informally: the $8 billion cost estimate for the program; the role of the lead center; the work packages
that might go to each center; and, finally, the reporting structure within the lead center. As Bill Lucas,
the director at Marshall Center, recounted it, the major forces driving the meeting were reaction against
headquarters and the degree of cooperation that the centers could muster among themselves. According
to Lucas, the general sentiment that headquarters should not run the program prevailed over the view
that the centers were unable to cooperate. 45 So the question of whether there should be a lead center
was easily settled, but not the issue of where to locate the lead center. 4e Hinners agreed, recalling a
consensus that having one center be a lead center was preferable to having the program managed totally
out of headquarters, although he felt there was a major drawback to that as well. The lead center, once
determined, would have budgetary control and determine the direction of the program and the work
assignments. 47 Griffin did not believe that he played much of a role in the meeting "because there were
guys that were highly respected, like Don Hearth, that stood up and were counted," expressing Griffm's
point of view. 4$
At the conclusion of their meeting, the center directors maintained that the responsibility for Level
B management and SE&I should be at one qead center" to which all other centers would report.
Organizational unity would increase with the appointment of a single space station program manager,
who would be lower in NASA's hierarchy than any of the field center directors. To meet the objection
that the program manager would have too little power, the directors insisted that they could substitute
a "spirit of cooperation" in place of official centralization. 49
Gerry Griffin produced what became known as the "barbed wire" organization chart (figure 2) to
illustrate the operation of the lead center approach, even though the center directors had not agreed
upon the location of the lead center, and both Marshall and Johnson were still competing for that
assignment. Upon returning from their meeting the center directors were asked to vote on who should
get the lead center. According to Hoban's recollection,
General Abrahamson started walking around the room, and said, "we're going to vote for who
should have the lead center." And Culbertson says, "Abe," you know, q_nock that off." Abe
replied, "No, no, just for fun, let's vote for who gets the lead center." So, I had a chance to vote,
and I voted for JSC because it seemed like the most logicAal place. If we had to have a lead
center, I thought they were very capable of doing the job. _'
According to Hobart, it was almost unanimous for Johnson. Marshall received one vote even though
Lucas abstained. Next, the center directors presented their proposal to manage the program, and this
was Griffin's barbed-wire organization, which laid out the program management at a field center. The
program management (Level B) would be responsible for coordinating the work of the various work
packages.
The associate administrators and headquarters personnel attending the Langley meeting also made
their recommendations. They recommended that the Level A program management be placed at the
associate administrator level and that a new position be established. The SE&I function would be
managed by the Level B center, and Level C would be managed at the various centers. 51
Burt Edelson, associate administrator of OSSA, summarized the views of the associate
administrators on the management of the space station program. Overall, they were not favorably
disposed to the lead center concept, especially with program management reporting to a field center
director. However, they were keenly aware of the problems created by an organizational structure where
the program management in one of the field centers reported to headquarters, as in the space telescope
4O
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program. The lead center seemed to be the best they could construct under the circumstances. It was
a compromise, and Edelson voted for it because he believed it was the best position "under the
circumstancesf "_'?
By advocating the lead center position, the center directors assumed and emphasized several factors.
They saw SE&I as the job of the agency, although some support contractors might be required. They
emphasized that a center could work for another center, and this meant that each center would provide
its share of SE&I personnel to support the lead center. Finally, the directors recommended that a board
of directors of field centers should be established for managing and executing the program. In this
outpouring of cooperative spirit, the center directors seemed to suggest that they were willing to give
up their valuable SE&I talent to other centers, but, in exchange, would control the program through the
board of directors. _
Although the lead center recommendation had been made at the Langley meeting, the meeting
consisted of personnel who were not empowered to make that decision. Indeed, Culbertson had earlier
reminded the attendees that their vote was not binding. The decision was vested with the administrator,
and Beggs and Mark were not present during the deliberations. They attended the meeting on Septem-
ber 23rd, and Lucas presented the recommendations to them. Beggs cautioned the participants at that
time that they did "not have an approved program yet. ''_4
Although the associate administrators and center directors had participated in the recommendations
that came out of Langley, Beggs did not formalize the decision until much later. In the interim, he
thanked the attendees for a helpful and useful colloquium. He was also appreciative of the "degree of
consensus among the group" regarding management issues and findings. He reserved the final decision
to himself, of course, and noted that even though they had not officially chosen a management approach,
they had taken the first step. _
From this process two perceptions emerged that linger today. The fLrst related to how much power
existed at headquarters. ''_ Given NASA's increasingly decentralized character, whereby the centers had
become semi-autonomous, and the fact that the stability of NASA lay primarily at the field centers and
not at headquarters, the question of the relative control of headquarters' resources vis-a-vis the field
centers had been discussed throughout the 1970s. At headquarters the central players-the administrator,
the deputy administrator, and increasingly the associate administrators-were mobile. Tremendous
turnover occurred in these ranks: the two top executives were political appointees, and the associate
administrators typically went back and forth to the private sector. With headquarters suffering from a
"revolving door syndrome," the centers provided the stability.
So NASA had shifted from the Apollo days, where the power lay at headquarters, to a situation
where the technical strength resided more and more at the centers. This, to some extent, was accen-
tuated by the fact that the centers had courted specific congressional constituencies in their own regions.
Although the NASA field centers usually did not actively lobby their delegations, the congressmen from
the districts involved were not insensitive to the presence of the field centers. This enhanced the power
of the centers. In addition, most of the contractors lined up with their aff'diated field center and also
served as effective lobbyists in Congress. As a result of the Wallops and Langley meetings, a perception
was reinforced that the field centers had become exceedingly powerful.
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A second perception related to John Hodge, the director of the Space Station Task Force. 57 Hodge,
who opposed the lead center decision, advocated that the program management be located at head-
quarters (or at least in a neutral center), and was seen by some of the field centers as being partisan
about the issue. Johnson had always attracted media attention because of the visibility of its manned pro-
grams--Mercury, Gemini Apollo, and more recently, the shuttle. Personnel at Johnson knew that
Washington civil servants generally considered them and the center itself to be overly self-confident, a
reflection of their disproportionate media attention. In this climate, Hodge's advocacy of headquarters'
management of the program was viewed by some as a bias against Johnson. This perception, whether
real or imagined, was to haunt Hodge later in the program.
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THE LEAD CENTER DECISION
At the Langley meeting, the institutional leadership of the field centers expressed the belief that the
way to structure the management of the space station program was to locate the program management
at one of the field centers Johnson Space Center was an overwhelming favorite for the lead center
assignment, but James Beggs and Hans Mark did not wish to rush into the decision. The space station
program had not yet been ;renounced, and they didn't have to make a final decision on the lead center
assignment until December 1983.
Gerry Griffin had won a victory for JSC at the Langley meeting, but he was not complacent about
it. He believed that certain key people at headquarters preferred Marshall over Johnson for the lead
center. Bill Lucas (at Marshall) and Griffin did not negotiate much prior to the Langley meeting. Part
of the reason, according to ,,'Jriffin, was perhaps that "they felt like they were negotiating from a position
of strength. "1 Griffin believed that Marshall had a pipeline to Washington through John Hodge and the
Space Station Task Force, and especially through Luther Powell, who was still in Washington at that
time. As he weighed his options, Griffin thought that Mark really believed that the lead center should
be at Johnson. He did not know Beggs' position on the lead center concept, however.
After the Langley meeting Griffin felt he had a foundation on which to build his case for Johnson.
He initiated a number of discussions with Beggs to present his case for Johnson. "I had the Langley
experience to kind of build on, and he [Beggs] had listened r.o that. He didn't have a lot to say, but he
just listened to all the different opinions. "2
Griffin believed that he had the support of many of the players in private industry, such as
McDonnell-Douglas and Rockwell, who had developed most of the manned systems since their
inception. Of course, it was not to their advantage to push too hard for JSC because if Johnson was not
chosen, they would have bttrned their bridges with Marshall Flight Center. Rockwell and McDonnell-
Douglas were pushing to have the lead center at Johnson, as well as IBM and others that had done work
with Johnson previously? Meanwhile, the lead center concept was refined through various negotiations.
Jerry Craig recalled, "John IHodge] and I had gone to a field center and presented the basic plan of how
the lead center would work and so forth. "4
Subsequently, "hand delivered" mail began to fly from Griffin to Beggs. The task force, including
Robert Freitag, did not hav_:access to information about the negotiations that were taking place between
Griffin and Beggs. Freitag never saw their correspondence, nor could he get Culbertson to reveal the
contents of the letters?
At this stage the positi,ms of the central players in the decision-making process had already been
established. Culbertson pr,_ferred the lead center option, and wanted the center to be located at
Houston. 6 Hodge, who was pushing for the SE&I function to be located at headquarters during Phase
B, had already had his vie_s considered. Mark believed that the technical job of integration should be
done at the field centers. In the multicenter arrangement with a number of work packages, integration
was really a problem of enlisting the centers' cooperation. This was a political job for which Mark felt
headquarters was well suited. "The problem in Houston was one of persuading the other centers to work
with Houston as a lead center. And that's the real function of Washington, to do that persuasion. Not
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to manage the project out of Washington. And having done that persuasion half a dozen times myself,
I know it can be done. "7
Although the positions of the key individuals were more or less evident, the perception of how the
decision was made differed. According to Culbertson, "the decision was essentially reached at a meeting
that Beggs, Mark, and Culbertson had. It was there it was dec/ded that the lead center would be at
Johnson. "8 Culbertson made a recommendation, and both Beggs and Mark accepted it. Hodge saw
different nuances in this decision process. He was aware that the center directors preferred the lead
center to headquarters control of the program and that the predominant favorite for the lead center
location was Johnson. According to Hodge, Mark "was tickled to death that not only had a decision been
reached, but it was the one he wanted. 'e
Most members of the Space Station Task Force did not know about the discussions among Beggs,
Mark, and Culbertson. 1° After the Langley meeting, however, they knew that such deliberations had
been occurring, but all they had as evidence was the final letter in which Beggs authorized Johnson to
be the lead center for the space station program.
Jerry Craig remembered how the letter authorizing the lead center at Houston came about. By then
he and Hedge had visited each center.
[Then] we went over and briefed Jim Beggs. When I got through Beggs said, Well, what do we
do now?."And I said, Well, we need to write a letter proclaiming JSC the lead center." And he
said, "Okay,... draft me up a directive naming JSC the lead center and I'll sign it."11
So Craig phoned Griffin and told him that Beggs had instructed him to draft a letter naming Johnson
as the lead center, and Craig wrote the letter that evening. "And that morning I got a five-page input
letter how John [wanted it treated], not a letter. He wanted to put everything in great detail what the
lead center was supposed to do. "12
Craig wondered how Beggs would look upon such a long letter. Disregarding Hodge's suggestions,
he wrote a very simple letter and presented it to Beggs. In February 1984, Beggs announced his decision
to locate the lead center at Houston, inviting the Johnson Space Center to proceed with the planning
of the program office.
Hedge interpreted the lead center decision with caution. 13 As he understood it, the decision to
locate the lead center at Houston extended only for the detailed definition period, at which time there
would be a review. *I had left with the impression that this decision only stood for Phase B and that we
would revisit the whole question of management at the end of Phase B. "14 Such an interpretation was
prophetic as it later became evident when General Samuel Phillips reviewed the management of the
space station program in May 1986.
The process that led to the lead center decision after the Langley meeting also had an effect at
headquarters. The task force members who had advocated the option whereby headquarters controlled
the program management had lost out. In addition, they were excluded from the deliberations among
Beggs, Mark, and Culbertson. Under I-lodge they had existed in an open climate without hierarchical
lines of authority, emphasizing open communications and unlimited access to data. The decision process
in the case of the lead center was not, however, representative of such an environment. It was more
institutional in nature; it followed the protocol and procedures of the agency. The members of the task
force were not included in the decision making in this more formal culture, a culture they were not
accustomed to during the task force days. The transition back to this more structured environment was
not likely to be an easy one.
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The Program Manager
Once the lead center o_ncept had been approved, Hodge set up a process for staffing the program
office. At the center directors' meeting at Goddard, Hodge presented the outline of his staffing plan. 15
His plan consisted of four _ain elements: first, all levels of the program would be staffed with the most
capable people; second, a search committee composed of a representative from the Office of the
Administrator and the center directors would be established to find these people; third, the committee
would identify the top twenty positions and screen potential candidates; and fourth, it would report its
findings and recommendations to the administrator for his review and approval. Hodge left the center
directors' meeting with the impression that the staffing process was acceptable to all present, and that
representatives from all centers would be considered for the job of program manager.
The responsibility for coordinating the search for program manager fell to Gerry Griffin, who
recommended Aaron Cohen from Johnson for the position. 16 GrilYm also received the nomination of
James Odom from Marshall. Luther PoweH was mentioned, but was not a serious candidate since it was
already known that he would lead the project office at Marshall. 17Andrew Stofan and Noel Hinners also
suggested candidates, but it turned out they were not interested in the position.
Culbertson's choice for program manager was also Cohen, whom he considered to be NASA's finest
program manager. Hodge did not want the choice to be made without going through the search process
that he had advocated, la B(:cause Culbertson and Griff'm were advocating Cohen without following the
selection guidelines that he favored, Hodge decided to take the matter to Beggs, and he let Culbertson
know he was going to do it before he did so. lg In his meethtg with Beggs Hodge pointed out that his
selection procedures had not been followed in picking the program manager, and, therefore, the
agreement that he felt had been made in the center directors' meeting had been undermined. _
Mark by then had raised his objections as well. He objected to the consideration of James Odom
for program manager as Odom was absolutely essential for the space telescope project, and could not
be spared to join the space station program. 21 Mark had other plans for Cohen as well. Mark felt that
Cohen, having been a project manager in both the Apollo and the shuttle orbiter projects, needed to
broaden his experience to make him a viable candidate for future promotions. Maxime Faget had left
Johnson by this time, and Cohen's technological expertise was also needed to replace Faget as head of
research and engineering, z2 It was mainly for this reason that Mark objected to Cohen's appointment
as program manager. 23
So the search for progr_un manager began once again, with Mark and Culbertson playing an active
role in the selection process. Their prime candidate was Nell Hutchinson from Johnson. Hutchinson was
between jobs at the time and fit the younger mold that Beggs wanted in rejuvenating the agency. Hutch-
inson had worked for Mark in the earlier days of the shuttle as a flight director, so Mark was familiar
with his work. Although Hutchinson had never managed a program before, he was a good
communicator, was familiar with NASA and the other centers, and had spent some time at headquarters.
By this time the other candidates had for one reason or _mother fallen by the wayside. Griffin was
being pressured to get the program office started, and after receiving the go-ahead from Beggs he
offered Hutchinson the position. 24
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Hodgewasnothappy with this selection either. I dearly didn't get my point across. "_5Once again
his selection process had not been followed. But he decided not to fight it any more, and allowed the
appointment to stand without any interference.
There were a lot of mixed feelings about Hutchinson's appointment because many felt that Cohen's
previous program experience made him the more qualified of the two candidates. Cohen had very high
praise for Nell Hutchinson, even though he was aware of Hutchinson's lack of experience. "I think Nell
is a very, very talented person. He is a very good engineer, very talented individual. "2e
The decision to give the job to Hutchinson, however, put Cohen on a track that would later lead
to his appointment as center director at Johnson.
I had a verygood "ob..I mean, there is no better, job, than head of research and engineerinf. I
would have done t_e job [Program Manager] if they d wanted me to. I was not hurt or anything
because the job I had was a very good job. Being. d_ctor of research and engineering after
having gone through two programs is not a bad job.
The involvement of Mark and Culbertson in the appointment of Hutchinson was not well known
in Washington. There was a perception by some headquarters personnel that they were slowly being
removed from decisions regarding the space station program. To them it began to appear that the major
decisions were being made by the center directors. According to Hodge, "it removed headquarters one
more step from the decision making process. "28
Hodge's role in the selection process reinforced the perception regarding his biases, real or
imagined, against the Johnson Space Center.
I went throuf, h a curious process there ... that got me a bad name down at JSC .... It was
immediately interpreted that I was anti-Aaron, and as a matter of fact, I had nothing against
Aaron .... I thought Aaron was a perfectly_ne guy, terrific guy. But I thought the process was
so bad that it would destroy the program."
The selection of the program manager sent out a signal that NASA was getting serious about the
space station program. The days of the Space Station Task Force and its culture were over. Culbertson
assumed command of the space station program, and it moved into another phase, beginning to carry
out its affairs. Hodge had encouraged wide participation through his democratic leadership style, but the
free-flowing structure of the Space Station Task Force had now served its purpose and Hodge's influence
appeared to be waning, a0 With the gearing up of the program office it became apparent that the change
in management style, although successful in the task force, was not to become a NASA standard.
Even before Hutchinson had been selected as the program manager, Griffin had talked to John
Aaron about the deputy's job. 31 Once Hutchinson's appointment was announced, Griffin brought Aaron
to Culbertson's attention. Culbertson had earlier gained a deep respect for Aaron and enthusiastically
supported Griffm's recommendation. Beggs endorsed their choice and Aaron was appointed deputy
program manager. Although both the key individuals that would head up the space station program fit
in well with Beggs' notion of rejuvenating the space agency, neither had program experience.
The lead center decision, the changing role of Culbertson, and the appointment of the program
manager and deputy program manager signaled the arrival of the space station program. By the time
these announcements had been made, President Ronald Reagan had made his speech approving the
space station program. One major decision remained: how should the space station program be divided
among the various field centers?
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CHAPTER 6
WORK PACKAGE SPLITS: ROUND ONE
The technological guidelines established by the Space Station Task Force in 1982 suggested that
there would be a number of field centers working on the pr_gram. Because their expertise lay primarily
in manned programs, both Johnson and Marshall had been deeply involved in the task force and would
undoubtedly be involved as the program was now formed. Because the scientific community was then
considered to be the primary user of the space station, Goddard, the science center, would need to be
involved. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) had also worked with the scientific community, so their
involvement was also a probability. The emphasis on technology development implied participation by
Langley, Ames, and Lewis, NASA's research centers. And, finally, since operations responsibility lay
primarily at the Kennedy Space Center, Kennedy would play an integral role in the program once the
station was ready to be launched.
The field centers had much to gain from the approval of the program. The directors and their
respective centers would gain visibility by participating in NASA's next major initiative. Perhaps more
important than the visibility, approval of the program meant there would be new resources available to
participating units. In an a ustere economy, additional monies were essential to maintain the institutional
base and employment at t_e local level. Moreover, for the center directors, their own visibility and status
in their regions would be enhanced.
The program had not been approved in early 1982, however, so it was premature to consider
distribution of resources. Instead, the center directors had to focus their attention on their ongoing
operations. This may have been a blessing to John Hodge, director of the Space Station Task Force.
Rivalry among the center:; receded, and Hedge could get the members of the Space Station Task Force,
drawn from various centers in addition to headquarters, to concentrate on building the constituency and
determining the specific details of the upcoming program.
In 1983, as NASA became more confident of winning approval of the program, the issue of resource
allocation received more serious attention. Work packages--i.e., portions of space station work each
center would perform--were negotiated over an extended period. These negotiations were complex,
intense, and lengthy, and they often appeared chaotic to an outsider, and even illogical to some within
the agency.
In February 1983, Calbertson and the task force held a competition for allocating the advanced
technology development "test beds." The test beds were not part of the work package decisions, but had
a significant impact on t_e expectations of work package assignments and the negotiations for those
assignments.
Test Bed Competition
Even in the early days of the Space Station Task Force, the members considered advanced
technology development to be a part of the space station program. This consideration was a reflection
of the Space Station Technology Steering Committee, which had stated that it was essential to continue
technology development for the evolutionary and growth aspects of the program. 1
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Asvisualizedbythe task force, there were several objectives of the advanced development activities.
The first objective was to develop "test bed" capabilities along major disciplinary lines and located at
various field centers so that technology alternatives and configurations could be tested and evaluated.
Second, any promising new technology arising from the test beds could then be transferred to the space
station development program. And, finally, based on those new technologies, qualified industry
subcontractors could be identified for later consideration during the design and development of the
station. 2
Historically, NASA and OAST had adopted a way of describing progressively increasing levels of
maturity in technology development. The process was divided into traditional categories of research,
generic technology, focused and applied technology, and advanced development. In the past, OAST had
funded technology development through the generic base. Afterwards, major developmental programs
carried focused technologies into the advanced development stage. The space station program would
follow this pattern.
The thrust of the advanced development program was to develop generic "test bed capabilities"
where new technologies and approaches could be tested for performance and the estimated risk in terms
of cost and schedule. Testing allowed new technologies to be integrated into the later phases of the
space station program. This approach would provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate diverse new
technologies throughout the life of the program. The task force also recognized the need for selected
flight demonstrations in space as well as on the ground, a
The advanced technology test beds were funded primarily through OAST. OAST funded the
technology that it would normally have supported, and managed some of the space station funds that
were focused on specific problems related to the technology of the space station. It was jointly managed
as a single integrated program, but part of the money came from OAST and was generalized in its
application, and the other part was space station money, and was more specific in its application. 4
Why should advanced development test beds be developed so early, especially since the technology
program would not have an influence on the initial space station design and development stage? Culbert-
son, who oversaw the space station activities, explained the reasons for the early allocation of test beds,
as he saw them:
[There were] two reasons. One was that we felt that the test beds provided an opportunity to
get the technology program going before the contractor selections had been made [before Phase
B RFPs], and provided a focal point for the development of individual components, which would
ultimately fit in systems. Second, and more importantly, by getting the test beds and putting the
responsibility for the test beds in the development centers rather than the research centers, but
still leaving the research centers with a broad responsibility for many of the components that
would go into the test beds, it helped forge a closer relationship between the research centers
and the development centers. In other words, the idea was that if Marshall or Johnson had the
responsibility for the overall communications system, the test beds encouraged Langley, Ames,
or Lewis, or any other center with interest in a particular part of the system to manage its early
technology up to the breadboard level or to the concept level, and to bring their components
to the test bed at the appropriate development center. It provided a good working relation-
ship, then, between those research and development centers.
The center directors were very interested in the test bed concept, of course, because it meant additional
technical responsibility for their centers.
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Culbertson and the task force decided to hold a competition for the assignment of the test beds,
with the centers submitting proposals as if they were contractors making bids. The field centers were
encouraged to team up to bid on the proposals. Culbertson wanted the centers to depend on each other,
and the built-in competition was a way of doing this. o The center proposals were finally submitted in
February of 1983, about six months before the Wallops and Langley meetings. Culbertson, however, did
not announce his decision u_atil February 29, 1984, after President Reagan's State of the Union Message
directing NASA to build a permanently manned space station.
The test bed assignme_lts carried with them dollars which were minuscule related to the overall
space station program. This allowed Culbertson to make up his mind without an elaborate set of criteria,
focusing on the technical capabilities and possible long-term roles of the field centers who competed.
The rationale for his evaluation was relatively straightforward, even though he was assisted by an inde-
pendent committee. Johnsen, with its longstanding emphasis on manned aspects of NASA's programs
and the proximity of the astronauts, won the lead assignment for the advanced development programs
in data management, environmental control and life support, and thermal management. Marshall, noted
for its structural engineering and propulsion systems capabilities, won thc assignment for altitude control
and stabilization studies, th_ ancillary propulsion system, and the space operations mechanisms. 7 There
was, initially, no lead center for the advanced development program on electric power. 8 This was later
assigned to Lewis when, dtte in part to Stofan's efforts, Legis was given a major development role in
the space station program.
At this stage there was no way that Culbertson or the members of the task force could grasp the
enormity of the work pack;tge problem. As a result, problems arose. The centers appeared to believe
that the test beds (and the subsequent work packages) would be housed permanently in their respec-
tive locations. Center personnel began to view the test beds as their own, leading to "turfbattles." Aaron
Cohen, then the director of research and engineering at Johnson, commented, "I thought it [test bed
competition] had some merits to it. I thought that was a very fair way to do it.... [But] I think it tended
to lead to some turf battles. _ And while the test bed competition was in progress, the center directors
launched a number of initiatives to determine how the space station program would ultimately be
divided among the centers.
Initial Field Center Considerations
The idea of the work p _ckages emerged initially from the meetings that Hodge and Culbertson had
with several center directors. It was recognized early in the program that space station program would
be a large one and, therefore, more than one center-at least Marshall and Johnson-would be
involved. 10
During the advanced development test bed competition, the Space Station Task Force, under the
direction of Hedge, focused on the missions that the station needed to accomplish. Meanwhile, although
the configuration had not been decided, the center directors were deliberating internally for their role
in the program. And it was only at the beginning of March 1983, as Luther Powell and his group began
work on concept developm._nt, that the station's cost estimates and the configuration received attention.
The demands of the station's electrical power system that Luther Powell's assessment had provided
surprised many members of the task force. Electrical power constituted a large component of the space
station program, and Andrew Stofan wanted the power system for Lewis. Lewis' strength lay in
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propulsion systems, and adding a developmental capability would enhance its already renowned tech-
nological and research capabilities. Because of Marshall's expertise in power systems dating back to the
Von Braun days of the 1950s, Marshall was Lewis' competition for the power system on the space
station.
Stofan lobbied both James Beggs and Hans Mark for the power system. 11 He initially faced
resistance from both, especially Mark. The crucial question here was whether Lewis was to be involved
at all, not if Lewis would be given the power system assignment. In the end Stofan's persistence paid off.
Both Beggs and Mark decided that not only would Lewis be involved, but that Lewis would have the
power modules. 12 It was clear that Stofan had made his case very dearly known, both within NASA and
among Ohio's Congressional delegation, and there was a perception that the strong congressional
contingent from Ohio had a major influence on this decision, but Mark denied it. "3"he strategic plan
for Lewis and giving Lewis a role in the power area of the space station was terribly important for the
future development of that center. And working the Ohio delegation was a minor part of the contract. "13
The inclusion of Lewis as a work package center concerned Culbertson. Johnson and Marshall were
working the manned elements and Goddard the unmanned elements. The inclusion of a fourth center
increased the management complexity. As Culbertson explained, "Management complexity increases as
the square of the number of centers you've got involved. With 3 there was a number 9 and with 4 there
was a number 16, so in my mind we almost doubled the complexity. "14 Culbertson recognized, however,
that Lewis had a lot of power experience in research and technology, and had done some demonstration
projects on space power systems development. "So, if we were going to add a center for the space power
system, Lewis was the proper choice. Aside from the increase in management complexity, it was logical
that we assign the power system at LeWIS."15
Goddard's involvement in the space station program, on the other hand, had been advocated by
Hodge and the task force. In Hodge's estimation, Goddard had a better relationship with and
understanding of the user community than did Johnson or Marshall. is "So we brought Goddard into it
to make sure that the users would be adequately represented and would recognize that we were
committed to the idea of making it useful to scientists. We felt that Goddard could do that very well. "17
The role of Goddard, therefore, was to have two important aspects. First, to manage the development
of some of the hardware, and second, to be the user advocate in the program organization.
There was some reluctance at Goddard, however, to be so actively involved with the space station.
At the start of the shuttle project, scientists, including those at Goddard, had participated in establish-
ing shuttle requirements. After that had been accomplished, however, the user community was no longer
included in the shuttle's development, and many at Goddard felt left out of the shuttle project. Noel
Hinners, center director at Goddard, had to overcome the reluctance of Goddard management. He
thought Goddard should be involved and spoke very positively about Goddard's participation. He, too,
felt that Goddard could bring a user perspective to the space station program, as well as benefitting
from the visibility that would come from working on a major NASA program. 18
It could be predicted as far back as 1983 that once the space station became operational, Kennedy
Space Center would have a relatively large role to play. Because the station would insure a permanent
human presence in space, Kennedy would be involved in maintaining and servicing it (not merely the
payload) in addition to the basic requirements for launching the station, once it became operational.
Langley Research Center had been an early candidate for the lead center, but Hodge and
Culbertson were unsuccessful in their attempts to persuade Don Hearth to locate Level B there. 19
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Instead,Hearth reserved for Langley technology development during the evolutionary stages of the space
station. In doing so, he insured a future involvement and influence as the program proceeded, and also
+
reduced the potential los:_of center personnel to other centers.
Marshall and Johnson were, of course, major contenders for parts of the development of the station.
Since the space station was a major program, and even the initial operating capability contemplated by
the Space Station Task F_)rce was immense, there was no doubt that development work would have to
be split between Marshall and Johnson and could not be located at just one of the centers. Although
the two centers had somewhat different areas of expertise_ the distribution of work between them was
still going to be a problem.
Ames Research Cenl er was a different story. Mark had been Ames' center director from 1969 until
1977 when he left NAS.A and joined the Department of the Air Force. When he assumed the
directorship in 1969, there were proposals to shut Ames down. One of Mark's first acts as director was
to establish a Strategy a,d Tactics Committee, consisting of rank and file employees as well as man-
agers, to work out Ames' view of its mission. Out of these activities emerged a mission statement for
Ames which indicated that the center would emphasize certain areas: computational fluid mechanics,
V/TOL, flight simulatiort, airborne sciences, and life sciences. _ It was unlikely that Mark would allow
a redefinition of Ames' mission at this point.
In the summer of 1983, in preparation for the Wallops and Langley gatherings, Mark asked the
center directors if they h_d the technical resources needed to build a space station. 21 As we have seen,
the key to program and project implementation was the institutional support of the center directors. This
support would be vital once the program had been approved. The center directors had responded that
they needed to know more about the station's capabilities and technical characteristics, dimensions on
which the Space Station Task Force had been working. The Space Station Management Colloquium held
at Langley on September 22, 1983, "seemed to be the place to learn more. '°_" It was too early to talk
about work packages th_n.
The Langley meetirtg did not specifically address the issue of work packages. The discussions
revolved primarily around whether the centers had the in-house capability to perform the systems
engineering and integration function, if they had enough support personnel, and which way to perform
the SE&I: should it be done at headquarters or at the field centers? Although the center directors did
not have a clear underst;mding of the extent of SE&I support necessary for the space station program,
the overwhelming conclusion was that NASA could do SE&I in-house without the aid of a support con-
tractor.
Technological Considerations
As the Concept De_elopment Group (CDG), under Luther Poweli, deliberated the space station
configuration, the issue of work packages and the technological interfaces among the work packages
received serious attention.
The space station program had been advocated as an agency-wide initiative, incorporating both
unmanned and manned elements. The manned elements insured a permanent human presence in space,
whereas the unmanned elements really referred to the platforms for conducting scientific research.
These platforms were ottly loosely related to the manned elements of the space station, since platforms
could be designed and C_eployedin space without any connection to the manned elements.
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By then, however, the Space Station Task Force had begun to advocate the notion of commonality
in the station. The $8 billion figure for the space station implied that the cost would have to be tightly
controlled in the program. To contain costs, Hodge and Powell advanced the idea that the manufacture
of the various components of the station be standardized. Insofar as the platforms were concerned, their
only link to the rest of the station was the need for commonality;, platforms should, to the extent
possible, employ elements that were developed for the manned station.
The interfaces between the platforms and the rest of the space station, arising from commonality,
were not heavily influenced by work package decisions; therefore, the CDG realized that the major
question regarding the work packages was the distribution of work between Marshall and Johnson. An
early attempt to tackle the question of work packages was made by W. Ray Hook, a member of the
CDG. _I was the guy that first made an attempt to divide the work. And very unsuccessfully, I might
add. _23
Hook looked at the work package problem pretty much from a technical capability standpoint. The
crews live and are part of Johnson, and politically that was not likely to change. The things that the
crews would be intimately involved with-the habitation modules, for example--he felt also ought to be
handled at Johnson. By and large he felt the rest of the spacecraft could be built at Marshall. So Hook's
proposal was to "divide the thing in half, give yourself two main prime contractors, split off these pieces
and have them managed by the other centers, and have as many work packages as you'd like, but
concentrated into the two manned space centers, Marshall and Johnson. "24
Technological requirements drove the management process in these early days. It was felt that the
technology required by the station necessitated two work packages with clear interfaces, just as had been
done with the shuttle. Marshall and Johnson would each spearhead one of these work packages. Even
then it was not obvious where the split would be made.
But a decision could not be made purely on technical considerations. There was the political
situation to be concerned about, as well as the institutional relationships between the centers. As it
happened, when Hook made his presentation to Culbertson, the recommendation of dual work pack-
ages with Marshall and Johnson each having a major share was turned down. 25
Following the Langley meeting, the CDG began to pay closer attention to defining the initial
capability of the space station. 26 Once the CDG had detailed the desired initial capability of the station,
Culbertson asked Bryant Cramer to assemble a working group to develop a concept for how to logically
approach the entire work package structure. 2r
Cramer's group, with input from industry and field centers, analyzed fifteen work package options.
The particular criteria that the working group applied were interface complexity, configuration sensi-
tivity, and programmatic constraints. With the help of a Center Technical Advisory Group set up to
review the options and evaluation process, Cramer's people created a "straw man" cut as to what the
work package distribution might be. 28
The working group reached an analytical solution that was close to what NASA f'mally ended up
with. The CDG had provided a general configuration and then Cramer's group established where the
interfaces were from system to system and then counted the number of interfaces. They felt that one
criterion for the decision should be to minimize the number of technical interfaces between work
packages. And so "they massaged this in every possible way they could find that minimum. "29
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Preliminary Negotiations with Field Centers
A series of preliminary negotiations with field center directors was initiated by Culbertson, who had
the advantage of Cramer':_ analysis. Culbertson conferred with all the directors individually about the
work package analyses conducted at headquarters. He wanted a general agreement over the concepts
that had been put forth by Cramer's working group, a0
However, Bill Lucas, the director of the Marshall Space Flight Center, did not concur with the work
package splits recommended by Cramer's group. Lucas objected to those work package splits because
Marshall's job, in that version, was seen to be an assistant role to Johnson. 31
In addition to minimizing technological interfaces and making the best use of the established
capabilities of the two centers, Culbertson worked to form work packages in which Johnson's and
Marshall's responsibilities would be of comparable magnitude. "I did not want one lots bigger than the
other, d2 However, having; given the lead center responsibility to Johnson, Culbertson did not want to
arrange the work packages in such a way that Marshall would have a major integrating role, because to
do so would leave them c,:_mpeting for the integration. This question hinged on two major dements of
the station: allocation of overall structure and geometric arrangement (which he called the architecture)
of the entire space station versus the inhabited modules. According to Culbertson's thinking, the
responsibility for the overall structure and architecture should lie with the lead center. If the lead center
did not have that responsibility, it would not have the integrating role, and thus would be subordinate
to the work package thai had the responsibility for the structures. Culbertson did not want this to
happen. 33
Distribution of work arrangements in an equitable faslfion between Marshall and Johnson without
a major integrating role for Marshall was complicated by the advanced development test bed allocations
already made. When Culbertson had made the test bed assignments, the complete work package
structure had not yet been determined. The allocation of the test beds, however, had reinforced
expectations that the wotk package assignments would likely follow the centers' relative expertise. As
a result, aspects of the h_bitation module were left at Johnson and facets of the structural parts of the
test bed assignment were located at Marshall. As the work packages were finalized, however, it became
clear that the structural _tssignment to Marshall would create problems because the structure was the
crux of the integrating job in the station.
By then Marshall had lost the battle for the lead cvnter assignment to Johnson, but the work
package issue was anoth_r matter. Historically, the capabilities associated with the habitability module
lay at Johnson. That's how many saw it. 34 Marshall personnel, however, believed that they also had
expertise in living quarters, having built the quarters for Skylab, which were much larger than those for
the shuttle, which were built by Johnson. Therefore, Marshall felt they had built the only real living
quarters up to that time. _ Furthermore, Marshall had had a major role in the oversight of ESA's
development of Spacelal:..
The structural expertise for building the space station lay at Marshall, at least in the perception of
that center, and this had been reinforced by the earlier allocation of the test bed facilities. _ So, when
Culbertson suggested that the structural aspects of the space station program should lie with the lead
center, that is, Johnson Space Center, Bill Lucas was naturally resistant. He had already lost the lead
center role, and now it seemed he would also lose one of the areas of expertise for which Marshall had
a good reputation.
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Because Culbertson received strong resistance from Lucas, he decided to bring this topic to a center
directors' meeting in Washington in March of 1984. By this time Neil Hutchinson had been selected pro-
gram manager for the space station program, and he attended the Houston meeting. The center direc-
tors did not resolve the work package issue at that meeting. According to Culbertson's recollection, "we
worked for most of the day to see if I could get agreement and couldn't. 'aT
Culbertson then decided that if he stepped back and let the two centers work together on the sprit
without intervention from Washington, a solution might be forthcoming. He told Griffin, "You've got
the Level 2 responsibility. See if you and Bill can devise an amicable solution to the split in responsi-
bilities between yourselves. "38But the tormenting work package dilemma was not going to be settled
that easily.
Work Package Negotiations Between Marshall and Johnson
(April-July 1984)
As Griffin assumed the responsibility for negotiating the work packages among the field centers, he
was keenly aware of four factors that would make his task both sensitive and complicated. First, and
perhaps most importantly, Griffin had the role of the lead center director in the space station program.
There was an agency-wide perception that in the lead center arrangement the director of the lead center
would be directing the work of other centers. Although all the field centers were considered to be
equals, the lead center assignment elevated Griffin's status, and that of his center, above the others.
Griffin was aware that was going to complicate his task of negotiating work packages. :_
Second, when he was assigned the responsibility for work package negotiations, Griffin did not have
the benefit of a clearly delineated configuration for the space station, a° The reference configuration
would be discussed and selected later during the "skunk works, "41but as of March 1984, the skunk works
had not yet begun. The work package negotiations that Griffin headed ran concurrently with the skunk
works. The input from the skunk works would be important, but the negotiations were ambiguous
because the configuration details were still unclear.
Third, Griffin was concerned about the reaction of Johnson personnel during the negotiations. There
was a widespread perception in the agency that the center would exert a strong influence on its director.
Griffin knew that he had to appease his own institution, especially if the negotiations went counter to
their expectations.
Fourth, Griffin was aware that some of his earlier positions with respect to the work packages had
been undermined by negotiations that had taken place at headquarters when Marshall and Lewis had
competed for the power system. As he recalled, q do remember literally being lobbied by both Bill and
Andy that they ought to do the power system. And they were more or less communicating with me to
support their position. "42Coming from a development center himself, Griffin wanted Marshall to have
the power system. He felt that getting another research center into development would weaken the
agency overall, q really thought that the Lewis Research Center ought to remain a research center. So
I really supported Marshall, quietly. "43However, Griffm's position-that the power system should be
allocated to Marshall--was undermined when Lewis won its bid for the power system, ca
These four factors influenced Griffin as he worked with the other NASA centers to define the work
packages. At that point he began what he called "shuttle diplomacy." q was flying around all over the
place. I'd go to Goddard, I'd go Lewis, I'd go to headquarters, I'd go to Marshall. "45The negotiations
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between Marshall and Johnson were the most sensitive. It was generally thought that Marshall and
Johnson could cooperatively run the program, like the Apollo program, in which clean interfaces were
possible. In the case of the space station, the question was how to split up the program between the two
centers. 4e
Although Griffin negotiated with Lucas and other center directors, two major meetings occurred
between representatives from Marshall and Johnson. The first meeting took place in April 1984 in
Huntsville, Alabama. In this meeting, the Marshall and Johnson teams considered two major alter-
natives on the principle that they would distribute the dollars equally. The first alternative located the
SE&I function and the habitation modules at Johnson, and placed the resource, lab, and logistic modules
at Marshall. The second alternative was to have the resource module and SE&I at Marshall, and the
rest at Johnson. It made sense for both of the development centers to be roughly equal in terms of their
next piece of the initiative. 4r
This first meeting was inconclusive. As Aaron Cohen explained, "Whenever you tried to break it
down in a neat way, it didn't come out, you just couldn't make a very neat solution like you could in
Apollo or shuttle. So, although those discussions weren't heated, the discussions were not very conclusive
either. "48
Following the first meeting informal conversations took place between Griffin and Lucas.
Perceptions began to diverge at this point. Although Marshall executives knew they could do the SE&I
job, Griffin had decided to do it at Johnson. Because the program management office, Level B, was
already located at Houston, it made sense for Johnson to perform the SE&I function. 49
However, as Marshall personnel saw it, the SE&I job and the habitation module were not enough
for Johnson to take on. Some even felt that Griffm could not convince his institution to go along with
this alternative. The reason, perhaps, was that SE&I did not carry with it hardware responsibility. "50This
meant that during the later phases of the program (beyond Phase B), Marshall would have a larger
hardware development role to play than Johnson. Unable to resolve the issue, the Johnson and Marshall
teams met a second time. also unsuccessfully.
Although Culbertson had directed Griffin to come up with a work package, he did refrain from
participating in the deliberations between Marshall and Johnson. He received briefings from Griffin to
keep him abreast of developments. As the negotiations between Marshall and Johnson continued, Cul-
bertson asked Hearth, center director at Langley, to arbitrate one of the sessions between Marshall and
Johnson. 51 Culbertson selected Hearth for this role for a number of reasons. Culbertson believed that
Hearth had little personal relationship with either one of the centers, and was unlike Dick Smith, for
example, who had been a deputy director at Marshall and had worked with Griffin. Second, Hearth did
not appear to have a vested interest in the negotiations since Langley's role was already established.
Langley was a research and technology center and would support all the centers. Hearth, therefore, was
not perceived as a threat either to Marshall or Johnson. And, finally, Hearth had chaired the meeting
at Langley at which the lead center responsibility and the work package concept had been developed.
So, Culbertson told Hearth, "you dreamed this up for me, now help me solve it. _
The belief in Hearth's ability to be unemotional in tackling the issue was shared by Noel Hinners.
_rle's very good at being a facilitator, getting decisions made, getting the arguments and discussion out
on the table, getting at the facts, getting the emotion out of the way, trying to establish what are the
facts. '&3 However, Hearth could not negotiate an agreement. Bob Marshall, at Marshall Space Flight
Center, felt that the arbitrator sent back what they had started with, and did not really arbitrate. 54
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Finally, on June 5, 1984, Griffm made a formal report to Culbertson regarding his assignment, and
recommended a division of the space station work for the Level C centers. He noted that some
guidelines that had evolved from Level A had influenced his recommendations. These included, "the
location of the power system responsibility at Lewis and a significant role at Goddard in customer
utilization. ''_ GritTm reported that with one significant exception, most of the centers were generally
comfortable with the work split that he proposed. The exception was Marshall. In a letter to Culbertson
a month later Griffin shed some fight on this inability to come to an agreement with Marshall and urged
Culbertson to trmalize the work package split.
Our areas of disagreement are significant and, I believe, are based on honest differences of
opinion as to how the program should be structured. Over the last two months, particularly as
a result of the skunk works activities, our overall understanding of the space station program
has grown and evolved considerably. The discussions with the MSC [Marshall] people have been
carried on in parallel during this period of program evolution. Hence, our discussions have
lacked a crispness that I believe is not unexpected, considering the rather unique way we set out
to initiate the space station program. I believe the situation h_ added considerable difficulty
in coming to a better understanding between our two centers.
Once Culbertson felt Griffin could not get an agreement, he decided to approach Beggs directly with
a recommendation. -i sat down with Mr. Beggs and said, 'This is my recommendation. The system would
not come to any consensus.' They were going to have to be told, and I told him this was the
arrangement that I recommended. _r Beggs approved and Culbertson's recommendations became the
work package allocations for Phase B.
Culbertson's solution did not completely match the capabilities of the centers, and in some instances
the earlier decisions he had made with respect to the advanced development test beds came back to
haunt him. For Culbertson, however, his work package splits hinged on two factors. First, to the extent
possible, he wanted to maximize the match between the work package and the capabilities of the center.
Second, he assigned the work package to Johnson that would be in line with its lead center
responsibility, even though, to some extent, it varied from Johnson's capabilities.
According to Culbertson's decision, Marshall would build and design modules with everything that
would remain common to the habitation module and the laboratory. And, since they were all to be
enclosed (and lived in or worked in by the astronauts), it was logical that one of the systems that should
be relatively common from module to module was the environmental control life support system
(ECLSS). This meant that ECI.,SS could not be assigned to Johnson, because it would have been very
difficult for Johnson to design all the systems and components and figure out how to test them and
install them into a module that was being designed by a contractor who was working for Marshall. _
Although Johnson was the kingpin in manned space activities, ECLSS went to Marshall. At the same
time, the stabilization control system involved the dynamics of the whole structure, and that went to
Johnson. "If that responsibility went to Marshall, I'd have the same kind of a problem as I was having
in the other one" [the module]. So, according to Culbertson, -if each one of them--Marshall and
Johnson-recognized that it was going to have to lean on some of the other's technical strength ... that
if each one of them was dependent on the other for a piece of its responsibility, maybe they would figure
out they'd have to work together. _'_qWhy not, then, redistribute the assignment in such a way as to be
more completely compatible with the centers' own strengths? Culbertson was against it for the simple
reason that Johnson had the lead center responsibility, and to a degree the primary structure was a
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majorintegrating tool. 60 Although he fully recognized that his solution was a compromise, he felt it was
an acceptable compromise and was better than any of the others that had been considered.
Culbertson's final work package division included two lab modules, one at Marshall and another at
Goddard, even though he believed that NASA would end up with only one laboratory module. However,
he had his reasons for the: definition of two lab modules. Since the laboratory module was a new idea,
he had two centers, each leading their two contractors, working on the lab module "so we could get the
best thoughts the country could put together. "al
As Culbertson saw it, Hodge and the task force assisted him in sorting out the work packages before
the Phase B RFPs went out. According to Hodge, however, "Phil worked that personally with Gerry
Griffin and John Aaron, and I didn't get involved in that. I was fairly sure the people down there didn't
want me involved in it." Eodge interpreted the reasoning behind the work package decisions that were
ultimately made:
The way it turned oat, the rationale that was used was, Marshall had more experience in
pressurized manned things with the Skylab and Spacelab, so they took all the pressurized
modules. Johnson wanted to take the rest of it. Because of the ar_J,aitectural control, overall
configuration control became Johnson's, which was what I wanted.""
After all this was done, Culbertson noted, "some changes of the work package assignments may be
necessary upon the completion of the Phase B definition effort, because only then will we really
understand the configurat ion we've been working so hard to split into pieces. _a So changes were still
a possibility as the study ?rogressed.
Culbertson's work package decisions differed significantly from Grifrm's recommendation. Whereas
the relative expertise of the different centers was the primary driving force behind Griffm's recommen-
dation, Culbertson focused on an additional factor. He argued that the structure of the space station
formed an important integrating mechanism for the program, and, therefore, should be assigned to
Johnson Space Center. As a result, the module was allocated to Marshall, although expertise for
habitation modules seemc.d to be at Johnson. In a similar sense, although Marshall's expertise seemed
to be in structures, the slructural elements of the space station were allocated to Johnson. Thus, the
need for locating the structural parts of the space station at the lead center, where the program
management function was performed, lead to a work package distribution that did not match the
expertise of Marshall and Johnson.
Although Culbertson's decision differed from Griffm's primarily with respect to the hardware
elements of the space station, over time another difference appeared. Based on Goddard's past expe-
rience with the users, both Culbertson and Griffin felt it would be desirable to have the customer utili-
zation function located at Goddard. This turned out not to be the case, however. Noel Hinners, center
director at Goddard, argued that the customer utilization function involved more advocacy than research;
therefore, the ideal location for that function was with the program management. Hence, he stressed
that the customer utilization function should be located at Houston. 64 As the Phase B studies started,
the customer utilization function was performed by headquarters and the Level B office at Houston.
Culbertson's initial gork package decisions were influenced by a number of factors. The first, of
course, was Beggs' guideline that the space station program be an agency-wide project. Influenced by
congressional delegation.,, from various districts, the number of work packages increased to four.
Although there was cong_essional query about hardware development responsibility at Kennedy, it was
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effectively thwarted because the Kennedy Space Center was to have a major role during the operations
phase of the space station program.
Second, during the period when Culbertson made his decision, the configuration of the space station
had not matured. The CDG had defined an initial operating capability of the space station program, and
the skunk works was refining a reference configuration, the "power tower." However, even then,
Culbertson, Griffin, and Hutchinson knew that the reference configuration would change during Phase
B when more informed studies would be conducted by the work package centers in conjunction with
their contractors. Several questions still needed to be answered. How would international participation
influence the configuration and the work package allocation among various international participants?
How should the space station be assembled? How should it be verified? What were the implications of
operations on the configuration of the station? These questions could not be addressed in the short time
frame in which the CDG and the skunk works operated. Only during the Phase B studies could precise
answers be provided.
As a result of the uncertainty created by such unanswered questions, the work package negotiations
appeared chaotic to onlookers, and even to many participants in the larger NASA community. To a large
extent, the appearance of chaos was inevitable, given the circumstances under which the decision was
made. Perhaps such chaos could have been avoided if NASA officials had postponed the work package
decision until after the Phase B studies were conducted. However, the congressional pressure and the
industrial contractors' influence were important in arriving at an early work package decision and
Cnlbertson felt that the Phase B work would be impossible to control if the center responsibilities had
not been at least tentatively determined first. Since such pressures were evident to many members of
the NASA community, the work package decisions that Culbertson orchestrated were often viewed as
political engineering, rather than anchored in solid program rationale.
Culbertson's work package decisions were a major factor influencing the evolution of the Phase B
studies. As we have seen, the uncertainty in the overall configuration made it impossible for them to be
cast in concrete. This also led to overlap among the work packages, which meant that the four field
centers and their contractors working on space station definition would have considerable room to
attempt to influence the definition in ways which would enhance their own positions. Since resources
were spread around, these redundancies and overlaps set the stage for a definition period in which
intercenter and contractor rivalry would influence how the Phase B studies, and therefore the space
station configuration, evolved.
6O
PART III
THE EXPERIMENT COMES TO LIFE

CHAFFER 7
SKUNK WORKS
With two crucial decis ions--the location of Level B and the advanced development test beds--behind
them, and another major set of decisions--the work package splits-well under way, NASA executives
focused on managing the space station detailed definition (Phase B). By now the management activity
had moved from Washington, D.C., to Johnson Space Center in Houston.
Space Station Management Workshop
During January and February of 1984, Johnson developed a range of Level B organizational issues
and options in preparatioa for the Level B lead center assignment? Following Johnson's designation as
the lead center on February 15, 1984, James Beggs directed Gerry Griffin to develop a detailed
functional plan by March 15, 1984. Since space station was an agency-wide program, it was necessary
to discuss the issues not ,:rely from Johnson's perspective, but from the viewpoint of the other centers
who were to be involved as well. The major goal of the Space Station Management Workshop, held at
the Lunar Planetary Institute in Houston in August 1983, was to develop a refined plan. It was essen-
tial that senior management from each NASA center participate in the workshop.
Robert Goetz, the deputy center director at Johnson, chaired the workshop. 2 It was attended by the
deputy directors of the major centers and personnel from centers who were likely to be involved with
the Level C activity. Robert Freitag represented NASA headquarters. A total of twenty people
participated. Louis DeAr,gelis, who conducted training seminars, was the facilitator.
Goetz made the introductory remarks and presented the range of uncertainties, guidelines, issues,
and organizational optioas that Johnson had prepared. This was the starting point for developing an
agency position on the Level B functional plan, and Gerry Griff'm's "barbed wire diagram" (figure 2)
received much initial attention. The discussion of Griffin's diagram brought out the complexity of the
program. Customer and operations interface, in-honse systems engineering and integration (SE&I), and
involvement of the key cznters complicated the task of management.
After introductory discussions, the workshop broke into four working groups. Each group looked
at a number of manage_aent issues, including the functions and alternatives for Level B, the station's
configuration, and the related SE&I tasks. Each team worked up its ideas on the topic at hand and then
the larger group assembled to review the teams' findings. 3
The three-day workshop generated a lot of heated discussion, but it also brought together all of the
center people with a car_ araderie that had not been present before. Participants began to look past the
needs of their own centers to the needs of NASA as a whole. As one participant put it, "I've got to worry
about NASA because m), center can't float if NASA sinks. "4
Although the worksaop considered various issues, there were certain "knowns" for the program?
First, the initial deploym _nt for the $8 billion station would start in the early 1990s. Second, there would
likely be international involvement, but the details of that international participation were not clear.
Third, all centers would be involved. Fourth, a Phase B definition period would be initiated in FY85,
lasting for two years. Fifth, six advanced development test bed teams had already been assigned. And
finally, the lead center for Level B program management, assigned to Johnson, would have at least five
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major responsibilities: SE&I; business management; operations integration; customer integration; and
support of Level A.
During those three days the workshop considered several structural options for Level B, although
it was assumed that the Level B organization would evolve with the program and the functional structure
would accommodate major international involvement at the hardware development and customer levels. 6
The options ranged from a matrix type organizational approach to a more self-contained Level B
organization. In a fully matrixed situation, Level B would rely on the Johnson institution for manpower
and technical support. In a self-contained option, Level B would staff its own organization with people
from either Johnson or the other centers. In the shuttle project the lead center worked more in the
matrix fashion than as a self-contained entity, r and within the Johnson center itself at that time there
seemed to be a strong feeling that Level B in the space station program should be matrixed as well.
The Space Station Management Workshop also advanced technical integration panels as
coordination mechanisms for Level B and a carryover from the shuttle orbiter project. There were two
types of technical panels. First, disciplinary panels cut across the work packages. "We had a power panel,
life support panel, communications panel, data processing panel, and so forth. "8 The second type of
panels cross-cut and leveraged the individual discipline panels, tying together to integrate and distribute
their work. An example is the configuration and performance panel. 9
The workshop participants also discussed the interfaces that had to be established between Levels
B and A, as well as between the Level B and Level C organizations. They assumed that Level B could
be organized without knowing the specific Level A organization, which did not yet exist. 1° Clearly, a
customer utilization office at headquarters would have to interface with the customer integration office
at Level B. Also, the mission requirements working group function would have to provide an interface
between the two levels. In addition, the workshop promoted the idea of technical panels to integrate the
Level C offices and the program requirements. This was not new in NASA, but a carryover from the
previous lead center assignment in the shuttle project.
Although the workshop dealt with several procurement strategy options, the participants could not
decide which strategy would be best for the program. The options ranged from one systemic work
package for the station complex to total system contracts separated into four identifiable tasks within
the contract. The workshop outlined an approach: a procurement development group would be
established in the skunk works to develop a strategy before the RFP was released. This group would
make maximum use of the existing Space Station Task Force and its CDG, and it would include a wide
participation from all the Level C centers. 11
Inevitably there were discussions about the configuration of the station. Johnson preferred one
configuration, called the delta, but it seemed to have some serious limitations. After some spirited
debates it was decided to defer to the skunk works to produce a reference configuration.
SE&I also received its share of attention. The workshop developed several assumptions regarding
the performance of SE&I. First, as stressed in the administrator's office, there would be no system or
integration contractor. Second, the Level B SE&I might be partitioned to be performed at multiple
centers, and all centers would support in-house SE&I. Third, support contractors could be used for in-
house SE&I. The customer and operation integration functions had to participate in this function.
Estimates were developed regarding the manpower required. They showed that perhaps the technical
personnel required for the systems engineering and integration function would be Level B's most
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important human resource. Of course, all centers had to provide key Level B personnel, that is,
personnel for the SE&I tunction. 12
The workshop's mos! important decision was to proceed with the skunk works, a concept that had
originated in the work o! Clarence Kelly Johnson, an aircraft designer at Lockheed. 13 It was decided
that the skunk works world be located at Johnson Space Center no later than April 1984, and it would
have three objectives: ]) to define the station's functional requirements; 2) to develop a total
procurement plan; and 3) to create a Level B program plan. The workshop recommended that the skunk
works fold into Level B. The skunk works would perform evaluation and trade studies to define the
station's functional requirements and its reference configuration. Because Johnson had the lead center
assignment, the skunk wc,rks would be located in Houston, although all centers would be involved. The
CDG members and other center personnel would come to Johnson for approximately four to six months.
In addition, the skunk works should, to the maximum extent possible, utilize the organizations of
Johnson and the centers.
During the Space Station Management Workshop several concerns were expressed. For example,
Robert Freitag, representing headquarters, emphasized that "we should think international in the
procurement of Phase B, as well as SE&I, design, etc. "14 Thomas Moser of Johnson was concerned
whether adequate time e_isted to perform the necessary in-house systems engineering tasks and generate
associated products for t!ae RFP by July 1984, as the skunk works was expected to do. Ronald Brown-
ing of Goddard noted that the technical panels proposed as part of the formal space station Level B
organization might dilute direct management authority anti control. Jerry Craig stressed that budgetary
issues, that is, who actually controls the budget, needed to be worked out. is And the role of the
Department of Defense was still not clear. Despite these concerns, most people considered the workshop
at the Lunar Planetary hstitute to be a success.
The center directors did not attend the Space Station Management Workshop. They were present,
however, when Bob Goetz summarized the workshop's re.commendations in the management council
meetings held in Houston. 16
Many regarded the decision to form the skunk works to be the major accomplishment of the Space
Station Management Workshop. 17 This was certainly true. However, a number of other things were also
accomplished. Work began on program management details, and several options for the procurement
strategy, as well as for the organization of Level B, were identified. Many of the options and alternatives
developed during the workshop became the background from which the program management defined
its structure and function Over and above this, the notion that the space station program was an agency-
wide program became _ ore detailed in the meeting.
Skunk Works Begins
When the skunk wol ks began in Houston, the program manager, Nell Hutchinson, and his deputy,
John Aaron, assumed its leadership. 18 The skunk works focused on ret'ming the broad details outlined
by the CDG. The Space Station Management Workshop had already set forth the idea of a reference
configuration, which woad be an initial station configuration against which alternate ones could be
compared. 19 As the CD,_G had been short-lived, its output was quite rough. Jerry Craig, for example,
commented: "It was kind of-not detailed. The concept was an $8 billion space station. You could argue
whether it was 8 or 10, but it was right in the ball park. 02° The reference configuration that the skunk
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works produced would have to be much more detailed because the RFPs and the evaluation of the
contract and proposals for Phase B would be based on the reference configuration they produced.
To gear up for the skunk works, Hutchinson was briefed by Griffin, the director at Johnson.
Hutchinson had to work very closely with Clarke Covington who understood and led the contingent from
Johnson Space Center. Jerry Craig, who had conceived the plan during the days of the PPWG, was part
of Hutchinson's management team. 21 By then Hutchinson had picked Allen Louviere from Johnson to
head systems engineering, and others soon followed.
Staff for the skunk works had to come from all the field centers. Centers could send as many people
as they wanted, and there ended up more people in the building than there was space for. "And some
came in and worked for a month and left and went home. Some stayed throughout the time. "_ John
Aaron observed that there were "about 200 to 250 people, depending on what day you counted. About
half were from JSC, in round numbers, and about half were from other centers. _'3
The skunk works was intended to assemble personnel with technical talent in differing areas of
expertise, and physically isolate them from the rest of NASA's activities so that they could concentrate
on a specific mission. According to many, that is precisely what happened. 24 John Aaron summed it up
well.
And good things happened, to our surprise. There was a lot of hype before that about the fact
that the agency does not really have that kind of talent. But you aggregate people at that level
in one place, strip them of their superstructure, which tends to strip them of their agendas, and
it's amazing what great things happened. "_
People worked well together in what was considered a very positive environment. They worked side
by side and were very busy. Opinions came from various centers on the matters at hand. There were
differences in concepts and that created a lot of discussion, but it was a good environment in which to
work. 26
During the skunk works Hutchinson showed glimpses of his leadership style. A former flight
controller, he was accustomed to making detailed decisions. This trait carried over into the skunk works
where Hutchinson was intimately involved in the technical details of the space station reference con-
figuration. Consistent with headquarters' demands, his goal was to build a relatively strong Level B
program organization. He kept in touch with his center director, Griffin, but would not allow himself
to be perceived as a "JSC person" because he wanted all centers to have a fair hearing in decisions
pertaining to the station. 2r
The skunk works retained many of the task force's characteristics, the secret of skunk works being
not to manage it very much. ss Individuals were organized into several teams: engineering, utilization,
operations, procurement, and the other functions that needed to be addressed. _ Hutchinson then
challenged the team to go off and develop the configuration.
So in that context it was a collection of teams, but it wasn't really organized in the normal sense
of the work other than we had groups worrying about engineering accommodations or
utilization or the requirements of the users, operations, procurement angl_¢ and so forth. That's
how we got to the point of arriving finally at a reference configuration, w
The skunk works' unstructured organization was quite conducive to the intense discussions that took
place over the reference configuration.
During the skunk works Hutchinson built two coordination devices which later evolved into Level
B's formal coordination mechanisms. The first, the skunk works senior staff meeting, consisted of senior
members from all the field centers, including Langley, Ames, Kennedy, and JPL, centers which did not
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subsequently play a role in the work package decisions. The staff meeting was formed to democratize
derision-making on major issues such as the configuration. "Hutchinson went around the room and
asked for opinions about major decisions such as the power tower versus delta. _1 Although it was
unclear to some why centers having no accountability were asked to vote, on the whole the perception
of the decision-making as democratic stayed with many on the staff. Although democratic, the decision-
making process in these senior staff meetings was interesting:, those who were present got a chance to
vote, those who weren't did not vote. This pattern persisted as the senior staff meeting folded into the
Space Station Control Bc,ard (SSCB), the major integration mechanism in Level B.a2
The second coordination mechanism that evolved during the skunk works was the oversight
committee, composed of nine members, representing agency-wide interests and chaired by Phil
Culbertson. _ The committee met with selected members of the skunk works (i.e., Nell Hutchinson and
some of his team members) every two weeks to assess their progress. Although extensive documen-
tation is characteristic of 1:hespace station program, the oversight committee did not formally document
anything other than assigned actions. It was not unusual, therefore, that "you'd find a piece of paper that
was signed appointing an oversight committee. That's probably the last you'll hear of it."34The oversight
committee did not supera4se the skunk works, but where the committee differed with the skunk works
approach, it recommen&d not that skunk works stop, but that it do the committee's bidding as well. It
was perceived that some of the work was done to the specifications of the oversight committee not
because it had power over skunk works, but because the committee involved people who had the
authority to get things &,he. _
The skunk works wit_essed the maturing and evolution of the reference configuration that had been
initiated by the CDG. Although Johnson and Marshall had their preferred configurations, the
configuration known as ttle power tower emerged from the skunk works. The power tower configuration
maximized the accommodation of user and growth requirements while demonstrating design and
operations characteristics,. To some extent this symbolized the need to incorporate user requirements
into the station's design. Iohnson and Marshall were quite content to keep the power tower configura-
tion, even though it differed from their plans.
Accomplishments of the Skunk Works
The four-month long skunk works was a period in the :_tation's management history in which all the
centers participated with,:mt field center interests dominating the decision making process. A period of
frenetic activity, the skunk works produced several concrete results. It gave birth to the power tower
reference configuration, and this was no small task. All the centers were involved. The power tower con-
figuration was a small triumph for the idea that the station was to be user driven. 3e
During the skunk works period the contours of the level B organization in Houston took shape,
and Johnson personnel filled over half the leadership positi,ms. The complete management structure was
in place during the skunl,: works, a structure that was ready to go back into Johnson Space Center and,
with a small additional gtaff, launch Level B.37 The skunk works also produced an initial planning
document for the detailed definition, or Phase B, activity. 3s
Although the skunk works was physically separated fzom the rest of NASA, it was not completely
immune from environmental pressures or from the workings of the agency. For example, in addition to
analyzing the major conlignrations, skunk works personnel received an additional task. The House of
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Representatives passed a $155 million bill in late May 1984 that authorized work on a comprehensive
manned space station. The House Appropriations Committee had added studies for a man-tended
station to those already existing in the bill for a permanently manned station, so NASA was required
to conduct studies for an unmanned facility in addition to the studies already under way. Proponents of
the man-tended option argued that such studies provided more choices for space activities if NASA's
funding were reduced at some point in the future, aa
The skunk works' time frame paralleled the division of the space station into work packages. The
configuration born in the CDG underwent extensive revisions during the skunk works. The configuration
now had much more specificity, enabling a more informed work package split. It was, therefore, not
surprising that information from the skunk works was used by the center directors and the associate
administrator in their decisions regarding the work splits. This information also influenced the
procurement concept developed by the skunk works. For an integrated spacecraft, called a power tower,
to be split into work packages, the agency would have to do a distributive analysis of SE&I.
Production of the RFPs, one of the main tasks of the skunk works, had to take into account the fact
that division into four work packages meant added difficulty in managing the contractors. The agency
would have to have four procurement packages, and the integration of these four different packages
would have to be done in-house. The interfaces among the work packages would need to be clearly
identified, a task that could not be accomplished at the skunk works stage. Although they had decided
on power tower as the reference configuration, it lacked the specificity needed to clearly identify inter-
faces. John Aaron remembered that "at that point the fundamental question came up about the role of
the program management organization called Level B. "40 Level B had to be a systems engineering
organization that had the span of the total program and would balance resources and the engineering
problem. The procurement concept ultimately decided upon during the skunk works involved sending
out a single RFP, even though one work package would be associated with each of the four main
centers. 41
Although the skunk works accomplished what it set out to do, some participants had misgivings
about its results. The power tower configuration was a radical departure from the one that the CDG had
presented, 42 and this change was seen by many as the cause for the increase in the cost of the space
station program. Moreover, to many, the products of the skunk works could not be disassociated from
the results of the work package decision. 43 Thus, it seems that it may have been too early to divide the
program into work packages. Why couldn't NASA have waited until the studies from the contract in
Phase B were available before the work package decision was made? Finally, although the skunk works
produced a program plan, and even an organizational plan, in retrospect many noted that they were
rarely used when Level B went into effect. 44
As was envisioned in the management workshop held earlier, the skunk works kicked off the Level
B activity. The contours of Level B were beginning to take shape.
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CHAPTER 8
FORMATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS PROGRAM OFFICE
After President Reagan, in January 1984, directed NASA to build the space station, NASA took
steps to create a permanent program office. Phil Culbertson was chosen to be the associate
administrator for the space, station, and the Space Station Task Force was folding into the program
office at headquarters. Jarr_es Beggs had asked Culbertson as far back as 1981 to head up the space
station program. 1 For Culbertson this was a dream come true: as the third man in the administrator's
office, he had long desired to manage the space station program. Up until Beggs and Hans Mark were
appointed, Culbertson's job had been to serve as a liaison between the shuttle program and the
administrator's office. The shuttle had been delayed, an area of great concern to the Carter
Administration, and Culbertson was asked to leave the shutlle office, where he had been the technical
deputy associate administrator assisting Allan Lovelace, NASA's deputy administrator, in a more direct
involvement in the program. When Beggs and Mark assumed NASA command, therefore, Culbertson
sat in the administrator's office "without any really apparent job" because at that time the Reagan
Administration did not want to be heavily involved in shuttle affairs. 2 Culbertson continued to write all
the monthly reports, however, and met regularly with White House officials. Although Culbertson's
position, that of associate deputy administrator, was known as the third man in the agency 3 and was the
top nonpresidential appointment, Culbertson himself did not view it as a senior position since to him
it was a staff job, performing administrative functions within the administrator's office.
Upon their appointments Beggs and Mark agreed that Culbertson could represent the
administrator's office on the space station program, which was at that time in the advanced programs
office in the Office of Spa:e Flight, thus allowing Culbertson to stay involved in the technical side of
things as well, "doing the things that the administrator and deputy administrator didn't want to do. 04 This
is how Culbertson had become the associate deputy admiaistrator, with the responsibility for over-
seeing the space station program and the task force until NASA created a permanent office.
A casual look at headquarters' organizational chart may suggest that Culbertson had been demoted
by accepting the position of associate administrator. 5 Culbertson, however, did not see this change as
a demotion or even a sacrifice.
I did not feel that [it was a sacrifice] because I wanted to manage it[the space station office].
I was anxious to manege the program and I felt it was a greater challenge. Less prestige, bgt
a greater challenge, and more fun to do than be a staff officer in the administrator's office. °
It came as no surprise t¢, John Hodge, Robert Freitag, _md the members of the task force when
Culbertson was named the, associate administrator, r Culbertson had been a sort of "godfather" to the
task force. To others, however, it was a complete surprise that John Hodge wasn't picked to be the
associate administrator. 8 There was a general belief that the director of the task force would become
the "AA," and this had not happened, even though most of the strategy had been worked by Hodge and
Freitag. The passing over of Hodge and selection of Culbertson to head the space station program was
an indication that Hodge't_ influence was waning, as had been the perception to some in the centers. 9
During the task force period, Culbertson had delegated to Hodge very broad responsibilities for the
space station program. Hcwever, once the program office took shape, he planned to take command. In
doing so, Culbertson was very aware that his management style differed from that of Hodge. Hodge's
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style was loosely unstructured, whereas Culbertson's was more highly structured. To Culbertson, "John
was much more willing to invite a lot of people into decisions. He always wanted all the centers involved
in decisions. I am willing to listen to centers, but I don't want them to make the decisions. I believe in
a single point for decisions to be made. "1°
Culbertson had worked for NASA for seventeen years and really believed in NASA's established
operating style. He also had a realistic understanding of his own knowledge and skills, and would have
preferred to have had more experience at the centers. Many of his subordinates understood that
Culbertson was dedicated to the idea that the NASA system would work or could be made to work.
Culbertson delegated and relied on the people to whom he delegated. Many believed his style of
management was "institutional" because he relied on bureaucratic mechanisms to produce desired ends
in the space station program. 11
Yet there was another side to Culbertson which only some of his closest subordinates perceived.
Culbertson was very careful of the feelings of others. He measured his words and chose his speech so
as not to cast bad light if possible. His first act as associate administrator was to ask Hodge to be his
deputy. Hodge, who had worked closely with him as his deputy, noted that "Culbertson would never
harm anyone. "12Culbertson would later say that that "was both his strength and his weakness. "13
As the Space Station Task Force made the transition to a permanent office at headquarters, the
members of the task force had to adapt to a new leadership style. To the "mavericks" of the task force
this was a difficult transition. Hodge believed he had brought innovation to a growing and maturing
bureaucracy. The task force had been set up outside NASA's bureaucratic confines, and the dynamics
of leadership encouraged "bucking the system" whenever it was necessary. Now that the program had
moved from the conceptual to the definition stage, a return to the bureaucratic norms was inevitable.
And not only had the style of leadership changed, but the program had moved from the conceptual
phase, in which innovations were necessary, to the hard work involved in the detailed definition period.
After President Reagan's directive to NASA, the agency began to organize the permanent office.
As a result of the task force, NASA had agreed on the principle of the three-tiered organization
structure. The three tiers--Levels A, B, and C-had differentiated functions. "Headquarters [Level A]
would look out and direct, the main purpose was to protect Level B from the political environment and
allow them to go do the technical job. "14 The program management rested with Level B, while the con-
tractors were managed by the work package centers, who composed Level C.
Calling the levels A, B, and C represented a departure from the traditional NASA practice of
differentiating the levels into 1, 2, 3, and 4 (figure 3), but the three-tiered arrangement for the space
station was in conformity with the agency's historical practice. Level 1 was headquarters management,
which involved overall budgeting, securing program approval, public affairs, and in general managing the
agency's environmental interface. Level 2 was overall program management. Level 3 was the individ-
ual contracting group at the major centers, and Level 4 had been the contractor. So in comparing the
two management plans, the partitioning of functions across the levels more or less conformed to NASA's
historical practices. 15 For the space station program, the nomenclature differed because those that set
it up wanted to show that this program differed from the shuttle. "We thought our A, B, C, D would be
different from their 1, 2, 3, 4, and it was different. And if we had called ours 1, 2, 3, 4, people would
immediately say, 'Our i is the same as their 1, our 2 is the same as their 2,' and they were not quite the
sanl.e."
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Themajordifferencebetweenthetwocenteredontheroleof SF_.,&I. According to Freitag,
The systems engineering is an analytical and an engineering task, whereas the integration can
be not only analytical, but it can be an inspection, testing, acceptance type function, that may
have a tremendous amount of activity at the center, and the headquarters .... Knowing that those
things were possibilities in the future, we didn't want [to be restrained by] their old
nomenclature because we knew ours was apt to be different, and we didn't want people thinking
they were the same. 16
The permanent Office of the Space Station was not formally established until the summer of 1984
because the office could not be set up without congressional budgetary approval. 17 So, as the skunk
works progressed in Houston, Culbertson and his deputy, Hodge, undertook different activities related
to the role of the headquarters organization. Culbertson interfaced with Beggs and was involved in
budgetary matters, working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress to make
certain that the following year's budget was in line with NASA's projections. Meanwhile, Hodge con-
sidered the external aspects of the program. He was involved with the international agreements and the
user community, as well as with the Space Science Board, Science Applications Board, and continued
to interface with the DOD. 18
Of course, Freitag and members of the task force assisted both Culbertson and Hodge during this
period. 19
Structure of Level A
The Office of the Space Station at headquarters was structured similar to NASA's other program
offices. It consisted of an associate administrator and a deputy associate administrator who were
accountable for the space station program. Two staff offices--the policy and plans and program
support--assisted the associate administrator in his relations with Congress, OMB, DOD, and eventually
the international partners. Four line offices reported directly to the associate administrator: the business
management division; engineering, utilization, and performance requirements; and an operations
division. The last three offices were keepers of the space station requirements. The policy guidelines that
Level A was in charge of, and that Level B implemented, emanated from these three divisions. In
addition, a chief scientist position was established to support the associate administrator's office and
interface and be the protagonist for the "users" (i.e., the scientific community) so that the definition
period was responsive to user requirements.
There was, of course, some reason for concern on the part of the users. Burt Edelson, associate
administrator of OSSA, had expressed his concern to Beggs over the ability of his and related program
offices to effectively participate in the program. OSSA had envisioned that major benefits could be
provided by a properly implemented space station program, and believed it imperative that the space
station structure included ways for various NASA program offices to influence its design and to support
its development, g0 Edelson expressed his concerns in a memo to Beggs, and he later outlined several
techniques to bring this to bear on the space station program. 21 Beggs referred the matter to Culbert-
son. Even though Culbertson was "sensitive to the needs of the user," he noted that the management
would be better off with a single chain of command and that Edelson's concerns could be worked out
within the existing scheme.
In the end, such concerns notwithstanding, the structure of the Office of the Space Station was quite
similar to the one that the Space Station Task Force had originally recommended.
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Staffing
When the Space Station Task Force folded into the Office of the Space Station, some key task force
people moved into positions in the permanent office. John Hodge became the deputy associate adminis-
trator. Danny Herman, with his systems engineering backgromld, headed the engineering division. Terry
Finn, the architect of many of the task force's political strategies, was one of the leaders in the policy
and plans office. Not all the offices were manned by task force people, however. Culbertson appointed
William Raney to lead the utilization and performance requirements division, and David Black became
the chief scientist.
Although the original e.,.timates to staff the Office of the Space Station ran near a hundred, by the
time Administrator Beggs made his decision, he was willing to place only sixty individuals in that office.
Culbertson later requested an increase of fifteen permanent positions for the Office of the Space
Station. 22
Program OMce Gears Up
Initial organizing efforh for the program office took place at headquarters amid the hustle and
bustle of operating activities. Although the three-tiered structure of the space station program manage-
ment had already been decided, critical questions regarding the detailed tasks to be performed at each
one of the levels, and the interfaces among these levels, especially Levels A and B, had not yet been
worked out. These organizing efforts focused on specificity within jobs and the interconnections among
various tasks that needed to be done.
Louis DeAngelis, the head of NASA's Office of Human Resources and Development, helped in
organizing a process by which details of individual relationships could be defined. This process came to
be known as Cycle Zero. 23 Hodge described DeAngelis as "the personnel type, the people type, who
really understands management from a people point of view. "24 Hodge described Cycle Zero. "It's where
you don't write an organization, what you do is you write the job to be done and you lay out the job with
the interconnections between the pieces of the job, and as a result of that, you automatically have an
organization. "2s So, in a seine, it was a backwards way of doing things. To get the organization sketched,
people were assembled and the jobs were defined.
Of course, by then the t;tsk force members had discussed how they were really going to manage the
program once Phase B ended. The focus mainly centered on the relationship between Level A and Level
B, and who was responsible for what. In traditional management circles, this is often referred to as
responsibility charting. It involved a collaborative process to decide the jobs to be done, to determine
who would do each piece of the task, and what the interfaces between the jobs would be. 2¢
A series of documents, often referred to as the John Aaron Matrix, came out of these meetings.
Hodge "had tremendous hopes for it. And it certainly got people thinking the right way, but it never
really came to closure. Never really did. And to this day it hasn't. _7 Although this process was not new
to NASA, Hodge felt that this was one of the very few occasions when the activity was so well organized.
Usually "that was done with a bunch of the good o1' boys sitting down and splitting it up without
understanding really what the impact of their decisions were "28
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InterfaceBetweentheSpaceStationOfficeandtheProgramOffice
In additionto the structure of the space station office at headquarters, interfaces between
headquarters and the program office at Houston received attention during this period. The links between
the associate administrator and Nell Hutchinson, the program manager, were constructed. Interfaces
were also developed between the engineering, utilization, and performance requirements, and between
the operations divisions at headquarters and their respective counterparts at Level B. Dominating these
interfaces was Culbertson's decision regarding Level B's role and functions. True to NASA's historical
practices, Culbertson wanted to strengthen the program management and protect it from Washington's
political pressures. _
In the space station program there was an additional complication. Hutchinson had a conflict of
interest between the program and his own career path. This was a natural outgrowth of the decision to
have the lead center at Johnson, as well as a work package at Johnson reporting to the center direc-
tor. Since Level B was in charge of the overall project, it had to make judgments among the work
packages at Marshall, Lewis, Goddard, and Johnson, and created conflicting demands for the program
manager. The program's requirements pulled him in one direction, while his own career, which was
controlled by the director at Johnson, frequently pulled him in the other. Culbertson appreciated this
conflict, and he also recognized that there would be a continuing struggle between Level B at Johnson
and the Level C centers as they sought to increase the activities over which they had control. He decided
that for the overall health of the space station program he should make the position of program
manager as strong as possible. He gave Hutchinson as much authority as he could to show that he
supported Hutchinson as director of Level B. Although in retrospect Culbertson saw that in giving
Hutchinson so much authority he weakened himself as associate administrator, at the time it was a very
deliberate action. 3°
Other decisions also cemented the interface between Levels A and B. For example, the utilization
and performance requirements division assimilated user requirements, which then had to be interpreted
by its corresponding office at the program level. The requirements that were generated at the opera-
tions office at Level A also needed to be translated by its corresponding office at Level B. Within this
multiple context, insofar as the program was concerned, Culbertson allowed the primary contact between
Level A and Level B to be through himself and Hutchinson. 31 He believed that this strengthened
Hutchinson's position. Culbertson's decision thwarted DeAngelis' earlier efforts, but it was consistent
with Culbertson's aim to maintain a single decision point in the organizational hierarchy.
To others in the task force, however, Culbertson's decision appeared to undo all the start-up work
that they had done earlier. Ostensibly those activities tackled a classic issue in multi-tiered organizations:
the relationship between the levels. How do Levels A and B, with somewhat overlapping functions, link
up? Should they connect through the individuals heading the respective levels, or should there be a
multiple contact level incorporating the offices in charge of operations, engineering, budget, and
customer utilization, offices that had a linking mechanism? Culbertson decided to structure the contact
primarily between the heads of levels, thus undoing for the most part the earlier activities. This meant
that whenever there was a disagreement between an expert at Level A and an expert at Level B, it was
always resolved with Hutchinson going to Culbertson. 32
Budgets were a second mechanism by which Level A interfaced with Level B. Given the three-
tier structure of the space station program, each level required budgets for performing certain kinds of
jobs. On the whole, the responsibility for putting the budget together rested with Level A at
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headquarters. Level B took most of the dollars because, after all, the contracts were managed at the
field centers, and the program office was empowered to coordinate these activities. After the budget was
approved, Level A's money ,_me off the top. The remainder went to Level B, which then administered
the budgets for the work packages. Since Level A had the main budget responsibility, however, this
meant it had leverage and could insist things be done that Level A felt were important. Bones of
contention included automation and robotics. _
As with budgets, the space station office at headquarters controlled some of the key program
milestones. These milestone g, the results of the Space Station 'Task Force's efforts, were already formed
by March 1984.34 They served not merely as an interface mechanism between the levels, but also as a
means to control the progress of the Phase B definition study and to keep the program on schedule. In
August 1984 the responsibilities for Levels A and B, the budgets, and the milestones, were signed into
agreement between the Associate Administrator for the Space Station Phil Culbertson, Gerry Griffin,
center director at Johnson, and Neil Hutchinson. _
Consistent with Culbertson's desire to make Level B strong, Hutchinson and Grift'm did most of the
recruiting for Level B. Although Culbertson was always consulted before senior positions at Level B
were filled, Level A, in general, had little input in the selectioa process. There was, however, one major
exception. Bill Raney, who _aeaded up the user requirements office at Level A, had asked for names of
those being considered fo_ his counterpart position at Level B and was given the opportunity to
comment on the candidate., .36 Carl Shelley was eventually selected for the position.
Shelley's first assignmc.nt was to go to headquarters where he attended a workshop and met
potential users and all the organizational user sponsors. He learned that there was a lot of dissatisfaction
with the way the manned space flight function within NASA treated users. Because of Shelley's early
contact with the user com_ unity a comfortable relationship was established between the users and the
two offices within the spact: station program. 37 This input to the selection process at Level B and the
subsequent orientation was not commonplace in the space station program.
The interface between Level A and Level B were not Culbertson's only concerns. During this period
he made institutional arr_tngements in order to clarify and strengthen the relationships between
headquarters and the center directors.
Institutional Linkages
Culbertson had reason to focus on building institutional linkages for the space station program. In
1984, the center directors reported to either the associate administrator of OAST, OASS, or OASTS,
in charge of, respectively, the science, technology, and development programs. Although the space
station program was an agency-wide program and would assume importance in later years, none of the
centers reported directly to Culbertson when he became the associate administrator. They all reported
to other associate adminislrators. Since the Level B and Level C offices reported to a center director,
Culbertson had to rely on the cooperation of other associate administrators to implement technical space
station policy. Because the center director reported to an associate administrator, Culbertson, who was
accountable for the space station program, did not have a direct institutional line to the program
manager (see figure 4). Culbertson explained his dilemma.
And here I was Associate Administrator for the Space Station, and I had my work going on at
the field centers, all cf whom reported to somebody else at my same level. At Houston the
organization consisted of a center director at the Johnson Space Center, and then he's got a
75
C
©
>
_d
O
C
O_
(D-) _-
(1)
c
C o -E
O co -_
C)
0 o
k_..
CO
0 l
co
(I)
CO
(1)
E
<
>,
(1)
c-
ii
O O
O
'-a
,,¢,
!
!
_D
IlL
I;:I
O
AI
T6
ORIGINAL
OF POOR
PAGE IS
QUALITY
bunch of subordinate., that report to him, but one of them is my program manager, Level B
person, who is looking at the entire space station .... The lines of authority that we tried to make
happen were that I directed [the program manager], who in turn was trying to direct the efforts
of [the four Level C project managers], who had responsibility to do the details. But from the
administrator's standpoint, he was holding the center director at Goddard responsible for the
overall work that Goddard did. So in fact what we found was that the only way we could for-
really provide direction was ... I just directed the center director, he directed Level B, and Level
B, through the center director, directed those other center directors, who directed their people.
In a very ritualistic way that's the way it had to happen. Fortunately we normally had enough
sense to ignore the ritual and wj?rk problems directly. But there was always a lurking threat that
the system would break down. "_
Since the space station program relied on the institution, and the institution itself was represented
by two different offices, Culbertson formalized the practice of dual interface mechanisms. The first was
the Space Station Steering Committee; the second was the Management Council. The Space Station
Steering Committee, which had existed during the task force days, comprised primarily associate
administrators drawn from various program offices. _ It served to keep headquarters program offices
informed of the space station's progress and to solicit the advice of the other AAs. After the task force
became the program office, the Space Station Steering Committee continued, and its attendance
improved. 40
The Management Co_mcil also provided institutional linkages. Culbertson was sensitive to the fact
that NASA's technical e_:pertise lay at the field centers, who would ultimately manage the work
packages. Therefore, the institutional leadership at the centers had to be coopted into the program. To
accomplish this, the Management Council, consisting of the directors of the centers involved, was
formed. The council was formally established in November 1984, but informally had met as far back as
the Langley meetings. In these meetings Cnlbertson stressed information that needed to be reinforced
at the project office level, such as the importance of the users' requirements in dealing with the
contractors.
Early Accomplishments of the Level A Program Office
The program office a_:complished a number of things before the Phase B contractor studies began.
Some were continuations of the task force's activities, some were new initiatives begun after President
Reagan's address, and some were thrust upon NASA by Congress and other pressure groups. These
accomplishments fall into three categories: 1) international participation; 2) user requirements; and 3)
congressional mandates.
International Participatien
The seeds for international participation had been sov, n before the Space Station Task Force was
formed. Working level di:;cussions between NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), Canada, and
Japan, had occurred from 1982 through 1984, prior to President Reagan's decision to go ahead with the
space station. The talks ct lminated in 1984 when President Reagan, in his State of the Union Message,
invited U.S. allies and frieads to participate in the program. In the spring of 1984, Jim Beggs, along with
a number of others from both inside and outside NASA, visited Europe, Canada, and Japan and joined
in high-level discussions on international participation. The space station was also discussed at the 1984
London Economic Summit.
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In April, Culbertson established the Working Group for International Cooperation, chaired by
Robert Lottman. 41 Its objectives, according to Culbertson, included the development of management
plans and schedules for the defmition phase, evaluation and support for policy development, technical
analysis, and participation in the negotiation of international agreements.
The pace of these international negotiations was hectic. In June 1984, space station personnel and
European, Canadian, and Japanese government representatives met for the first time since the London
Economic Summit. Following this meeting, the Working Group on International Cooperation reviewed
the language of the RFPs emerging from the skunk works and began to draft a Memorandum of
Understanding for the Phase B RFP.
The international negotiations were led by Margaret "Peggy" FinareUi, under the overall direction
of Bill Raney, and with the assistance of a number of people, including William E. "Gene" Rice,
representing Level B in the Program Office. In the spring of 1985, ESA, Canada, and Japan signed the
Memoranda of Understanding with NASA. It provided the framework for international cooperation on
the space station during Phase B.42
While these negotiations were going on, the program office at headquarters was also wrestling with
the issues of managing the international partners once they came on board. The In'st question the
program office had to tackle was how to treat the international partners. Should the European,
Japanese, and Canadian efforts be treated like the other work packages and be integrated into the
management structure in a manner similar to the other four work packages? Or should they be put in
a position where their laboratory work would be done at Level C, the place our lab work was
performed? From a headquarters point of view, the latter solution would have been simpler, but it was
politically impossible to do. The international partners wanted to be seen as true partners. They did not
want to play a role which seemed to be at Level D.
The second issue the program office had to deal with was the degree to which NASA should strive
for commonality or interchangeability between foreign and American laboratory parts. The question of
commonality became an issue because the Europeans did not want NASA dictating what particular
design or what components they were going to buy. The basic principle of international participation has
traditionally been one of no funds exchange. That is, Europeans did not have to buy U.S. components
for their laboratory. However, if there was no attempt at commonality, then the logistics and spare parts
problem would increase dramatically. This would also affect training for on-orbit repairs. 43
A third management issue related to the exchange of technical data in the international sphere. The
concern that the DOD had over technology transfer was going to be an issue, 44 and the program office
had to decide how to deal with it.
Focus on the Users
Responsiveness to user requirements was one of the guiding principles of the space station program
from the very beginning. When the program took shape, there were two objectives vis-a-vis the users.
The program had to continue to be responsive to the users so that the space station program's fund-
ing could be stabilized over the years. There was also a need to incorporate user requirements in the
station's definition stage. Before the Phase B studies began, the program office undertook several
initiatives to accomplish both these objectives. 45
To sustain the user constituency, the program office continued initiatives that the task force had
started. Because of its visibility in Washington, the scientific community continued to be important.
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Under the auspices of NASA's OSSA, an advisory committee on space station, called the Task Force
on Scientifc Users of the Space Station (TFSUSS) was created from the extant advisory committee,
SESAC. TFSUSS was ch_tired by Peter Banks, Professor of Electrical Engineering and Director of the
Space, Telecommunications, and Radio Science Laboratory at Stanford University. The Banks
Committee, consisting of some twenty U.S. scientists and several international observers, assisted NASA
in planning the station's scientific utility, and served as a focal point for scientific input into space station
activities. It also clarified the relationship between new capabilities and the existing science and
applications program and periodically updated scientific requirements.
Although it was clear, even during the task force days, that the scientists who had influence in
Washington-i.e., space astronomers--were not really a user constituency, they were, nevertheless,
potential users of the station. However, the space station opened up whole new lines of science and
space endeavors--life sciences, material sciences---in ways that had never before been possible. 4e Com-
pared to the older and more mature disciplines such as space physics, these sciences were relatively
young. This meant that the constituency was young as well, and the continued support of (and lack of
criticism from) the overall scientific community remained important.
The scientific community was not the only user group. "The support from users really comes in the
folks who want to develop new technologies, want to do commercial things, commercial folks that want
a chance to get to space "4z Consequently, the program office established the Commercial Advocacy
Group, another continual ion of the Commercial Working Group which had existed as part of the task
force. It was empowerec to develop domestic and international commercial participation and func-
tioned as part of the utilzation and performance requirements division. By incorporating commercial
users, NASA also encouraged private sector participation, a theme dear to the Reagan Administration. 48
The continued efforls to nurture the user community produced tangible results. In May 1984, a
group of scientists, led by Robert Jastrow of Dartmouth College, wrote to Congress in support of the
space station's scientific raerits. With regard to the commercial users, Space Industries lnc.'s Max Faget
signed a Memorandum of Understanding in August 1985 to exchange information with NASA on their
respective programs during the station's Phase B definition and preliminary design period. 49
However, all was not smooth sailing. As the Phase B RFP was prepared, the Banks Committee had
concerns over whether l he user requirements would be adequately incorporated into the station's
preliminary design and definition. Banks wrote directly to Jim Beggs, the President, and various
newspapers, but he event ually came to believe that the user requirements were being incorporated into
the space station definiti:m. 5°
To incorporate user requirements into the space station definition studies, the program office
initiated a series of worD;hops. The workshop at Hampton, Virginia, was designed to influence the RFP
generation in the skunk works. Another meeting, held in September 1984, briefed user sponsors, both
American and international. These workshops and associated Management Council briefings resulted
in the functional requirements envelope, which was defined before the contracts on the Phase B studies
started. The workshops also organized and refined the user requirements so that they could be
meaningfully incorporated into the contractor studies in Phase B. 51 The early task force effort had
sought to understand th_ data NASA had collected from its potential users. After the space station
program was approved, user needs took on a more serious note. This is because now they were
requesting dollar commitments for future use of the station rather than merely asking if sometime in
the future they might be interested in using it and what would they like it to do. 52
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The early studies conducted during the task force period produced a large collection of potential
uses for the station. On the engineering side, however, ideas were maturing about the space station
configuration and its capabilities. The two sides had to reach some compromise. From Raney's point
of view
the first major thing to do was to try and understand what the users had told us, and then to
guess as to what sort of functional capability the station should have, but stay away from
specifying the design configuration and speak rather to general functions. And that had to do
with, for instance, the level of power available for users, number of crew available for user
functions, the channel capacity of communications, and what sorl_of repair work might need to
be done on user equipment as well as space station equipment, w
These questions had definite design implications: whether to have a mobile crane of some sort to move
things around on the outside, how big to make the doors to get equipment in and out, what kind of
storage was needed for spare parts and workbenches, and the like. These were, in fact, the basic level
of functional capability that the station required. A formal document called the Functional Requirements
Envelope was produced in the spring of 198554 which was actually the beginning of the incorporation
of user requirements into the station's design. As the contract studies began, it represented another early
accomplishment of the program office at headquarters.
Dealing with Congress
Although by January 1984 President Reagan had given the go-ahead for the space station program,
a number of battles were yet to be fought in Congress. The subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee had not approved the money to pay for the facility. President Reagan had asked Congress
to approve $7.5 billion in obligational authority for NASA for the fiscal year ending in September 1985.
This included an initial request of $150 million for a permanently manned space station. Several
members on the House Appropriations Committee were not favorably disposed to the permanently
manned space station, _ however, and so Congress produced some additional directives. Two additions
impacted the space station program in a major way. The first of these incorporated an option for a man-
tended facility in the Phase B RFPs. Stimulated by the efforts of Edward Boland from Massachusetts,
NASA was additionally required to conduct a study on the man tended option. In an effort to appease
those interested in a fully automated facility, the lawmakers also told NASA "to complete a second study
on space station automation and robotics and spend no less than 10 percent of the cost of the facility
on such systems." As President Reagan signed the legislation on July 16, 1984, approving what NASA
officials believed would be the first incremental step toward a permanently manned space station, the
legislation incorporated mandates to NASA to study both these options. _
NASA subsequently established the Advanced Technology Advisory Committee to examine the
potential for incorporating these advanced technologies in the station and submitted its first report to
the Senate Appropriations Committee on April 1, 1985, before the Phase B contractor studies began. 57
The man-tended option presented its own management problems. First, there was the question of
the concept of a man-tended station. As the space station idea had evolved during the task force days,
laboratories and habitats (part of the space station) had been perceived as part of the manned system;
the unmanned part was the platforms. The science to take place in the station--experimental
science--generally required human presence. It did not consist of long-term instruments that would be
set up and run for extended periods of time unattended. Culbertson strongly (and unsuccessfully)
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opposedtheman-tendedconceptbecauseheconsideredit totally inconsistent with the purpose of the
space station. Culbertson c,xplained the changes that the man-tended option would require.
All the characteristics of the space station that had emerged during the early days of the concept
were the kind of science which required man's presence. Now ... we were told that we had to
do this study of what could be done in the space station in a man-tended mode. Well, that
meant that either we dreamed up a new class of science, new set of science experiments to go
in it, or we were going to modify scientific equipment which was planned to be used in the
manned mode, and wc also had to modify characteristics of the space station tPomake sure it
would successfully suFport these instruments during periods of man's absence. _
Now, however, there was the problem of trying to persuade Congress against the man tended option in
light of NASA's opposition to that option. Culbertson expl-,dned:
We were asked to do a study that most of us thought was a study of an illogical thing to do, and
we knew that if we concluded that it was illogical or expensive to do, we would be accused of
not doing a good study. We had to bend over backwards to try to make this concept that w_
opposed look as good as it could, or the study would be rejected. And that was difficult to do. _"
As Culbertson wresth:d with the issue, the first cracks in the space station program organization
appeared, a precursor to future events. The skunk works had produced the RFF for the Phase B
proposals. In the bustle of their activity, the operating skunk works did not worry about congressional
mandates regarding the man-tended option, automation, and robotics. This had been forgotten, in spite
of pressure from the headquarters program office. 6° Ultimately this was resolved by inserting the two
options in the RFP at headquarters. As time went on, it was difficult for some of the members of the
Office of the Space Station to understand why the man-teeded option had not been seriously studied.
The policy and plans office was concerned about this, realizing that NASA would have to submit
something to the congres,,_ional committees before the configuration was selected. 81
Culbertson solved the problem of political feasibility by establishing an ad hoc task force on the
man-tended option, chaired by Richard Carlisle. The study was finally done at Goddard, not at Johnson.
To many in the program office, however, Culbertson's thinking was not clear. 62 They wondered why
Level B at Johnson had not been asked to conduct the study. Culbertson himself had two legitimate
reasons. First, the study }tad to originate from a credible source, especially since NASA had opposed
the man-tended option in the past. Second, he did not want the Level B studies to be mired down in
considering the man-tended option, particularly in light of his own view that this option was really not
a logical alternative. _
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CHAPTER 9
FORMATION OF LEVEL B
John Hodge and the task force considered the process of program definition in early 1983, as well
as the organizational flmctions to be carried out, and the staffing approach for the space station
definition period. As Hodge saw it, the definition process would unfold over time and would move from
user needs to mission requirements, which would then dictate the system requirements. The system
requirements then would set the boundary conditions necessary for definition and configurations. 1
With respect to staffing, Hodge expected to use incentives to attract NASA'sbest and brightest from
all the centers and headquarters. Personnel rotation would keep a fresh outlook over time, although
there would be a degree of permanence to ensure continuity. 2
Although this thinking took place in early 1983, the actual organizing for program management
(Level B) received seriou:; attention only after Presidential approval of the space station program a year
later. By then NASA ha,:! chosen the lead center concept for the program, which nullified Hodge's
assumption that control of the program would remain with headquarters.
At the Space Station Management Workshop held at the Lunar Planetary Institute (outside JSC)
in March 1984 an attempt was made to detail the structure of the program office. This three-day
meeting, however, was to,.) brief to allow anything except the broad contours of the program's structure
to emerge. Much of the discussion revolved around how the program office should be structured in
terms of its relationship to the lead center, Johnson, since participants were still enthralled by the lead
center concept operating in the space shuttle program. Although these two themes dominated the
discussion of organizational structure, the workshop also outlined a structure of the program office itself
and examples of possible space station program management organization were produced.
The Space Station Management Workshop addressed the broad structure of program management
and the coordination mechanisms that would be necessary between Levels B and A and between B and
C. Although the idea tha_: there would be four work packages had gained acceptance, the participants
were uncertain as to hov, the work packages would be organized. Amid this general air of ambiguity,
the members identified three critical organizational issues with respect to the Level B-C interface. These
were: a) definition of in-house SE&I; b) the impact of adwmced development and test beds; and c) the
coordination mechanism., themselves. Program office activities during the definition phase were also
roughed out?
As the workshop par! icipants debated tentative program management structure, they were awed by
the extent of the SE&I tc be performed by the program office during the definition period. Unlike the
shuttle, which had clean interfaces, the space station, with its four work packages, had very complex
interfaces. It was clear that the space station would present a systems engineering job that was quite
complex and far exceeded the one NASA experienced during the shuttle program. Because of this
complexity the staffing for SE&I at the program office would have to be much greater than that for the
shuttle. The SE&I staff would have to integrate the many interfaces that had been created in the space
station program. This included the interfaces created by the four work packages, in addition to those
generated by the advanced technology development efforts at the eight test beds.
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The Metamorphosis Begins: Skunk Works to Level B
During the skunk works the space station program management organization began to take form.
Although the initial phase of the skunk works was devoted to developing a reference configuration, it
also created a skeletal Level B organization. In fact, a chart of the interim Level B organization
appeared in the draft of the "Space Station Program Initiation Agreement" that Gerry Griffin forwarded
to the acting associate administrator for the interim space station office. The chart identified the support
and llne functions performed in the program office. The support functions included managing the RFP,
administration, and program planning. The line functions included systems engineering and integration,
cost analysis and budget management, advanced development integration, customer integration, and
procurement. The informal organization also had the Office of International Affairs and Systems
Requirements and Quality Assurances (SR&QA). 4
During the latter phase of the skunk works, serious attention focused on the formation of Level B,
an activity which paralleled the activity of the Source Evaluation Board (SEB). (The SEB will be dis-
cussed later in this chapter.) Since Neil Hutchinson headed the SEB, the organization of Level B was
delegated to John Aaron. s
By this time Culbertson had formulated the initial work package splits which was a major part of
Level B's coordination problem. As Aaron began to organize Level B, therefore, he had to be concerned
with Level B's tasks and the appropriate allocation of work among the work packages. How should Level
B and the entire agency fashion a coherent whole from the mass of data generated by the work package
contractors' studies? Aaron explained the problem as he saw it.
Right there at that point the fundamental question came up of the role of the program
management organization called Level B. Is that a systems engineering organization that has
the span of the total program, and therefore should be able to balance the resources and
balance the engineering problem? Or was Level B's function one of splicing coordination and
connecting parts and pieces that were designed and built in a distributive environment? The
engineering prerogative question of Level B and the program management organization versus
the centers and their projects came up very early. In fact, it was never really resolved. 6
The lead center concept of program management hinged on the assumption that the center directors
would cooperate and share their resources. Resource sharing in this context meant that the directors
would put their best systems engineers at Level B. The work package splits decided upon by the
associate administrator emphasized that the SE&I function would have to draw from all centers. Each
of the work package centers would have to share its burden of SE&I at their own centers in addition
to the SE&I job performed at Level B at Johnson. For example, the common module at Marshall
required significant SE&I effort from that center, r and the power responsibility assigned to Lewis would
involve its own SE&I effort.
Meanwhile, international participation also increased the complexity of program management. By
the time that the skunk works ended it was obvious that the international partners would conduct
parallel studies and that Level B would have to keep track of them and splice their recommendations
into the definition of the space station configuration. 8
The space station program increased in complexity once more with the inclusion of the Technical
and Management Information System (TMIS) Project, an idea originally developed by John Hodge and
the task force. John E. Cools was hired to start the TMIS project in Level B. 9 While the skunk works
was in progress, Hutchinson established the Space Station Information Systems Requirement Panel,
which was given the task of defining the administrative communications, engineering tools, and databases
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that would be needed throughout the space station program. This panel, a continuation of the Infor-
mation Systems Working Group, was charged with obtaining the statement of work and the
requirements for the RFP for the Phase B contract. Cools' job was to coordinate and integrate the
requirements of TMIS. Fie also def'med the budget, the procurement process, and the implementation
of operations. Cools held this position for about a year and a half, and in the fall of 1985 it became the
TMIS project office. 1°
Evolution of Program Office Organization
The small interim Level B organization informally established during skunk works formed the
nucleus of the larger organization once the Phase B study contracts were awarded. This organization
performed major tasks before the beginning of the Phase B studies, including program planning,
developing an organization, and activities related to procurement--i.e., preparing an RFP, the release
of the RFP, the SEB, and the like. When the interim program office was established, the importance
of the international dimt:nsion was already fully appreciated by NASA officials. Because of this there
was already an internati:mal office reporting to Hutchin:;on, which was a departure from the Space
Station Management Workshop's original intentions. The nucleus of the TMIS integration office was also
in place at that time.
Two factors influenced the evolution of the Space Station Program Office. First, as we have seen
earlier, Culbertson had decided that the Level B organization should be strong and autonomous. 11With
this understanding, Aaron initially, and later Hutchinson, began to build their program office at John-
son. 12 One of the recommendations of the Space Station Management Workshop was not heeded, so
the program office did not rely on the JSC institution. It was not matrixed with Johnson, a factor noticed
by personnel there. Robert DoLts, who helped organize the management workshop, was concerned that
of all the successful options that they had developed, the one that Hutchinson and Aaron chose was
"toward the more undesirable end of the self-contained." tie found it frustrating that the time had been
spent at the Lunar Planetary Institute meeting discussing Level B organization and all their work was
being totally ignored. "I came back a couple of times from skunk works and said to Bob Goetz, 'Hey,
you just wouldn't beliew: what those guys are doing. They're doing exactly opposite." Considering the
extensive commitment oF the JSC institution to the shuttle and the extremely difficult job before them,
one can understand why the program office evolved to a more self-contained than matrix-supported
organization. 13
The SE&I task was complicated by a number of factors. Technological interfaces were complex, and
they fell into two difficult groups. First, there were the major architectural components: assembly struc-
ture, laboratory modules, habitation module, and the free Ilying platforms. Second, there were a number
of systems that cut across architectural components: power, data management, and the like. The two
clusters generated multiplicative interfaces since they all had been distributed across four field centers. TM
In addition, many of the station's requirements were expected to mature only during Phase B.
However, studies of req_zirements imposed by emphasis on missions and operations took place and the
international negotiations progressed. These studies meant that the requirements would be changing,
and SE&I would have ':o adapt to those changes. For all practical purposes, in decisions related to
configuration, SE&I became the final arbiter of the data generated from various sources: trade studies
of work package centers, advanced development test beds, studies of user and operations requirements,
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and even the international partners. As a result of these very complex interfaces, the Systems
Engineering and Integration Office, reporting to Hutchinson, became the focus of the engineering
activity conducted during the def'mition period.
As had been suggested by the Space Station Management Workshop, and consistent with the interim
program organization operating during the skunk works, the Space Station Program Office that came
into existence in April 1985, before the Phase B studies began, consisted of four main line functions:
program management, customer integration, data management and operations, and SE&I. is There was
one major difference, however. The workshop thought advanced development would be a separate line
function within the program office. The interim program organization had functioned this way. Before
the Phase B studies commenced, however, advanced development became a part of the SE&I function.
Each of the Level B offices had the primary task of coordination, although this was much more
complex for the SE&I function during the definition stage. Coordination was achieved by a hierarchy
of panels, structured, in many respects, by the panel structure formed during the shuttle development.
Coordination Mechanisms Within Level B
The program organization created a series of committees for coordinating the tasks Level B had to
accomplish during Phase B. There were two kinds of committees: panels and boards, le They were
hierarchically arranged in a pyramidal structure as shown in figures 5 and 6.
At the base of the pyramid were the technical integration panels, as we noted in chapter 7. Based
on the Space Station Management Workshop's recommendations, both disciplinary and cross-cutting
panels were employed. Most of the cross-cutting panels were chaired by members of the Level B SE&I
organization. 17
Above the technical panels in the pyramidal structure lay the System Integration Board (SIB), and
three key panels: operations, customer integration, and international technical and integration. These
three sought to ensure optimization of the configuration of the space station within the evolving
requirements of operations, user needs, and the international partners. The SIB was perhaps the single
point in the engineering organization empowered to optimize space station configuration within the set
of requirements provided by the three panels. Although the three panels and the SIB were hierarchically
alike, in the definition phase the SIB's role was more significant than that of the panels. 18
The original design and intent of these panels and boards was to balance out the differing priorities
established at the work package level and to bring them together to fulfill the system requirements. The
coordination mechanisms ensured checks and balances. Aaron explained:
The resources that we brought on board in the form of contractors actually worked for the
project managers at the field centers .... For example, the data processing resource belonged
to Clarke Covington; that meant he was the administrator of that contract. It's obvious that data
processing affects all elements of the space station in terms of how do you define the
architecture of the services, where you put the computer, where you put the CRTS, what's their
functionality. All these questions are global kinds of questions, and you get into trouble if he
[Clarke] asks the global view of that from the perspective of a single work package .... If you
asked a data processing guy his view of the space station, then he saw it through the eyes of a
computer. If you ask a power system guy his view of space station, it is through the eyes of guys
who work with solar panel_ and power systems. The question is how you keep all those
checks and balances going. 9 "'"
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The job of the integration panels was to make sure that the trade and engineering studies conducted by
the contractors took into account the global question of what the space station requirements should be,
not just from the point of view of one center.
The panels exchanged data important in coordination, but they were not empowered to make
decisions. The decision-making body in the Space Station Program Office consisted of a control board,
which was known as the :_pace Station Control Board (SSCB). _
Smiling
Once Hutchinson and Aaron assumed command of the Level B organization during the skunk
works, they faced the problem of staffing. They had to pick individuals to head the respective line
organizations and the staff functions. Hutchinson and Griffin negotiated these staffing choices. Since
Johnson was the lead center, the managers of the Level B offices also came from Johnson. They were,
respectively, AI Louviere for the SE&I Office; Richard Thorson (who was RFP manager during skunk
works) for the data man:igement and operations office; Carl B. Shelley for the customer integration
office; and Thomas Kloves for the program management office. Gene Rice headed the international
office, and John E. Cools led the TMIS integration office. 21
Most of those choses for these positions had one thing in common. They had not been associated
with the Space Station TAsk Force. In reality, few people from Johnson who had worked on the Space
Station Task Force or the Concept Development Group had responsibility for any of the major offices
within the Space Station Program Office. Johnson personnel noticed this, and they did not understand.
Not privy to the negotiations between Hutchinson and Griffin, many at Johnson came to believe that
Hutchinson brought in people, mainly from flight operations, to serve as key personnel, and people who
had key jobs in the task lorce were not even considered. This meant, to some, that Hutchinson chose
to go back to his friends _a flight operations. Once it was perceived that this was going on, many people
who had worked on the task force decided not to stay with the program office. 22
The size of the staff that Hutchinson and Aaron had considered also created difficulties at Johnson.
Hodge's original estimate for the program office was nearly 200. Hutchinson took that seriously, even
though this was a huge number for a program office when compared to the number of people in the
program office of the shuttle. Hutchinson also discarded the alternative preferred by the Space Station
Management Workshop (i.e., fully matrixed with the Johnson institution) partly as a result of his own
(and headquarters') desire to create an autonomous Level B organization. To add to these difficulties,
many at Johnson underestimated the complicated SE&I job required for the space station. Their own
shuttle experience was different because most of the systems engineering job had been done by the
shuttle prime contractor.
At the Langley meeti_ag in September 1983, the center directors had agreed that the requisite SE&I
personnel would be provided to Johnson, and, in general, the staffing could be met by all the field
centers involved. Howeve r, when Level B was organized for the Phase B studies, most of the centers
declined to send a sufficieat number of SE&I personnel. Johnson people started calling the other centers
asking for additional personnel, but most of the centers refused the request. This was a major turning
point in the formation ot Level B.23 According to James Kingsbury, the animosities really started to
build at that point. Becatlse other centers had refused to send more personnel, the staffing had to be
completed with Johnson personnel. There were a few from headquarters, a few from the other centers,
but by and large, everybody else from the skunk works had returned to their centers. 24 In addition, it
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was also becoming evident that the early estimates of the SE&I task had been understated, perhaps
because the center directors did not appreciate the complexities involved. Even at Johnson, which had
the lead center assignment and the program office, Hutchinson's estimates of SE&I personnel required
were considered to be too high, 2s indicating once again that there was no real grasp of the SE&I job
to be done.
Fortunately, Hutchinson had a powerful ally in Griffin, who was able to persuade individuals like
Carl Shelley, who was initially resistant, to join the Space Station Program Office. 2e In spite of Griffm's
efforts, however, staffing was not easy. Since Johnson had the lead center assignment as well as a work
package, both Level B and Level C offices had to be staffed. Clarke Covington would head up the
Johnson Projects Office, and when Hutchinson and Aaron sought people to fill the Level B organization,
they found themselves competing with Covington. The program organization consumed more human
resources that had been expected, so this brought the two offices into combat many times, both wanting
the same person to work in their office. One of the tactics Level B used was to offer promotions, which
Level C was not able to do at that time. This caused a lot of frustrations in staft'mg Level C, although
promotions were eventually given in Level C as well. 27 There were some individuals who chose to join
Level C rather than the program office. For example, Bob Dotts, who enjoyed his previous technical
management assignment and wanted to be closer to hardware design, joined the Projects Office, and
so did Jerry Craig. 28
The pattern of recruitment generated different perceptions in other centers. The fact that most of
the major offices within the program office were headed by Johnson people was not unnoticed. Even
the panels were headed mostly by individuals drawn from Johnson. The other centers believed that they
had given up detailees to work at the program office at Johnson. They did not understand why their
people had no significant positions within the program organization. 29
There is one set of staffing decisions that did not involve Hutchinson. The center directors selected
the project officers in the four work package centers. 3° Ron Browning at Goddard, Ron Thomas at
Lewis, Luther Powell at Marshall, and Clarke Covington at Johnson were chosen to be the project
officers. It was unclear why Hutchinson did not show any interest in these decisions. If the program
organization was responsible for coordinating the work packages of the four centers, why did the
program manager not get involved in the selection of the project officers? In this instance, the center
directors made these decisions, checking first with Culbertson, but without consulting the program
manager. By not participating in the selection of the project officers at the centers, Hutchinson missed
a chance to strengthen Level B and its relationship to the centers.
Budgetary Issues
Along with staffmg_ Aaron, the deputy program manager, was also involved in outlining the station's
resource control requirements. The framework that initially emerged specified the discretion that had
been delegated to the project offices. Although all allocations had to be recorded at the project offices,
funds could be reallocated at their discretion for focused technology within disciplines. Beyond these
discretionary allocations, however, Level C offices could not reallocate funds between disciplines without
the notification or concurrence of the program office. They also had to have approval from the program
office for funds to initiate new tasks. 31
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Although the framewc_rk might appear rational to individuals involved in Level B, the budgetary
relationships were somewhat skewed. The program office under Hutchinson reported to Griffin, the
center director. At the same time the Johnson project office also reported to Griffin. Theoretically, most
of the project offices were under the budgetary control of the program office. Most of the project
officers realized that when the program manager had budgetary authority, and he reported to a center
director, then they had to rely on the program office for their budget approval. This meant that each
of the work package centers (other than Johnson) in a sense reported to Griffin. In terms of his
budgetary allocations, Hulchinson was perceived as skewing allocations in the direction of Johnson.
Kingsbury remembered t_aat "there was almost nothing that Johnson wanted to do that wasn't
supported. _
The complexity of all these organizational issues was not lost on the associate administrator for the
space station program. Culbertson and Aaron visited Peter M. Drucker, the noted management
consultant, on January 10, 1985. They talked to him about some of the organizational issues that kept
cropping up in the program organization. According to Culbertson, Drucker emphasized three points.
First, the program organi_tion had to change over the phases: before definition, during definition, and
then again during Phases C and D. Second, Level B had to be strong in order for the program office
to function. And third, the program personnel had a conflict of interest between their career interests
and the interests of the program. This confirmed Culbertson's earlier position, namely to strengthen
Level B. In addition, Drucker emphasized the need for building good relationships throughout the
program by bringing the center directors into this process early, aa
Project Offices Gear Up for Phase B
The project offices at lhe field centers were organized at the same time as Level B. In Marshall and
Johnson the pattern of organization conformed to tradition. In Marshall, the space station activity moved
out of the advanced development programs office into the permanent project office, reporting to the
center director. Luther Powell, who had extensive experience in the Spacelab program and who had
headed the CDG effort, was appointed the project officer by Bill Lucas, the center director. At John-
son, the informal projects office was formalized, and Clarke Covington, the project officer, reported to
the center director. In both Marshall and Johnson, the project offices were matrixed to the institution,
consistent with existing NASA practice. 34
In Goddard and Lewis, who had not participated in a program organized under the lead center
concept, the story was different. At Goddard, which had a smaller share of the space station project than
either Marshall or Johnson, Noel Hinners, the center director, did not want the work package to siphon
off resources from the center. Therefore, he did not let the project organization report to him, but
rather to Bill Keithley, the flight project Officer. Ron Brovoling, a veteran project manager, was chosen
to head the project office there. _ At Lewis, Andrew Stofan created perhaps the only self-contained
project office among the work package centers. Ron Thomas was appointed the project officer, and
reported to the center director. Further, Thomas interfaced with Hutchinson, letting his deputy, Thomas
Cochrane, take charge of Lewis' internal project management. _ This was unlike Goddard, where
Browning managed inter_al affairs and sent others to interact with Level B.
In addition to the above work package centers, there were project offices at the Langley and
Kennedy centers. Langley supported Level B at Houston in major technology decisions. 37 As we have
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pointedout in our discussion of the initial work package splits, Kennedy's role in the space station
during launch and operations had already been anticipated.
By the time the space station organization was complete and the Phase B studies were ready to
begin, one consistent theme dominated the program's stalTmg. At headquarters individuals who had
limited program experience held most of the senior positions. At the program office level, the key
positions were filled by "self-styled rookies," and most of the major functions were headed by people who
had had little or no involvement with the Space Station Task Force. _ The project offices were also led
by individuals who had limited project experience. Only Ron Browning of Goddard had managed
projects. In a major agency-wide program which was expected to transform the agency, individuals with
relatively little program management experience led the organization. The relative youth (by NASA
standards) of key players did conform to Beggs' desire to revitalize the scientific and technical expertise
of the agency. This meant, however, that these people were in on-the-job training rather than being able
to handle the problems that came along with knowledge and assurance that comes only with experience.
Bringing the Contractors on Board
NASA does not manufacture hardware or components. It relies on industrial contractors, mostly
aerospace firms, for its hardware development. Thus, a substantial element of program management
effort is devoted to managing the contractors. Procurement, or contract management, involves a number
of time consuming activities: writing a reasonably detailed statement of work, or RFP, which forms the
basis of contract awards; evaluating the bids put out by the competing contractors; awarding the
contracts; and, finally, managing the contractors as the work progresses. :_
Traditionally NASA has used the definition process to start with a number of contractors,
progressively narrowing down to one development contractor. In the detailed definition phase NASA
typically carried two contractors. This, to some extent, encouraged competition among the contractors,
since one of the Phase B contractors would be awarded the more lucrative Phase C and D contracts. 40
NASA believes that competition stimulates contractors to innovate, which leads to improved designs
during Phases C and D. Further, the expectation during Phase B activity is that the contractors will look
for ways that they can be more competitive in their bids during Phases C and D.
Historically NASA has used a number of organizational mechanisms to perform various activities
involved in the procurement. For writing the RFPs, NASA organizes a procurement development team
to draft the procurement package. The first draft of the procurement package consists not only of the
basic requirements but a lot of contractual aspects. The documents are long, including requirements for
delivery, actual development of hardware, and a number of data requirements. 41 Developing the
procurement package is a very expensive effort and it involves many man hours.
Once the RFPs go out and the contractor bids come in, NASA uses an SEB to evaluate the bids. 42
This is an ad hoc organization that exists only for the evaluation of a particular procurement. The
members of the board are senior people, many of who have served on the procurement development
team. If RFPs are issued by a field center, the SEBs are established locally: the center director typically
appoints the chairman of the SEB. With the concurrence of the director, the chairman of the SEB
invites people to serve on the board. While the contractor bids are evaluated, the members of the SEB
are cloistered together, insulated from the rest of the organization and the contractors. In NASA,
membership of the SEB is tightly-held information, not released to others. As Max Egert put it, "You'd
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have to give a million do tlars to fred out who is on the Source Evaluation Board. '40 This is a legal
necessity, and is not politi,:aUy motivated. The contractor awards have to be fair and be seen as fair, so
it is necessary to insulate the members of the SEB from the influences of contractors who have their
own serf-interest at heart.
The SEB reports its evaluation to the selection process, without making a recommendation, and the
awards are made final veth the signature of the administrator in Washington. Once the awards are
made, the management of the contractors typically falls into the hands of the center or the project office
that leads the particular procurement package. As Culbertson noted, "Work package management and
managing of the contractors is really a Level C activity. In other words, this has to be done by the field
centers. "44
The procurement activity during Phase B of the space station program retained many of the
characteristics of NAS/Fs traditional procurement policy. However, space station had unique
characteristics.
Space Station Phase B RFPs
The Space Station Management Workshop at the Lunar Planetary Institute had advanced three
options for managing the procurement activity, ranging from a single RFP to more distributed RFPs
operating out of the cent,:rs. As the skunk works began to write an RFP, it had already been decided
by headquarters that there would only be one RFP. 45 To many in NASA, the idea of a single RFP for
a multiple procurement was new. As Bob Dotts recalls,
It was the first time I'd ever seen something like that. It was a generic RFP that then had
pieces, and one of the difficulties in building that RFP was to make it clear if you're bidding
on Work Package 2, what parts of it do you bid. So what we tried to shred out is to show
exactly what the Work Package 2 responsibilities are,, but put it together in an end to end
document for the total system. _
By late June 1984, the skunk works had produced the "Space Station Definition and Preliminary
Design Request for Proposals," which was distributed to NASA headquarters and to the centers.
Comments were to be incorporated into the next RFP draft, which was, in turn, to be submitted to the
Source Evaluation Board. The board would review this draft before releasing it to industry.
The RFP produced intense activity for the skunk works. Hutchinson wrote:
As most of you are l]robably becoming aware, I seldom pass out 'attaboys,' but I believe the
release of the Phase B RFP for agency review represents a significant milestone in your efforts
and definitely warrants one. This group of people, and particularly the leaders, who spent so
many nights and weekends browbeating each other and the document into shape, is as fine a
team as I have ever been on--and I have been on a few. I only wish there was some way we
could keep the whol,z bunch together for the duration! 47
Although the preliminary draft was available as early as June 1984, the RFP did not go out to
prospective bidders until September of the same year. A number of factors may account for this delay.
First, the work package i:_sue was being settled during this period. Second, in headquarters the interface
mechanisms between the Space Station Program Office and OSSA were being worked out. Burt
Edelson, AA for OSSA, was concerned that the user requirements were not adequately represented on
the RFP and wanted to _eet with individual contractors who were going to bid for the work package
out of Goddard. 48 As it turned out, this did not happen. Culbertson made it very clear to the other
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associate administrators that the procurement process was to be managed out of the field centers and
the Space Station Program Office. There would be time later for Dr. Edelson to express his opinion.
The general public was first introduced to the Phase B RFPs early in July. This was the first time
contractors had seen the reference configuration for the space station, called the power tower. 40 The
space station reference configuration description, released by Johnson in August, included comprehen-
sive information on design, dimensions, and engineering details. Space station definition and the
preliminary design RFP was finally released on September 14th. Bids were due the following month.
The RFP that evolved from the skunk works featured mission-related characteristics, evolutionary
growth, customer interface, maintainability, commonality, and' test and verification on orbit. A budget
of approximately $8 billion had been estimated to define, design, develop, test, and assemble the initial
capability. The RFP emphasized the need to contain costs and accommodate international partners. In
addition, consistent with the mandate from the House Appropriations Committee, the contracts
emphasized the need to study a man-tended option and to incorporate automation and robotics
advanced technologies in the design of the space station. The proposals were on a fixed-price basis. _
The procurement approach also featured the four work packages. The RFPs summarized the roles
to be played by Marshall, Johnson, Goddard, and Lewis. The statement of work showed the preliminary
work breakdown structure across the field centers and the role of the Space Station Program Office. The
initial plan for Phase B defmition was included.
Structure ol' the SEB
Consistent with the idea of a single RFP, there was a single SEB, chaired by Hutchinson. While the
RFP was being prepared, Hutchinson put his SEB together. He chose Aaron Cohen to be his vice-
chair. There were representatives from each of the work packages: Luther Powell from Marshall, Clarke
Covington from Johnson, Ken Sizemore from Goddard, and Ron Thomas from Lewis. There was also
a representative from Kennedy.
Hutchinson's SEB was supported by satellite boards in each of the work package field centers. They
reviewed the evaluation plan for each of the work package contracts before the RFPs went out on the
street. After each work package team put the details together for the proposal, the board reviewed them
and got the SEWs approval. The SEB was ultimately charged with reviewing each of the work
packages. 51
Although there were differences in terms of how the satellite boards reviewed the work of a
proposal, the case of JSC was typical. The satellite board at Johnson was organized into two committees,
consistent with standard NASA practice: a technical committee and a management committee. _ The
technical committee consisted of engineering, advanced development, and customer utilization panels.
The management committee evaluated the management capabilities of the proposers, including the cost
reviews.
With approximately $155 million in space station definition contracts to be awarded byApril 1, 1985,
more than 100 companies teamed up on 13 bids received by NASA. _ As the bids came in, the SEB
became active and worked at a hectic pace from the third week of November to the end of December.
Each of the source boards from the work package centers sequestered off in buildings to evaluate their
respective bids. Each reviewed their findings with Hutchinson's SEB on their particular date. The main
source board read all the proposals and reviews of the satellite boards to make their final judgments.
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The final decisions would be made by Beggs himself, so the evaluations of Hutchinson's SEB were
submitted to headquarters. By March 1985, NASA annoimced the successful Phase B contractor
teams. "54The winners at M_trshall were Boeing and Martin Marietta, successful bidders at Goddard were
RCA and General Electric, and the Lewis package went to Rocketdyne and TRW. There was a glitch
in the process, however. NASA could not decide the contractors for the JSC work package. According
to Aviation Week, the proposals from Lockheed, McDonnelFDouglas, and Rockwell "proved too close
to call,_ and required further consideration by the SEB before the final awards could be made. _
Johnson's satellite board reviewed the major weaknesses of each of the three proposals with
Hutchinson's SEB. Having done that, they developed a set of questions to be asked each proposer which
were intended to clarify points that were in doubt. Each prospective contractor was invited to respond
to the questions that had been raised. The day for each was decided by drawing straws. On their
assigned day Rockwell, McDonnell-Douglas, and Lockheed, responded. The process was repeated
several times: the SEB ask,_d more questions, and the contractors returned with their responses. Finally,
the SEB had sufficient data to send back to Beggs for his selection. The contracts were finally awarded
to McDonnell-Douglas and Rockwell. Lockheed later teamed up with McDonnell-Douglas on its work
package contract. "m
By April 15, NASA had completed a review of the bidders of the work packages. The eight
contractor teams who were" going to be part of the work packages were on board. The Phase B studies
were ready to begin.
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CHAPTER 10
PHASE B STUDIES
In April 1985 the spa,'-e station program launched the Phase B studies. By then headquarters, the
program office at Houstor_, and the project offices at the field centers were ready to go. The contractors
were also on board at each of the work package centers.
In order to fully understand the Phase B studies for the space station program, it is necessary to set
the context in which those studies took place. First, and perhaps most importantly, Hans Mark, the
deputy administrator who had played a key role in the program's approval, left NASA in September of
1984 to assume the Chancellorship of the University of Texas at Austin. 1 As a result, James Beggs was
without a deputy as the Phase B studies began. A considerable time elapsed before a new deputy was
named, so Beggs relied oa Phil Culbertson, the associate administrator for the space station program,
to fulfill some of his deputy's functions. This put Culbertson in a difficult position. These duties pulled
Culbertson's attention away from the space station program and the other NASA programs in which he
was involved. Beggs was aware of this.
Well, Phil couldn't perforce be the deputy without being the deputy. And you can't occupy a
role without having t:he trappings of the office. He couldn't really sit there and tell center
directors to do things because if they want to do it differently, they wot_ld challenge his
decisions. Does that _ome from Beggs or is that some, thing you want to do?"
Second, the shuttle pl oject--NASA's major manned venture---was experiencing difficulties. Since the
shuttle was in the operations stage, it had high public, congressional, and media visibility. Problems with
the shuttle consumed headquarters' attention because they had to be resolved quickly. These difficulties
also needed the attention of Marshall and Johnson, who between them had the primary responsibility
for the space station program. As headquarters and the development centers focused more and more
on the shuttle, the space station program did not receive the degree of support that it needed. 3
Program-related faclors also affected the Phase B studies. As noted earlier, the work packages
contained overlaps and rzdundancies. This caused the project offices and their associated contractors
to be unsure of their responsibilities. Since resources were closely tied to the content of the work
packages, the field centers promoted their own best interests and their preferred options. Thus the
program office (Level B) had to arbitrate technical and work allocation disputes among the project
offices, a large and some times intense task. Second, the program office did not have a staff sufficient
for the SE&I task that was so crucial for the coordination of work among the project offices. As we have
seen earlier, the field centers could not provide enough personnel to staff the systems engineering
function when Level B was formed. Even in Johnson Space Center, the lead center, the institution
seemed to resist allocating systems engineering talent to the space station program. In the case of
Johnson, this appeared to be because energies were focused on the shuttle project. Third, to complicate
matters further, the interfaces among Levels A, B, and C had not been clearly defined, and the process
by which such interfaces were negotiated had not really been completed. As a result of all these factors,
the Level B organization at Johnson was working under very difficult circumstances at the start of the
Phase B studies.
When the lead center decision was made, and the work package allocations were negotiated, no one
could have foreseen the departure of the deputy administrator nor the vast attention that the shuttle
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would require. Nevertheless, management decisions, espedally those of the lead center and the work
packages, had determined the course of the Phase B studies and the functioning of the program office
at Houston.
Going into the Phase B studies Neil Hutchinson had three major tasks. First, he would oversee a
reexamination of the reference configuration, power tower. Upon completion, Phase B would have a
preliminary design of the space station that could be taken into the Phase C-D competition among the
contractors. His second task was to involve the contractors in the program to a greater extent than they
had been before. The contractors would do the technical analysis, prepare the data, and present the
changes desired by the work package centers. And his third task was to determine how much the space
station would really cost. 4
In addition to these three tasks, Congress, despite NASA's opposition, mandated two more: studies
of man-tended options and automation and robotics.
Three people played important roles during the Phase B studies, dealing with the complex work
package structure and NASA's intricate management system. Culbertson led the headquarters office,
Griffin was the lead center director, and Hutchinson was program manager. Since Culbertson decided
to make Level B as strong as possible, and had therefore delegated a great deal of responsibility to
Hutchinson, the program's technical management during the Phase B definition period fell to
Hutchinson.
Level B in Operation
As the Phase B studies progressed, Hutchinson's management style became clearly visible. 5 A
former JSC flight director, Hutchinson involved himself in the details of his decisions, a process that was
interpreted differently throughout the agency. At headquarters, for example, some believed that Hutch-
inson did not delegate. This then caused a lot of problems for his staff. Because Hutchinson chose to
make most of the decisions himself, he weakened a staff that had great potential. 6
Hutchinson was aware of the headquarters perception, partly because of the conversations he had
with Culbertson. "I think Phil felt that maybe I didn't give enough free board sometimes to the Level
C guys, and that I overran his guys maybe a little too much sometimes, and I believe that criticism to
probably be valid. "r
At Johnson Space Center Hutchinson was perceived to be a manager who could not distinguish
between tasks of differing priorities. Although space station requirements and budget authority, for
example, were areas of high priority, Hutchinson is remembered as taking stands on issues such as
having a parking place closer to the door so he could devote a few more minutes a day to the program. 8
And others felt Hutchinson was involved in micromanagement. 9
AI Louviere, who headed up the SE&I function, remarked, "John Aaron and Neil both tried very
hard to convince people that this management scheme we had was very complex, very hard to get
anything done in. It was management by committee only. "1° Individuals at Level B who were closest to
Hutchinson in the program management, however, described his style favorably. John Cools "felt Neil
and John ran an excellent ship. I really do. Neil and John complement each other very well, as did Al
Louviere and Tom Kloves, Gene Rice. "11
98
What caused such divergent perceptions regarding Hutchinson's management style? To some extent,
Hutchinson himself may have contributed to these perceptions. However, there are other reasons for
the differing viewpoints.
In the first place, Level B was located at Houston, and this may have exerted an influence on the
decision making. Hutchinson got the first taste of the institutional pressure in the first half of Phase B.
As we have noted, one of the tasks of the Phase B studies was to reexamine the configuration that the
skunk works had produced. During the skunk works, Johnson had advocated the delta configuration for
the station. Although the skunk works had eventually settled on the power tower reference configuration,
the issue was revisited during Phase B. The proximity of Johnson to Level B allowed some Johnson
senior management to insist upon an extensive reevaluation of the delta configuration. According to
Hutchinson it was, "a considerably further examination than I guess I thought it warranted. "12
Although Hutchinson was at Johnson, he had to make every effort to see that the interests of all
the work packages were represented in the program. According to Louviere and others, Hutchinson
really tried. 13 In his effort lo be viewed as independent of JSC pressures, Hutchinson was probably not
seen as representative of J_hnson's interests.
Second, Hutchinson reported to Griffin, the director at Johnson. So did Clarke Covington, the
manager of the Level C w¢,rk package at Johnson. This meant that Griffin had to arbitrate differences
between Level B and Level C. Fortunately for Hutchinson, Griffin had been party to the lead center and
work package decisions and was committed to making Level B work. Hutchinson at least felt this was
so. q never had an instance where I did not get the support I needed out of him, either in the
management council or downward into the field centers. "14 Covington, the project officer at Johnson,
confirmed that Griffin law,red most of Level B's decisions. 15
Unlike Johnson, however, major differences with other project offices could not be resolved so
easily. Since they reported to their directors, disagreements had to be negotiated between Hutchinson
and the project officers, and between the center directors :is well. Thus, the space station program's
management system contributed to the cumbersome decision.making process during the Phase B studies.
As we have seen earlier, Level B had panels and boards to resolve technical issues during the Phase
B studies. The Space Station Control Board (SSCB), chaired by Hutchinson, was at the apex of the
hierarchy of panels and boards. Hutchinson preferred a single decision point, so the panels reporting
to the SSCB made recommendations, not decisions. As the issues were worked out in the panels and
finally came to the SSCB, all foreseeable implications of the alternatives were considered and
discussed. 16
Although in theory this system worked smoothly, the work package splits and their associated
redundancies made it difficult to function in this organization. The major problem was that any of the
options suggested by one c,f the work packages would have to be reexamined by other work packages
and their contractors, lz Sirce the project officers tried to promote their preferred options, adjudication
of technical differences among the work packages became the',program manager's major task. According
to Hutchinson the division of the space station "brought about a set of management difficulties that were
just awesome. It really took a toll to adjudicate the disputes that arose between the field centers over
the two years that I was dcing it. They were constant, they were difficult, they were sometimes vicious,
and most of them were ve;y parochial. "la
AI Louviere agreed. "[What] most of the centers really objected to was having a Level B override
their decisions .... That really didn't happen, but it was the threat that was there. "19
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Thus, although Culbertson wanted Level B to be strong, and Hutchinson wanted to be perceived
as neutral and impartial among the work packages, the management system and the work package
overlaps, in addition to Hutchinson's style of management, contributed to lengthy decisions over
technical issues.
Level A and B Interfaces
Culbertson also faced a formidable task. He was in charge of the space station program, a program
that had been publicized as NASA's next logical step. He represented the space station program in
Congress and to the international community, and was in charge of the policy decisions that guided the
program and directed the program management to conform to headquarters' guidelines. As the Phase
B studies progressed, Beggs' reliance on Culbertson clearly sapped his energies. Culbertson's duties were
also complicated by the intricate structure of the space station program.
Administrator Beggs' presence mitigated the ambiguous nature of Culbertson's task somewhat.
Having initiated the program, and won its approval from the President, Beggs, the agency's chief
executive, was unquestionably committed to the program. Further, Culbertson had Beggs' support and
confidence. Much depended on the personal relationships at headquarters, however. The structure of
the space station program itself did not vest much authority in the associate administrator for the
program. The problem that existed in resolving differences among the work packages (the AA had no
direct line to the project offices) also existed when major differences had to be settled among the center
directors. In this instance, however, the single point of resolution rested at the administrator's office.
Furthermore, in his desire to make Level B as powerful as possible, Culbertson had delegated most
of the budgetary authority to Hutchinson, although Culbertson could override him. This had two major
consequences. Hutchinson had the responsibility to make the first-level resource allocation among the
work packages. Culbertson then found that in overriding Hutchinson's recommendations he had to vio-
late his basic desire to keep Level B strong. Since Hutchinson reported to the director at Johnson, work-
package centers other than Johnson could make a case that Hutchinson skewed the distribution of funds
in Johnson's favor.
In addition, as we noted earlier, when the Phase B studies began, the interfaces between Levels A
and B had not been worked out. Functionally there were many interfaces: systems engineering and
integration, operations, customer utilization, and international participation. At least two of these
interfaces appear to have been well managed: customer utilization and international participation. Both
functions represented NASA's involvement with its external constituencies. The perception of better
management in customer utilization and international participation here is understandable. These were
areas that were not a bone of contention between centers, so the decisions regarding these matters were
not continually revisited and changed.
Also William Raney and Carl Shelley, the individuals in charge of customer utilization at Level A
and Level B respectively, established a good working relationship which enabled Raney to communicate
the user requirements (as seen from headquarters) to Shelley. Shelley could represent the user
requirements in the space station program management's deliberations. In the case of international
participation, headquarters inevitably had to play a major role because these negotiations were
considered "exceedingly sensitive. _ Under Bill Raney's direction, Peggy Finarelli lead the team at
headquarters, and Gene Rice represented Level B. In addition, Culbertson chaired a committee of inter-
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nationalpartners.Hutchinson was a member, although "during this time the activity in the international
world was really steamin[; up, and Level A was running that activity totally. "21
Perhaps as a consequ_'nce of headquarters' budgetary dependence on the program office at Houston
and the lack of clarity in the station's interfaces, Culbertson and Hutchinson became the central figures
in managing all the intez faces between headquarters and program management. Headquarters per-
sonnel associated with th(: space station program sometimes felt confused within this organization, and
sometimes felt powerless to influence the course of events. Level A's lack of say-so over the budget is
an example. Raney comraented, for instance, "Those of us who thought that in some sense Level A
should be senior to Level B didn't appreciate having Level B decide how much money we were going
to have to spend. _22
In a three-tiered organization structure such as the one NASA had devised for the space station
program, the interfaces between Levels A and B were always difficult. In the case of the space station
program, these difficultieg were exacerbated by two other factors. First, as we have already noted, both
Culbertson and Hutchinson had to depend on others to direct and manage. Second, the space station
was a relatively new organization. It takes time to build relationships and establish clear interfaces. It
would have been unreali.,.tic to expect that complex interfaces could have been worked out rapidly. As
the Phase B studies progressed, the intensity of the task may have caused NASA to lose sight of these
factors. Structural factor_ contributing to the frustrations of NASA employees tend not to be personal,
and are therefore overloc,ked or ignored in attempts to vent those frustrations. Culbertson, on the other
hand, was visible to thos,: under him, and he became the focus of their complaints.
Issues at Level C
As the Phase B studies moved along, the project officers at the centers felt the impact of
Hutchinson's leadership, the structure of the program office at Houston, and the long, complex decision
making process.
Johnson Space Center
At Johnson, Hutchinson's effort to build a program office independent of the JSC institution created
difficulties for the projec: office, especially in staffing matt,_rs. Since nearly half the Program Office was
staffed with Johnson personne l, Johnson's institutional resources were taxed considerably. This meant
that Clarke Covington, head of the Johnson project office, had to go head to head with Level B to get
the project office staffed. Covington felt that Griffin was supportive of Level C, but in disputes between
Levels B and C, he believed that Griffin supported Level B. 23
Since the work packages contained overlaps, and program management coordinated the work, the
division of responsibiliti._s among the work packages and between Levels C and B at Houston was
unclear. This meant that at times Level B was doing what should have been Level C or Level D work.
The selection of the concept for deployment of the truss and the size of the truss structure for the dual
keel is an example of thi_ problem. How should it be directed? Should it be put together from a "bunch
of sticks'? Was it deployable, or did it basically deploy itself? What should its size be? As Bob Dotts
recalled,
We were given the _:esponsibility for the truss, that was part of our work package, and so we
went off and did a l_)t of work with our contractor, the different options, trying to look at the
cost and so forth, an_ we came back to the Systems Integration Board that AI Louviere chaired.
101
... We gave a 12-hour presentation to that SIB on the subject, and it showed the minimum cost
was to go with an erectable, but we felt the ten foot was the better way to go. All the other
work packages agreed with us, that that was the minimum cost. But Al had Langley supporting
him in the activity, and his guys didn't agree with that, they felt that the bigger truss had some
real advantages, primarily from a customer standpoint a rigidity standpoint .... The
frustrating thing was they chose to go with the five meter. 2_nd
The complex committee structure, causing long and arduous decision-making, was also frustrating
to those at Johnson Level C. This frustration persisted in spite of the recognition that the Level B
program office had a difficult job to do.
Marshall Space Flight Center
Since the memory of work package negotiations was still fresh in the minds of people at Marshall,
the project office there was aware of the composition of Level B, especially its committees. Level B per-
sonnel dominated the SSCB, which was at the top of the committee structure. Most members of the
SSCB were originally from Johnson. Although Hutchinson had tried hard to project his independent
image, Marshall continued to believe that Level B was influenced by the JSC institution. This was a
difficult perception to refute since the SSCB "had 19 people on it, 16 from Houston [Johnson], 2 from
Huntsville [Marshall], and I from Goddard. _5 Level B personnel chaired most of the panels reporting
to the SSCB as well.
Because of the dominance of Johnson personnel, those at Marshall felt thoroughly under-
represented. This may have been the reason for the SSCB's decline in attendance. Why should Marshall
people attend the SSCB when it was a foregone conclusion that their point of view would lose? 2e
Such feelings were exacerbated by the push and pull of the various work packages which lengthened
the meetings of the boards and panels far in excess of the four hours scheduled. 27 As far as Marshall's
representatives were concerned, the work package at Johnson enjoyed the benefits of proximity to Level
B. Since Huntsville was far away, and travel took time, Marshall representatives were not able to attend
many of the frequent meetings of the technical panels. The length of these meetings led Luther Power
to write to Hutchinson in protest.
It is my understanding that several of the technical panels which met the week of March 4-8,
1985, have established follow-on meetings. As you are aware, this is contrary to the agreement
reached between Level C centers and Level B.
The amount of activity in the program and the limited manpower available make it
difficult, ff not impossible, for the centers to continually support these meetings. I, therefor_
strongly urge you to inform the panel chairmen that follow-on meetings are not to be planned. _
At Marshall, as at headquarters, there was also the perception that Hutchinson did not delegate. 29
At Johnson, Covington could take his disagreements with Hutchinson directly to Griffin. In the case
of a Marshall dispute with Level B, however, Lucas and Griffin had to resolve the issue. Since budgetary
authority was vested with the program office in Houston, this did not seem to sit well with Bill Lucas. 30
Goddard Space Flight Center
Goddard's project office also experienced difficulties with respect to budgetary authority, the time
demands of meetings, and the delays in decision-making. Ron Browning at Goddard, perhaps the most
experienced of space station project managers, was sensitive to Level B's role, and the fact that the space
station program was in its infancy. 31
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Goddard was organi2ed differently from the other centers. Browning reported to Bill Keithley and
was, therefore, one level removed from the center director, Noel Hinners. Thus it was widely perceived
that he had less access tc, the center director than the other project officers.
Goddard experiencexl the same problems with attending meetings as Marshall. Delays because of
Hutchinson's insistence ca making all the decisions also kept Goddard from moving forward on their
work, and this eventually involved the international community as well. _
Browning was used to working with projects with good boundaries, ones that were well understood
and defined. He found the constant bickering and inefficienOy run program to be a product of the
manned aspect and not _t all like he was used to working with. Eventually interest in the program at
Goddard waned somewhat because personnel there saw that it took up a lot of resources and did not
really make a lot of progress. 33
When the work package splits were negotiated, the major linkage between the manned and
unmanned elements of rite space station program involved commonality. This commonality presented
problems for Goddard .:luring the Phase B studies. Goddard's part of the space station was the
unmanned, scientific experiments, and free-flying platforms. As Browning said (and Noel Hinners con-
firmed), "commonality fi,r the sake of commonality put an undue burden on us, in weight, maybe in
complexity, possibly evec cost. "34
Goddard was also restrained by decision-making delays. There were two lab modules in the work
package splits, one at Goddard, one at Marshall. A lot of time was spent on how to divide up the
modules. Part of the delays was attributed to Hutchinson's leadership. "He had never run a project and
a program, and that was kind of obvious when you got to watching. He just didn't have the experience
base. .-a,s
Goddard's user's perspective also was not completely appreciated. At times the pressure to build
the space station took precedence over the needs of the users. "We felt that what we were bringing to
bear was building things that got long-term use, and we had to look at it from that point of view. 3e
Despite the differem perspective, Goddard's project office understood Level B's difficult job.
Because of this approach of multiple centers, I guess Level B also was trying, and I think they
did a pretty good jot,, of trying not to be biased, because there they were in Johnson and a lot
of the arguments ancl fights were between Johnson and, Marshall, and they tried to be as neutral
as they could be, and it's tough. 37
Lewis Research Center
The space station pr.,)gramwas important for the survival of Lewis as an institution. Andrew Stofan
had formulated Lewis R+:search Center's strategy around the space station program. This was not lost
on the project office. Ron Thomas, the Lewis project officer, sought to represent Lewis in a favorable
light to Level B. He wanted to establish the credibility of the project office, and show that it could
perform developmental work on the station's power system.
Langley Research Center
Although Langley l_esearch Center did not have a work package during the Phase B studies, it
performed four function:_. Langley supported Level B with SE&I. It was also in charge of the evolution
studies, and had some responsibility for advanced development of technology. Langley's advanced
development program reported to Mark Nolan, the advanced development manager of Level B at
Houston. 38 In light of L_+ngley'ssupporting role, its stake in the space station program was considerably
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lessthanthoseof theworkpackage centers. Langley provided a unique vantage point for observing the
relationships between Level B and the other centers. "We could see that there was a lot of tension
created ... I'm not sure they handled that too well. "3°
There were also differences of opinion between Level B and Langley. Langley had been involved
in the VHSIC program, and the military supported the Speed Integrated Circuitry Program. Since the
military was involved, product lines were maintained. If, for example, NASA built a processor and ten
years later needed it back, the agency could do it. In the case of the shuttle project, Langley had to
replace the computers, and since the Westinghouse Corporation no longer maintained that product line,
it had turned out to be very expensive. Thus, Langley sought to get the VHSIC into the space station
program.
We felt that was a big plus, going down to Level B to start to get it into the program. And the
response down there was, well, we don't really have to do that because, see, we will have these
work package contractors, and in the work packages there will be a contractor who is involved
in the VHSIC Program, so we'll have it there. That isn't true. You don't get VHSIC just
because you have Texas Instruments involved in your program. You get the VHSIC insertion
because you are working with the program. That was a false perception, and we never could
turn that around. 4°
As a result of these differences, some at Langley perceived Level B to be "close-minded."
II* it IIG
At the project offices, the prolonged meetings necessary for coordinating the work packages were,
therefore, viewed with frustration. Inevitably, Level B disagreed with them on several matters. To some
extent, all program managers faced tough decisions and could not appease everyone. In the space station
program, the program manager's role was rendered more complex by his structural location, the
redundancies in the work packages, and the differences in culture between manned and unmanned
programs. It was far easier to meld two development centers--Marshall and Johnson--in the shuttle
project than four field centers--two of them development centers, one a science center, and a fourth a
technology center---in the space station program.
Accomplishments of Level B Under NeU Hutchinson
In spite of structural problems and overlaps in the work packages during the Phase B studies,
Hutchinson's program office accomplished a great deal. The program office undertook a careful
examination of the station's configuration during the Phase B studies, which resulted in a change of the
reference configuration from power tower to dual keel. Many in the space station office considered this
change a major victory for the station's users.
The industrial contractors who would eventually be involved in the space station program during
Phase C and D were brought on board. The project offices at the various field centers relied on their
contractors for many of their studies; the contractors presented their findings to the SSCB and other
panels of the program office at Houston. Over time, they made recommendations regarding the reallo-
cation of work packages.
The Space Station Program Office was successful in arriving at a cost estimate for the program,
which in Hutchinson's estimation remained valid through Phase B.41
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The program office acx:omplished three additional objectives: Ywst, with the passage of time, the
four work package project c,fficers built a working relationship that has continued to the present. These
relationships provide overall stability for the space station program. Second, more than in any other
previous NASA program, _:he Space Station Program Office emphasized user requirements as the
primary driving force for tht'.station's configuration. Thus, one of the Space Station Task Force's major
guidelines was upheld during the Phase B studies. Finally, the program office, under Hutchinson,
brought ESA, Japan, and C_nada into the deliberations regaJ'ding the program's technical details. This
was the first time that NASA successfully brought international involvement into the def'mition stage of
a program.
In sum, as the Phase B., tudies under Nell Hutchinson progressed, the space agency revisited several
of the problems created by its intricate management system. Much depended on the relationships and
understanding between thr¢;e key individuals in the program: Phil Culbertson, Nell Hutchinson, and
Gerry Griffin. To many of the field centers, the experience of working interdependently with other
centers was new. The nature of the definition period was such that nothing could be cast in concrete.
In addition, the work package issue exacerbated the problem of overlaps and redundancies. This
intensified the managers' roles. It is a tribute to Nell Hutchinson's energy that so much was
accomplished in so short a time.
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CHAPTER 11
TURBULENCE IN THE SPACE STATION PROGRAM
NASA experienced unp_'ecedented and increasing turbulence beginning in 1984, and this influenced
the space station program's evolution. Hans Mark's exit in 1984 signaled the beginning of top
management turnover within the agency. His departure left James Beggs without a deputy. As we noted
in Chapter 10, without Mark, Beggs began to rely heavily on Phil Culbertson, the associate administrator
for the space station program, to fill the deputy's role.
Lt. General James Abrahamson, associate administrator for the Office of Space Flight, also left
NASA to head up President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, and Jesse Moore took Abrahamson's
place. Beggs knew he had placed Culbertson in a delicate position, but finding a replacement for Mark
was not easy. "I couldn't get the White House to move. I had a couple of candidates that I said, TI1 pick
one of these,' and they wouldn't do it. "1
William Graham was the White House's final choice to be NASA's deputy administrator. Unlike
Mark, Graham was not familiar with NASA. He had previously worked as a staff analyst, and many felt
that he lacked line management experience. NASA personnel quickly noticed the uneasy relationship
between Beggs and Graham, especially at headquarters. Beggs was keenly aware of their differences.
His [Graham's] priorit.es were quite different from mine. I don't think he could have done
much on the shuttle, but he kept it at arm's length. He wasn't interested in getting involved
there. He didn't go t_, the readiness reviews. He didn't get down to the people. He was
uncomfortable with it.
As a result, Beggs continued to rely on Culbertson for management issues, particularly those involving
the shuttle. Discord in NASA's management ranks climaxed with Beggs' indictment, a terrible morale
blow to the agency. It was a sad day for NASA, not just for Jim Beggs, because this was the first time
that NASA had been touch,)d by a major scandal. Although Beggs was later vindicated, the damage had
been done, both to Beggs and to NASA.
Graham had been at NASA for about ten days when Beggs was indicted. Beggs, of course, took
steps to support Graham and in this received help from Culbertson. Culbertson described what
happened:
On the way into work on a Monday morning it was announced on the radio that Mr. Beggs had
been indicted .... I went to my office, and I typed a note myself to Jim Beggs which said some-
thing like, Jim, I'm ten ibly sorry to hear what's happened. If I can be of any help, let me know.
And I walked over and gave it to his secretary before 8 o'clock, and then I went back to work.
He called me out of a meeting that was going on at 11 o'clock and asked me to come to his
office. We met about 11:15 and he asked me if I would move back to the administrator's office
to provide some help to the new deputy administrator who was going to have to be acting
administrator while Jim was on leave. And I said, I'll do what you want me to do. And so he
had Bill Graham come in, and we outlined the job, and gave it a title--general manager. There
had not been a general manager for the last 15 years. I wrote the position description, and we
wrote another piece of paper appointing John Hodge as acting associate administrator, and I
wrote it for Beggs' signature, and Bill Graham said, why don't you write it for my signature
and then i_ will show that it was a decision that all of us made. That was changed, and the job
was done. °
Culbertson knew that he was in an extremely awkward position because it would be perceived that Beggs
had "put his man in to kc ep his eyes on Bill Graham. "4 Culbertson had developed a close working
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relationship with Beggs, and his sense of loyalty forced him to accept a sacrifice: he relinquished the
space station program, which he had long cherished, to become NASA's General Manager. "I already
owed a lot to Jim Beggs. He had done a lot of things for me, and it seemed to be the thing to do. _5
This arrangement between Beggs, Graham, and Culbertson did not last long. Soon after the
Challenger accident a significant disagreement arose between Graham and Culbertson causing Acting
Administrator Graham to revoke all of Culbertson's authorities agreed upon during the earlier meeting
with Beggs. Only with the arrival of James C. Fletcher, Beggs' replacement, did Culbertson reemerge
with authority, e
Fletcher offered Culbertson the leadership of the space station program, but Culbertson declined
for two reasons. First, he knew that for the time being he could be more useful in the administrator's
office. 7 He also knew that he would not be in charge when the station was launched, which had been
his dream, and that fact led him away from the program, e It was with sadness, therefore, that Culbert-
son handed over the leadership of the program to John Hodge.
Beggs' indictment, his leave of absence and eventual resignation, meant that NASA was without the
two top administrators who had orchestrated the successful space station initiative. Leadership of the
agency rested with an acting administrator. The turnover at headquarters was also mirrored in the
centers. Gerry Griffin left to head the Houston Chamber of Commerce. His departure dealt a severe
blow to the space station program because Griffin, who had been intimately involved with the details
of the space station program, had understood the guiding principle under which it operated, especially
the need for agency-wide involvement. He had created an effective management team on which Nell
Hutchinson had relied throughout the rocky Phase B studies period. With Griffin's exit, the leadership
of the Johnson Space Center passed to Jesse Moore, who had not been party to the center directors'
alliances. In addition, Moore had limited familiarity with Johnson at the time he became director, having
served his major NASA tenure with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. As a newcomer to Johnson, Moore
needed time to bring others around to understand his own management style.
A further blow to the program came with the exit of Neil Hutchinson, who had shouldered the
tremendous task of program management and had worked what others at Johnson and NASA believed
to be an impossible job. With Hutchinson's departure, the two key roles in the space station--associate
administrator and program manager-had passed into the hands of acting executives. Hodge was acting
associate administrator, and John Aaron, Hutchinson's deputy, became acting program manager.
The Challenger Accident
Turbulence in NASA's management ranks combined with the events surrounding the fright of 51-
L, Challenger. The shuttle, a visible symbol of NASA's technological and management excellence,
exploded before the eyes of the world on January 28, 1986. The accident dealt a severe blow to NASA
morale and the assumptions underlying the agency's management practices. Because of the accident it
became obvious to everyone that NASA had problems. Headline hunters and headline writers
hammered at the theme that NASA was in crisis.9 Congress inevitably became involved and authorized
former Secretary of State William Rogers to form a commission to look into the Challenger accident.
As a result of the events surrounding Challenger, the shuttle's design was called into question.
Perhaps most important, the Rogers Commission questioned the management structure of the shuttle.
The management experiment, embodied in the application of the lead center concept, to some extent
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was discredited by the Challenger disaster. Of course, by then headquarters' personnel was also
becoming convinced that the lead center concept was not working, and that the program management
function should be relocated. 10
Although the groundwork for reexamining the work package decisions for the space station had
been laid in September 1985 "#hen Culbertson reopened the work package issue, no decisions were made
until months later, after the Challenger accident. Changes at headquarters and at the program level at
Johnson meant that key figm es who had played significant roles in the management of the space station
program were not present when the decisions were made. Of course, John Hodge had been with the
program since its beginning but his status as the program's acting associate administrator did not give
him sufficient legitimacy to get everything done. Similarly, John Aaron, the acting program manager, had
also been with the program since 1984. But the institutional leadership, Culbertson, Griffin, and Beggs,
who had been the primary architects of the space station program, were gone. Moreover, the controversy
surrounding Challenger con_.umed NASA's energy, especially at Johnson and Marshall. With much of
the attention focused on the shuttle project, the space station program could not expect the degree of
institutional support that it _,ad enjoyed earlier. This lack of support was compounded by the fact that
the newer actors' priorities were unclear. Finally, and perhaps as a consequence of the first two factors,
the new work package and program management decisions would have to be made in relative isolation
from the rest of the agency.
The Transition
With the departure of Hans Mark, Neil Hutchinson, and James Beggs, the stewardship of the space
station program passed into the hands of two individuals, John Hodge and John Aaron. Hodge had been
deputy to Associate Admini:;trator Phil Culbertson and became acting associate administrator of the
space station program at headquarters when Culbertson became general manager. Aaron had served
as deputy to Neil Hutchinson and became acting program manager upon Hutchinson's departure.
Consistent with his philosophy of management, Culbertson delegated the responsibility of the space
station program at headquarters to John Hodge. When Culbertson became general manager, he chose
to strengthen Hodge's positic,n within the organization, just as he had done with Hutchinson. 11Although
Culbertson knew that Hodgc's decisions might be perceived to be biased, he did not give much credi-
bility to such perceptions. Culbertson knew that "John understood that he was a controversial figure with
respect to his relationship wil h the Johnson Space Center. "12Although the detailed definition phase was
not over, Culbertson felt thai Hodge's conceptual strength would carry the program along. Realistically
it would have been difficull for Hodge to act as associate administrator throughout the program,
especially during its development phase, but Culbertson felt that Hodge would do a "first class job. "13
At headquarters the transition from Culbertson to Hodge took place rapidly. Hodge remembered
that "itwas all a matter of da'.cs."14Although some decisions of who was in charge of what were finalized
later, the pace of the transition reflected the turbulence within NASA at that time.
Hutchinson had left the program office in Houston, but his deputy, John Aaron, provided continuity
and stability. In 1984, when Aaron came to the space station program, he had labelled himself a
"rookie. "is Before he became acting program manager, Aaron developed a feel for the program and had
now accumulated a fair amount of management experience. He had a established a good working
relationship with Level C project managers and enjoyed a great deal of support from Hodge as well. 16
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Hodge brought a sense of urgency to his t_k. The Phase B process was working, but there was
much to do between the date when he took over and March 31st, "which was the decision time for final
configuration, final separation of the work packages, final management concept, all those things. "17 And
Hodge took his job seriously. "My first principle was, I'm not going to let anybody stop us doing that. "18
Since the turmoil within NASA allowed the space station program to operate in relative isolation, Hodge
and Aaron continued their work, for the most part untouched by institutional pressures. 19
Work Package Splits: Round Two
As we noted earlier, Culbertson's initial work package splits in mid-1984 were made in partial
ignorance, since the details of the configuration were not dear at that time, and the station's manufac-
turing and assembly sequence had not been established. These issues were probed duringthe Phase B
period. Culbertson, Hodge, and the program management were fully aware of the redundancies that
existed in the work packages as the Phase B studies had started. L° They intended to sort them out as
they gained a more detailed knowledge of the station. As the studies progressed, the configuration
changed from power tower to dual keel and some unanticipated redundancies began to surface during
the contractor studies. 21 If redundancies in the modules and the sequence of actual manufacturing and
assembly were not sorted out, the contractors could not be specific as to their responsibilities and their
accountability could not be established. This could lead to hardware duplication or could create a
situation where contractors might blame each other for not full, ling their part of the bargain, espe-
cially in cases where specific work was not accomplished. Assembly sequence created more problems
of accountability. The hardware developed by one contractor would have to be transported to another
location so that it could be fitted with another contractor's work there. In this scenario hardware might
shift contractor hands a number of times, making it difficult to pinpoint where errors or mistakes were
made.
As the Phase B studies started in April of 1985, the program management was not sure of the
assembly sequence and no one was certain how much redundancy had been built in. Culbertson recalled,
"Since the assembly sequence hadn't been worked out, we didn't really know how much was going to be
common, and that evolved rather slowly among these contractors as it took place. "_ And as Phase B
began to wind down, these redundancies surfaced and had to be dealt with.
An awareness of the redundancies and the problem of accountability was widely shared by members
of the space station program at headquarters, program management, and the project offices at the field
centers. 23 Anticipating that the decision on the final work package split would have to be made in March
of 1986, Culbertson had formed a group to advise him on the matter.
Led by Marc Bensimon, 24 in whom Culbertson had developed a great deal of respect, his advisors
consisted primarily of Level A (headquarters) personnel. This working group provided Culbertson with
background information regarding the work package decisions that needed to be made before the
development contracts were awarded. In a series of sessions, the task group developed a philosophy for
work package splits for the development phase. According to the group, the work package decisions for
the Phase B period themselves consisted of redundancies: the field centers had bits and pieces of work
assigned to them, and there had been no attempt to organize the work into more or less self-contained
projects. The division of work packages during Phase B had produced intricate and complex interfaces.
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Integration of the work l_ackages'--where the interfaces came together--was located primarily at Level
B.
The working group thus advocated the idea of "projects. "aS The project concept was anchored in a
number of ideas. First, and perhaps obviously, SE&I would be done at the total program level; that is,
this function would insure that the whole space station met headquarters' requirements. Second, and
perhaps to simplify the SE&I function, the field centers would be allocated relatively self-contained
packets of work called projects. The centers could then focus on their work, given the constraints
imposed by the SE&I, without undue interference from other work packages. The working group
believed that during Phase B such projects could not be designed because each work package had to rely
on each other for defining its work. This had prevented them from optimizing their work package
because of the multiple iJaterfaces that had been created. For example, guidance control had to rely on
data management, which, in turn, was related to many other elements in the program whose work lay
scattered across the fielc centers. Third, projects as envisioned by the working group would be given
constraints, guidelines, or ground rules, so that each field center could function more or less indepen-
dently of the others. Stated differently, each work package project would have to function within
envelopes and boundaries laid down by headquarters. This would enable them to optimize their project
because the project wou!d be within the established boundaries. _
Of course, the experience of Level B in the space station program weighed heavily on the minds of
Bensimon's group. The _:arlier work package decision and Level B's organizational problems had led
them to several conclusions. First, because of redundancies and overlapping interfaces, the program
came together at one single point in the organization, that is, program management. Second, the staffing
for Level B required manpower, which had not been provided to Level B during Phase B. And third,
the organization of Level B did not provide adequate controls and levers for managing a program this
large.
The working group presented a model against which work package decisions could be evaluated.
They were aware that ccmpromises would need to be made before a final division could be made. The
model was a first step, providing a yardstick for splitting the work package projects across the field
centers. 27 This is the cla_;sic way to arrive at work package decisions, so there was nothing unique in this
particular approach.
Over a two-month l_eriod the working group made recommendations to Culbertson for what came
to be known as reslicing the pie. 28 The group stressed that the work package structure should be a
central programmatic issue. The issue had to be settled, taking into account key aspects guiding the
program, including pro,gram factors for the development phase, institutional concerns, political
acceptability, and exterr_al NASA-related issues. Bensimon's people maintained that the overlap and
imprecision in the Phase B RFP no longer served any useful purpose. Furthermore, senior management
should clarify the interfaces, particularly with respect to the common modules, and assign unambiguous
element and subsystem :esponsibilities for development and integration. In addition, the group wanted
to provide Level B with the authority consistent with the work package structure and eliminate "turff
involvement in data excaanges. _
Armed with this information, Culbertson briefed the work package center directors at headquarters.
All the centers were inv:)lved, but Johnson's position received the most attention. As part of Johnson's
presentation, Rockwell, one of the two contractors associated with the Johnson work package, gave its
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versionof the work package assignments. Rockwell advocated work package splits that gave Johnson
Space Center a major role in the space station program, far more than it had received during Phase B. _
After Culbertson received the reports from the centers, he sought an independent opinion before
deciding the work package splits for Phase C. He invited Johnson's director of engineering and research,
Aaron Cohen, to participate in the decision. Cohen gave his report to Culbertson in January 1986 (but
prior to the Challenger accident). Although there were differences-some compromises from Johnson's
original position had been made-Cohen's presentation was very similar to Rockwell's earlier one.
Bensimon's group and Cohen differed on the solution to the work package splits problem. The
Johnson position, as articulated by Cohen, focused on controlling costs by keeping most of the program
at one field center. The interfaces in the space station program could be contained in a single work
package. This would make the job of program coordination far easier than if it were widely distributed.
Headquarters, however, was committed to maintaining the guiding principles of the space station
program that had been formulated during Beggs' tenure. Johnson's recommendation ran counter to two
of the program's major precepts, namely that the space station had to be an agency-wide program, and
that there should be more than one contractor. If Johnson's division were adopted, both of these
principles would have been disregarded. By allocating a major portion of the program to Johnson, the
remaining centers, especially Marshall, would have very minor roles. This de facto meant that there
would be a single contractor, and it would be associated with Johnson. 31
Johnson's option did not sit well with officials at headquarters, who opposed it on the grounds that
it violated the program's basic premises. Because Rockwell's studies had formed the basis of Johnson's
proposal, headquarters took notice. Rockwell, the prime contractor for the shuttle, had considerable
experience in major development work. Because of the close relationship between Rockwell and Johnson
during shuttle development, headquarters believed that Johnson was "captive of Rockwell. "_
The work package field center project managers, in conjunction with Level B, deliberated the work
package issue. Acting Program Manager John Aaron attempted to build a team to provide stability amid
NASA's management turbulence. His group met several times in Memphis, Tennessee. Ernst Geissler,
the project officer from Kennedy, was present at some of these meetings, in anticipation of Kennedy's
operational role in the future. It was clear that when development work started there would be a fifth
work package, managed from Kennedy Space Center. _
These meetings also tackled issues involved in managing the program and resolved problems that
had developed during the Phase B studies. An effort was made to work out the relationships among the
field center project managers and the program manager at Level B. The project manager at Lewis, for
example, commented that the sessions went a long way to build rapport among the players, 34 so it
appeared that John Aaron's attempts to build a team were succeeding.
Following Cohen's report to Culbertson, headquarters still was unable to resolve the work package
splits issue. Under Hodge's direction, headquarters personnel tackled it at the program management
level. Bensimon organized a meeting between Levels A, B (John Aaron), and the four work package
project officers. Although the process started, headquarters was not fully persuaded that both Level B
and work package 2--both located at Johnson Space Center--wanted to play a meaningful role. _
A second meeting, lasting two days, took place at the Lunar Planetary Institute in March 1986. All
the project managers participated. Marc Bensimon also attended. On the first day it appeared that the
project managers arrived at a compromise that most could live with. It centered on the division of work
packages during the program's development phase. There was a sense of cohesiveness then, but it fell
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apart the next day. The acting program manager and project officer from Johnson Space Center seemed
to be reluctant to go along with the agreement. As Ron Thomas recalled, the particular issue of the
division of work packages between Marshall and Johnson created a lot of problems. There was no com-
promise on the part of either to reach a solution. _
The meeting at the Lunar Planetary Institute was significant in three respects. First, this was an
attempt by program personnel to arrive at a solution to the work package splits. Unlike Cuibertson's
first decision, no center directors were involved. Second, the reluctance of John Aaron and Clarke
Covington to go along with an option where the major work was not done at Johnson was seen as
Johnson's institutional position on the matter. The meeting really seemed to epitomize the whole story
of the work package wars 3z
Despite the lack of a resolution, Hodge made work package recommendations to Bill Graham,
NASA's acting administra_:or. Hodge emphasized that a successful program must balance issues unique
to the space station program and external issues such as NASA's goals and the talent of the centers. He
stressed that the convoluted process leading to the work package decisions had produced two
approaches: primary integration and equal accountability. Primary integration hinged on a prime
contractor, whereby most of the work would be allocated to one of the centers, presumably Johnson
Space Center. The equal accountability approach distributed the work across the field centers and
emphasized minimal changes from the existing work package structure. Hodge noted that equal
accountability required a strong Level B and created additional integration problems for NASA. He
recommended this second option because it meant tittle change from the existing work package struc-
ture, had a broad politic_Llconstituency, facilitated growth, and utilized NASA talent. 3° In essence,
Hodge advocated a position that ran counter to Johnson's proposal. Despite the fact that all
recommendations made for final work package splits ran counter to Aaron Cohen's proposal, Johnson
continued to advocate the prime contractor option (or non-option, as it was). 3° Even as late as May
1986, for example, internal memos at Johnson indicated that headquarters would adopt the prime
contractor option because it was the sensible thing to do. 4°
Many remember the work package splits during 1986 as a struggle between two polar options, one
promoting a prime contractor and locating most of the work at Johnson, and the other functioning in
a distributed mode, with ilittle change from the previous work package pattern. The process did not
converge, in spite of the efforts of the project officers, acting program manager, and even headquarters.
Although Hodge had made his recommendation to Graham, the repercussions of the Challenger
accident (in January) created problems for his suggestion. 41 With the demand for changes within NASA
following the accident, it did not seem prudent to accept a proposal that advocated tittle or no changes
in the existing work package structure. Hodge's equal accountability option located the pressurized
environment at Marshall, the structures and architecture at Johnson, the platforms and servicing at
Goddard, the power system at Lewis, and the launch operations at Kennedy. His recommendations were
very similar to Culbertson's. The distribution of work between Johnson and Marshall, however, created
an interesting paradox: it was based on an inside/outside sprit for the space station. The pressurized
environment and all the ieside work would be done at Marshall. The structural architectural option at
Johnson meant work on all the program's outside elements would be done at Johnson. However, it also
meant that Marshall would have responsibility for a major subsystem, the environmental control life
support system (ECLSS), traditionally the forte of Johnson.
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Johnson's expertise in ECLSS was built on.the fact that it had the major responsibility for the
shuttle's manned aspects. The astronaut corps lived in Houston. If Hodge's recommendation was
accepted, there was speculation that the astronauts might have to move to Huntsville. This speculation
caused a great deal of consternation and unnecessary divisiveness because moving the astronauts was
never really considered. 42 In the aftermath of the Challenger incident, the astronauts were not pleased,
and they did not let the issue rest.
The Phillips Report
While the work package deliberations took place, NASA reeled from the impact of the Challenger
disaster. The Rogers Commission Report did little to restore NASA's image. It underscored the
problems of the lead center in the shuttle program and called into question the competence of NASA
management. The Rogers Commission wanted headquarters to take tight control and bring the centers
under its direction. As a result, headquarters decided to reexamine the management structure of the
space station program before it began the more costly design and development phase. 4"3
In 1984, when Beggs made the lead center decision, Hodge had believed that the decision stood only
for the detailed definition period. He thought that during the design and development phase the lead
center concept would be reexamined, and based on the experience of the Phase B definition period,
NASA might decide to keep the lead center or drop it. In light of the "work package wars," Hodge
recommended that an independent committee be formed to evaluate the existing management structure.
His idea was favorably received. 44
Who would run the committee? Graham suggested General Samuel Phillips, who had directed the
Apollo project. Hodge did not object, but pointed out the implication of that choice.
If you give it to Sam, you can almost guess what your answer is going to be, and it is not what
we've got. And I said, if I had chosen Sam Phillips, the agency would have been absolutely
convinced that I had made a deal. I said, that's okay. If you want to do that, we'll do that. He
said, that's what you ought to do. 45
So, at Graham's instruction, Hodge invited Phillips to evaluate the program's management structure. 4e
Hiring Sam Phillips did have implications, as Hodge had anticipated, especially since Phillips had
worked for NASA during the Apollo days. As we recall, two of the alternatives that the Space Station
Task Force had considered for the organization of the program were the Apollo and the shuttle models.
The shuttle model involved the lead center concept. On the other hand, during Apollo headquarters
exercised the program management function. Many knew about Phillips' prior experience and believed
that he preferred program management to rest with headquarters. To some it was a foregone conclusion
that the space station program's organization would return to the Apollo model when Phillips' findings
were announced. 4r In the centers, especially at Johnson, it was also believed that the Apollo structure
would return as a result of Phillips' investigation. Not all field center personnel read this implication,
however. James Kingsbury of Marshall noted, for example, that he did not understand why Phillips might
suggest the Apollo form of organization for the space station program. 48
Phillips' study had three major objectives. First, it would review the management structure of the
space station program. Second, it would investigate the distribution of work among the field centers.
Finally, it would evaluate NASA's plans for in-house systems engineering and integration. To accomplish
these goals, Phillips formed a committee of "experienced managers with extensive backgrounds in the
aerospace industry and knowledgeable of NASA and how the agency conducts its business. "49
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Phillips' group conducted lengthy interviews at NASA headquarters, the Level B program office, and
the five field centers inwdved in station program development. In each of the centers Phillips' team
interviewed the center director, project director, and project office employees. The team also spoke with
each of the Phase B contractors. 50
At headquarters, Phllips' group interviewed several members of the Space Station Task Force.
These interviews revealed that NASA's autonomous centers and intercenter competition, its severe fiscal
restraints, and its minimal centralized control made it extremely difficult for Level B to work as part of
a field center organization. These inevitable conflicts of interest constituted a competitive asymmetry.
Level B had access to sp4:cial program resources that enhanced the lead center's institutional capabili-
ties. Level B also could get information about the internal practices of the other centers, data that those
centers could not get about the lead center. In addition, since the center directors reported to their insti-
tutional associate administrators at headqua.rters, a major tool that should have enabled the associate
administrator of the space station to direct the program was not available to him. The task force
members argued that the lead center concept was not workable. They preferred that the program office
be directly responsible to headquarters, rather than report to any of the center directors. 51
Phillips and his group visited all the centers. Each center presented its version of the space station
story. Hodge even had a chance to make his case before Phillips' recommendations went forward, but
believes "he didn't change anything as a result of what I said, but at least he told me what was going
on. ,,-52
Phillips presented hi:, findings to Fletcher at a meeting attended by then General Manager Culbert-
son, Hodge, and members of his own group. _ He outlined principles to restructure the program, to
divide the work packages, and to clarify the role of SE&I. At the end of the presentation, Fletcher
accepted Phillips' recommendation as the basis for reorganizing the space station program. This quick
decision came as a big surprise to some at the meeting. _
Having decided to abandon the lead center concept, Fletcher relayed the news to the center
directors and called a meeting the following day. At that meeting Phillips indicated how the space station
program would proceed. _
Andrew Stofan, the director at Lewis, who later played a key role in the space station program,
recalled the report.
Now, what Sam Phillips gave us was what we gave him .... Once Sam Phillips came to Lewis,
I talked to him, and Noel talked to him, and Dick Smith talked to him. And it turns out that
all of us told him exactly the same thing. It isn't working, and you have to take it and set
something up in Washington to run it .... You can't have centers telling other centers what to
do. It won't work. And we all came to that, even though we're the ones that said, do it that way
in the first place. _
Johnson, of course, was an exception.
So, based on the Phillips Report, Fletcher decided to abandon the lead center concept, which had
been the root of many problems, especially those between Marshall and Johnson. He also chose Andy
Stofan to become the r_ew associate administrator for the space station program. Why was Stofan
selected for the job, espc cially since he was content with his director's job, and was reluctant to take up
a new position? Stofan himself does not quite know the reasons. 5r
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CHAPTER 12
REORGANIZING THE SPACE STATION PROGRAM
The Phillips Committee's recommendations centered on correcting the management structure and
improving the distribution of work among the field centers in order to maintain accountability and to
better assure product quality. Regarding the management structure, four major recommendations were
made:
Establish space station program management office at headquarters headed by strong program
director;
Provide technical suppc rt to that office through the acqui,_ition of a contractor highly competent
in system engineering _nd analysis and who would command the technical respect of the field
center personnel;
Establish a branch office at Houston for systems integration; and
Provide line direction of the field center project managers directly from the headquarters
program management office?
With respect to the work package issue, the Phillips Committee debated three major alternatives.
The committee made its recommendations based on the issue of controlling costs. The committee
argued that maintaining contractor accountability was essential to cost control. The program should be
segmented into clearly def.nable, major deliverable items that could be integrated and checked out
independently. The entire design and development responsibility for each deliverable item should be
assigned to a single contract or. In debating the alternatives, the committee concluded that options other
than the one they recommended would cost upwards of $200 to $900 million in total program costs. As
a result, the committee recommended the following work package assignments: all pressurized modules,
nodes, and tunnels to the Marshall Space Flight Center; the truss and its associated systems to Johnson
Space Center; the platform _ and servicing facility to the Goddard Space Flight Center; and the power
modules and the power management system to Lewis Research Center?
The Phillips recommendations thus gave Marshall the role of single module developer and single
module integrator for the program. This could have caused a skill mix within NASA, since much of the
skill required for the habitation module rested with Johnson, so the committee recommended that
Johnson provide technical direction to the Marshall contractor for the design and development of the
manned systems.
When Fletcher decided to discard the lead center concept, Hodge anticipated that the news would
have to be communicated to each field center with great care and sensitivity. This was, after all, a major
change in the space station program. Unfortunately, Jesse Moore, Johnson's center director, planned
to leave NASA and was unable to inform Johnson personnel in a timely manner?
At the time all this was going on, Houston was experiencing an economic downturn, a result of
growing problems in the en,._rgy industry. If Level B was moved from Houston, many felt that this would
create further problems Ix:cause of layoffs and loss of jobs in the contractor community. So when
Fletcher accepted the Phillips Committee recommendatiot_s, the Houston congressional delegation
became concerned. Stofan igot the first taste of his new job.
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I had been back in Washington one week and there was a hearing called on the Hill. Fletcher
and I and Sam Phillips were called to the hearing. And the first six people that testified were
senators and congressmen. I had never seen that happen in my life in Washington. And they
proceeded to tear us to shreds over a 'misunderstanding' about the division of responsibility
between Johnson and Marshall .... I didn't know anything was wrong, not that wrong. Fletcher
didn't know anything was that bad either. 4
NASA almost lost the space station because of the Texas delegation's outcry. Fletcher announced
a 90 day "cooling-off period" to put the coalition back and save the program. According to Stofan,
That was a direct outcome of these earlier decisions that didn't define any interface and kept
it all vague. We paid the price for that .... It was just that Jim and I didn't know what we were
getting into, neither one of us. We had no idea when it blew up. We didn't know why, what was
going on, we didn't understand what all the big problem was. We found out in a hurry. '_
At headquarters, it appeared that the Houston delegation's protest had been triggered at least partly
by Johnson personnel, e If this were true, it violated the basic differentiation of NASA's functions: head-
quarters should interface with Congress, whereas the field centers were primarily in charge of projects
and development work. Amid the outcry of the Challenger disaster, such a violation of responsibilities
by individuals not skilled at politics could have had dire consequences for the agency if the perception
was found to be based on fact.
As Fletcher and Stofan faced their problems at headquarters, emotions in the centers, especially
Johnson and Marshall, also ran high. 7 At Johnson the decision to relocate Level B created insecurities
in those associated with program management. Johnson personnel in Level B had worked intensely in
program management. The decision could mean they would be taken out of their current assignments
and placed in other jobs, perhaps in Johnson, or in the Washington area. In light of NASA's travel
restrictions and its civil service codes, this would mean a substantial financial sacrifice. 8 Many were
unwilling to move. In addition, given the nature of the work package splits Phillips recommended, both
Johnson and Marshall confronted the real possibility that they might lose their unique institutional capa-
bilities. Johnson might lose its expertise in the manned aspects of space programs, especially if ECL_S
was located at Marshall. Marshall might lose its expertise in structures and propulsion. These fears
heightened the insecurity. The morale at each center hit an all-time low. 9
Fletcher made a number of visits to each of the centers to placate the institutions. Hostility was evi-
dent when he visited Johnson. During his open meeting with Johnson personnel, people expressed their
extreme frustration, especially over the relocation of the environmental control and life support systems.
No one understood the rationale for the decisions. 1° Fletcher's cooling-off period was politically
necessary; it was also needed to restore NASA's morale and to allow time to appease the field centers.
Decision Reversal
Fletcher's decision to relocate the program management at headquarters and his selection of Stofan
to be the program's associate administrator inaugurated a new era in the space station program.
Abandoning the lead center concept was a decision made on conceptual grounds, perhaps without
considering the details of its implementation. In this instance, the need for program integrity overrode
institutional concerns. The issues that the center directors had raised at the Langley meeting in 1983 still
persisted. How could NASA insulate the program management from the political pressures of the
capital? How could the agency bring talent from across the field centers to Washington? Did NASA
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managers have sufficient martpower to handle the systems engineering and integration function? What
impact did the program have on the resources and skills of the field centers?
The Phillips Report had outlined solutions to only part of these issues and had pointed out the need
for contractor support for th¢_ SE&I function. Beyond that, the phillips Committee adopted the recom-
mendations of the Rogers Commission in recommending that program management be relocated at
headquarters. The decision was, therefore, anchored in the Apollo concept of organization. The milieu
and the experience of the program management had played a role.
We have already alluded to the changed environment in which these decisions were formulated. It
was a period of unequaled turbulence for NASA, caused by management changes, both at headquarters
and at Johnson, and by the events surrounding Flight 51-L, Challenger. The emotions of NASA
personnel had been heightened in the wake of the Challenger accident, management turnover left the
program in the hands of acting executives, and at the time the decision was announced, Johnson Space
Center was without a designated leader. These factors create_J a situation which could be described as
chaotic at best.
By then, the experience: of program management under the lead center concept had sensitized
several center directors to the difficulty of building collaborative relationships. Lucas, the center director
at Marshall, was always kee_dy aware of the difficulties with the lead center concept, based not only on
his own experience at Marshall, but also on his earlier experiences with the Apollo project. Stofan, the
center director at Lewis l_'_fore he became associate admhfistrator for the space station, and Noel
Hinners of Goddard also _une to see that the lead center omcept just could not work. 11
In addition to the que._,tion of the lead center, the experience of the program management also
highlighted staffing problems. The project managers at Wallops in 1983 initially estimated that 600 to
1,000 SE&I personnel would be required. Given the magnitude of the systems engineering task that
other programs confronted, this may have seemed to be too high by many in NASA, especially the
center directors. If the estimates were correct, where would the talent come from, in light of other
programs NASA operated'? Was NASA's energy consumed with the space shuttle during 19857 At
Johnson, where the prograa management was located, Nell Hutchinson's program did not rely on the
Johnson institution, but rather built its own capabilities. 12 This had taxed JSC's resources, however, and
many at JSC did not understand the extent of the SE&I tasks involved. Tom Moser, who became pro-
gram manager under Stofan, among others noted how much he had underestimated the SE&I task. 13
In retrospect Beggs ur derscored the turbulence surrounding the work package issue and the lead
center concept in this period.
The one thing that is t,_rribly distressing to me, and will always be distressing to me, is the fact
that I was unable to be there at the time when the agency really needed my leadership, or
someone's leadership, the most. That was from that period when I was indicted until really
Fletcher got his feet back up on the desk. That was a terrible period for the agency, and I think
a lot of the problems that subsequently came to light in space station in particular were due
to that interregnum when no one was really exercising any top management supervision .... I
think if someone had jumped in there, had been able to do the day-by-day analysis of what was
needed, you would have prevented some of the subsequent turmoil that occurred. TM
Beggs also recognized the need for a support contractor for systems engineering.
In my mind I felt sooner or later we'd have to take on a systems contractor, somebody outside
who would be able to do the systems design and the system conceptualization activity because,
while NASA is pretty gcmd at overseeing work done, complex things, they are not terribly good
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at the detail work, the detailed system analysis, system design work. So I felt that sooner or
later we'd take on a systems contractor, but f_st I wanted to get the thing off the ground. 15
Beggs had conceived the space station program as evolving over stages, each thread to be woven one
step at a time. This was consistent with his philosophy of building the space station by the yard.
The significance of Beggs' assessment needs an additional comment. As we have seen, during the
Space Station Task Force's days, headquarters had debated the relative merits of the lead center vis-
a-vis the Apollo model of organization. Culbertson had always opted for the lead center concept of
management, based on the rationale that the program management should be separated from
Washington's pressures. He also felt that it would be easier to fred staff at one of the field centers.
Hodge argued for the Apollo model of organization. Although in 1984 Hodge had not succeeded
in persuading top management to adopt this option, in 1986 he was the acting associate administrator
to whom Culbertson had delegated the responsibility for making that decision. During 1985, when
Hutchinson headed Level B at Johnson and Culbertson was the associate administrator, there was an
implicit understanding among them and Griffin, Johnson's center director. This coalition fell apart with
the departure of Hutchinson and Griffin and Culbertson's assumption of the role of general manager.
So, in the period before Fletcher took over, dear leadership was not exercised. The system's centrifugal
tendencies exerted themselves. By that time, based on programmatic considerations, and its own
difficulties in managing the program, Johnson personnel concluded that the work packages should be
designed to place the major part of the work at their center. Some might have interpreted the aban-
donment of the lead center concept as partly triggered by Johnson's intransigence. It was also inter-
preted as an exertion of authority by headquarters in the decision process. 10
Fletcher's decision to abandon the lead center concept was also important in another respect. The
process of decision-making was a drastic departure from the way the lead center concept had earlier
been orchestrated. Under the initiative of the Space Station Task Force, and in a milieu fostered by
Beggs and Culbertson, the lead center concept was arrived at as a result of considerable center director
involvement. The logic was that programmatic concerns should be tempered by institutional concerns.
Further, if the center directors implemented the program, they thus gained an important voice in the
decision-making process. As we have seen during the second round of work package negotiations, the
center directors were less involved than during the earfier work package decision. Although the directors
participated in the reviews of the work package decisions, they were not co-opted into the decision
making. This was mostly done either at the program level or by the program manager in conjunction
with the project managers. 17 Further, as the Phillips Committee made its recommendations, Fletcher
made the decision himself and communicated his decision to the center directors. He did not involve
them in the process. This, therefore, was a departure from Beggs' earlier decision-making style.
Why was the decision made so quickly? Why couldn't it have been postponed until Johnson°s
leadership was in place? The decision to abandon the lead center had perhaps the most severe
repercussions at Johnson Space Center. It created insecurity for a large number of JSC people
associated with Level B at Houston. What would they do when the program management was removed
from Houston and placed in Washington? NASA had always experienced considerable problems
regarding assignments when projects were completed. It was clear that many individuals in Level B had
deep roots in Texas, and it was unreasonable to expect all of them to uproot their families and move
to Washington. Could this have been anticipated when the decision was made?
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Ironically, the absence of a clearly designated leader also left Johnson without an advocate for its
position at headquarters. Nowhere, perhaps, was the lack of leadership so keenly felt than in the imple-
mentation of the decision to reverse the lead center concept.
Fletcher's decision to adopt Phillips' recommendations inaugurated a new era in the space station
program. Andy Stofan had his own set of challenges, and he had to appease the Houston delegation over
NASA's decision to relo,:ate the program management. He had to build the headquarters program
organization from scratch. He also had to forge linkages with the directors of the field centers in order
to get the program moving again. Stofan is remembered as a hero for accomplishing these difficult tasks
in his relatively short tenure at NASA. 18 Amid this change in program management, one anchor of
stability remained: the pr,_ject offices at the field centers. The four project managers: Ron Browning at
Goddard, Ron Thomas al Lewis, Clarke Covington at Johnson, and Luther Powell at Marshall, did not
change. This is yet anoth¢r indication that the overall influence of the program lay primarily at the field
centers. 19
Amid the turbulenct: of the period the space station program continued to evolve. The major
premises guiding the pro_am, which had been articulated during the days of the Space Station Task
Force, had remained intact. It was still to be an agency-wide program, combining both manned and
unmanned elements, and ensuring a permanent human presence in space. It would cater to the users'
needs by accommodating newer technologies as they evolved, and would involve as many field centers
as necessary. James Beggs' dream for the space station program had survived.
Oh, well, I think NASA will come back strong. I think any new president is going to have to
address it. I think th_ tenor of the times will require it. I think the Russians are going to be
doing some very intc resting things in space. I think the Europeans and the Japanese will be
moving, and I think it will start to become a major issue in this country .... I think NASA will
do very well because it represents a very important piece and part of the country's advance_
science and technology activity. Not only that, it puts a halo over all of science and technology."
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IN SUMMATION
In 1982 NASA faced seemingly insurmountable odds in its desire to create a space station. Indeed,
the program did not yet exist. It was only an initiative set forth by the new administrator, James Beggs,
his vision for the future of NASA. From 1982 through 1986 NASA gained approval of the program
despite the odds, enlisted the support of those both inside and outside the agency, including the White
House and Congress, chose the lead center form of organization for the program, performed detailed
definition studies, and arrived at an initial baseline configuaration+The program grew from nothing to
a full-fledged program ir the space of approximately four years. In 1986 NASA changed the
organizational structure of the space station program and brought the management to Reston, Virginia,
a suburb of Washington, D.C.
The management of these formative years of the space station program may not seem unique at first
glance. NASA had risen to many technological and management challenges in the past. It had handled
major manned programs before, put men on the moon, and designed and operated the shuttle. And
budgets of both the Apollo and shuttle projects had been larger (in inflation-adjusted dollars) than the
$8 billion allocated for the space station. There were fewer technological difficulties to deal with than
with Apollo or the shuttle, and NASA was familiar with the management of multicenter programs.
Despite all this, NASA confronted many unique challenges with the space station program. First,
NASA's management undertook the approval of the program in an environment where many
constituencies had an impact on the program, and none could be ignored. Congress, scientists, indus-
trial contractors, and even the astronaut corps had to be considered when making station-relatod
decisions. In a climate of :conomic austerity, it was difficult to appease all NASA's constituencies.
Second, the space station program extended the mission of the agency. As a permanently manned
facility, the space station would make operations a regular activity of the agency, and therefore a mission,
the same as research on science and technology. This, in turn, implied that even during the design phase,
NASA had to figure out how to make the station flexible enough to accommodate growth beyond its
initial operating capability, respond to future technological development, and attend to life-cycle costs
in addition to development costs.
Third, the space statien program policy guidelines differed in many significant ways from Apollo and
the shuttle. It was conceived to be an agency-wide activity, which meant that the field centers had to
cooperate to an extent unparalleled in any other manned program. The program was to be responsive
to customer requirements and involved non-astronaut personnel. The program also involved international
partners in design, development, and operations. Each of these policy guidelines was a significant
departure from NASA's previous experience, requiring NASA managers to take on new tasks as the
program moved to the dctailed definition stage.
Altogether, the unique characteristics of the program represented a departure from generally
accepted NASA routine:;, and key decision-makers were aware of the magnitude of the change
demanded by the space station policy guidelines. For Beg_s, who represented the institutional perspec-
tive, the space station program was a means to revitalize the scientific and technical capabilities of the
agency. John Hodge, who had a programmatic orientation, viewed the program as a means to bring
about change within NASA.
Systemic change was demanded of NASA during these formative years, especially as the program
moved to the detailed definition phase. Studies of change efforts in the private sector and in
125
PRECEDING PAGE BLANX t'JO'l" FILMED LPAG_NII, N_
bureaucracies show that systemic change is only accomplished over an extended period of time. Against
the backdrop of our knowledge of organizational changes, the space station program, nevertheless,
demanded that NASA managers learn new ways of doing business in a relatively short time.
The intensity of the management task was further magnified by the turbulence NASA experienced
during this period. As the space station program moved to its detailed definition stage, NASA's
administrator, deputy administrator, the associate administrator for the space station program, the lead
center director, and the Level B program manager--the central players in the program---were removed
by turnover or reassignment. NASA also experienced turbulence as a result of the problems on the
shuttle, which threatened the legitimacy of the entire agency and led to scrutiny of all management
processes by the Rogers Commission. The stress and turmoil that followed spilled over to other NASA
programs, including the space station.
The space station program was a fledgling program within NASA from 1982 to 1986. Management
is both important and difficult during the early stages of a program. The Hearth Committee, which
preceded the space station initiative, underscored the importance of management in the early stages
when it emphasized that the conduct of the extended definition phase determines the ability to control
schedule and cost overruns in major NASA programs. Management is also difficult because new
programs tend to suffer from nthe liability of newness." Since new programs are not dearly defined, they
demand that personnel be flexible and adapt to changing circumstances. (In established programs,
organizational structure and individual roles are usually dear, and routine, efficient behavior is possible.)
New programs also have a harder time securing resources and are at a basic competitive disadvantage
relative to established programs. In the case of the space station, personnel and facilities were not readily
available, so established programs had to provide them.
The management history of the period 1982 to 1986 provides four major features in the management
of early stages of new NASA programs. First, NASA management showed how difficult it was to
establish the legitimacy of a new program, not merely among external constituencies, but internally as
well. Second, NASA sought ways to merge programmatic and institutional considerations during planning
and implementation. Third, NASA learned that the organization of the program at any given point would
be based on the experiences of the previous stages of the program. And finally, a new generation of
NASA managers learned about the agency's organizational heritage and the nature of relationships
between the centers and headquarters.
Legitimacy of New Programs
In both public and private organizations, major new programs transforming organizational missions
are initiated by top management. In NASA, a clear differentiation of functions between headquarters
and the field centers has developed over the years, with headquarters initiating new programs and the
field centers implementing them.
Generating and maintaining the commitment to new initiatives at the field centers is a sensitive task,
since new initiatives compete with ongoing and well established programs for resources and attention.
Established programs possess several advantages. They enjoy the patronage of external constituencies.
Since they are in advanced stages of technological development, they can point to hardware and
equipment as tangible results of performance. Premises (or policy guidelines) underlying these programs
have become more or less accepted in the agency, and alternative premises considered in the earlier
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stages of programs are typically forgotten. These programs are in the development or operational stages
and have been assimilated htto the agency's ongoing activities. Major ongoing programs also bring more
money to the field centers than newer programs. The design and development phases consume the major
share of program budgets, and the established programs can command greater institutional attention
at the field centers than do new programs.
The space station initiar.ive did not possess any of the advantages enjoyed by ongoing programs like
the shuttle. When James Beggs and Hans Mark decided to launch the initiative, the external
constituendes for the space station had to be built with only the promise of future benefits as a drawing
card. Consequently, NASA had to create and nurture the legitimacy of the program among those outside
the agency as well. By legitimacy we mean convincing others that 1) the program is justified and
significant enough to command resources, and 2) the premises or policy guidelines on which the program
is based have been understood and the commitment exists to uphold them.
NASA's top management understood the need for creating legitimacy before they could receive
Presidential approval and iJfitial congressional funding. As we have seen, a major effort was undertaken
to build constituencies: Beggs had established a personal relationship with a receptive President; the task
force brought much of NASA into the process and minimized the differences among the centers so that
program approval was not !eopardized. Advisory groups allowed external constituencies to have a voice
as well.
Headquarters' role in legitimizing the program within NASA was appreciated by both Beggs and
Mark. Beggs knew that foe using the agency on a different set of missions would not be easy) Despite
his awareness, fiscal austerity demanded that external constituencies be maintained. This led Beggs to
an organizational strategy of grafting a major new program onto an existing organization rather than
creating a new center. M,_rk, who had always believed in the lead center form of organization, saw
headquarters' job as political, persuading field centers to allocate resources to new initiatives and to con-
form to policy guidelines without headquarters' involvement in technical management.
The management his::ory of the formative years of the space station program illustrates the
complexity of the task of le_,itimizing the program among constituencies within NASA. Internal problems
existed throughout the 1982-86 period. The decision to extend the definition period gave internal forces
adequate time and opportunity to attempt to change the program premises they opposed. Many believed
that Beggs' plan to build the space station by the yard was not fully understood by Level B personnel
as they tackled the cost of the station. Many at Goddard did not appreciate the need for commonality,
a technological guideline f:_rmulated by headquarters to minimize development costs. Similarly, during
the second round of the '0york package splits, Johnson wanted to change the space station from an
agency-wide program to a program that was relatively serf-contained within a single field center.
Why did management problems persist? First of all, there was no consensus regarding the priority
of premises within the agency. This was particularly pronounced at the field center level, where conflict
among premises affected technical decision-making. It became difficult to contain costs with agency-
wide involvement, for example, and this was reflected in the difficulty of enforcing technological
guidelines such as minimitation of life cycle cost and commonality.
Management problems also persisted because the program premises entailed a major change from
NASA's normal operating procedures. Over time, as NASA evolved into a decentralized organization,
the centers had grown ao:ustomed to autonomy and operating independently of each other in regard
to technical management is_sues.Although fiscal restraints stimulated competition for resources among
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the field centers, some top executives considered competition at the technical level not merely a
necessity, but a virtue that enhanced programmatic effectiveness. 2 The test bed competition is an
example. This built-in competition contrasted with the collaboration required for the space station
program to truly be an agency-wide program. The complex technological interdependence among work
packages increased the amount of collaboration required.
Because of emphasis on users and the inclusion of international partners, NASA had to change the
way it handled its technical activities. Such premises as minimization of life cycle costs forced NASA per-
sonnel to adopt new costing techniques. Methods of estimation used in the past that were oriented
toward development costs had to be broadened to anticipate costs during operation and growth stages
of the space station.
Organizations typically assimilate major operational changes slowly. Maintaining the premises of the
space station program, therefore, was a significant management task that could not be accomplished
quickly. During the 1982-83 time frame, while the Space Station Task Force was in operation, this task
was relatively easy for several reasons. Fh'st, both Beggs and Mark, the most powerful executives in the
agency, had publicly committed to the initiative and were actively shaping the program's premises.
Second, since the task force was mounted from headquarters, Beggs could maintain his priorities. Under
his leadership, which we have described as "crescive," individual initiative was encouraged, but when it
threatened his priorities it was strongly discouraged. Third, since the approval of the program was a
primary task at this stage, the field centers did not anticipate the impact of the program guidelines.
Fourth, since the task force was located at headquarters, it was shielded from the field centers' pull
toward decentralization. Finally, although the task force drew members from all the field centers, the
leadership of the task force managed to keep the members focused on a unified goal, maximizing the
flow of information, and freeing the members from field center concerns and generating commitment
to the program.
However, from 1984 to 1986, as the space station program moved into the extended definition
period, the management task became increasingly complex. Philip Culbertson, as associate adminis-
trator at headquarters, discovered that his ability to lead the space station program suffered from the
existing structure of centers reporting to associate administrators. No line organization reported to him
from the field centers. Similarly, the program manager at Level B had no direct (formal) line of
communication to the project offices at the field centers. An organizational structure that facilitated
frequent communication was still needed during the extended definition period. The existing structure
and the associated work package decisions, however, stifled information transmission. This structure also
created extreme dependence on three individuals: Culbertson at headquarters; Neil Hutchinson at the
program management level; and Gerry Griffin, the center director at Johnson, to whom Hutchinson
reported. In addition, the program had to operate under the premises already formulated by the task
force under Beggs' guidance. Since many of the key players, both in program management (including
Hutchinson) and at the field center project offices, were not closely associated with the task force, they
had little ownership of the process; some did not even appreciate the rationale for the often conflicting
set of premises. Finally, unlike the task force, the extended definition demanded a higher level of
resource commitment from the field centers. These resources had to come from the centers at the
expense of other major programs in advanced stages. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the case
of system engineers, a precious resource in NASA.
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In a three-tiered organization such as NASA, maintaining program guidelines and channeling
resources are significant l:asks which are the prime responsibility of headquarters, not technical program
management. The decision to adopt an extended definition period implied that the responsibility would
be immense during Phase B. As the program grew into Phases C and D, headquarters' role would
become easier because nlore resources would be available for the program and its premises would be
more widely accepted in the agency.
Traditional management theory posits that responsibility, influence, and authority should be
correlated. There are at least three mechanisms by which such correlation can be maintained: personal
(informal) influence, structure, and process of management. As we have noted, Culbertson enjoyed great
credibility with Beggs and Mark, the top executives in the agency. This, in turn, lent Culbertson personal
influence within NASA. i[ndeed, he left his imprint on the major program-related decisions: lead center
and the initial work package splits. Structurally, the associate administrator of the space station did not
have line responsibility over the program management or the institutional heads at the field centers. In
large organizations, senior managers exercise influence on the process through their control of mile-
stones, budgets, personnel policies and very infrequently by wielding the weapon of total dissuasion. 3
Culbertson, however, had to rely on persuasion alone to maintain his influence and authority.
The story of the formative years of the space station program illustrates the intensity of the
management task required of headquarters in the early phases of the program. 4
Interdependence Between Program and Institution
In NASA, there is a mutual dependence between the institution and its programs. Major programs
such as Apollo and the shuttle are symbols of the agency's success, and provide the rationale for
continued agency funding and thus for its survival. At the same time, the institution embarks on such
programs only when th.: top leadership is committed ta them. Accordingly, the programs and the
institution influence eac]l other.
The influence of prod)gramson the institution is not uniform. For example, the science programs
affect mainly Goddard :_pace Flight Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Others, such as the
shuttle and space statler, affect the whole agency. Given the variation in influence of programs on the
institution, top leadershil_ may also assign different levels of priority to programs. We see these priorities
through the channeling of resources. Typically, given NASA's decentralized structure, headquarters plays
a major role in developing and administering the budget while the field centers are responsible for
allocating personnel for projects during implementation.
The institutional arid programmatic perspectives are different. At its extreme, the institutional
perspective holds that programs come and go while the institution remains. From the programmatic
perspective the institution exists for the program. The institutional perspective is relatively long-term
whereas programs typically are finite. Such differences existed in the space station, for example, between
Beggs and Hedge. Begg_ saw the space station as a way to build the science and technology capabilities
of NASA. For Hedge, tae institution served the program.
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Thetwoperspectivesare often in conflict. From the institutional perspective, resources flowing into
the program are a function of the mission and priorities of the agency or the field center. From the
programmatic perspective, resources are rarely adequate for maintaining program integrity. Continual
negotiation is necessary to mediate between the two points of view.
In single center programs, the differences in programmatic and institutional perspectives are
resolved by the field center director. In the traditional matrix of most field centers, the center director
is the final arbiter of disputes between the projects officer and the institutional directors. In multicenter
programs like the space station, the program structure determines how such conflicts are resolved. In
NASA, headquarters may have to make the final decision.
NASA adopted a number of mechanisms during the formative years of the space station program
to serve as an interface between the programmatic and institutional perspectives. The agency achieved
varying degrees of success. During the task force days, Beggs made sure that the institutional perspective
permeated task force deliberations. Key premises--agency-wide involvement, building the station by the
yard, no single prime contractor, and international participation-flowed from Beggs' mission of
revitalizing the scientific and technological talent within NASA with support of external constituencies.
Options which made programmatic sense but which clashed with Beggs' institutional perspec-
tive-starting a new center, for example--were ruled out early in the deliberations. Under Hedge, the
task force itself became the keeper of program integrity. Location of the task force at headquarters and
Hodge's management style facilitated this.
As the prospects for program approval improved, the task force saw the need to invite the
institutional leaders into the deliberations. The Wallops and Langley meetings in 1983 were held because
the task force believed that if the center directors publicly committed to the details of the program at
an early stage, subsequent implementation might be facilitated.
How successful was this process? By one yardstick it was quite successful. The center directors
unanimously recommended the lead center organization for the space station program and expressed
their preference for Johnson as the lead center. They also agreed to cooperate with each other by
providing the lead center with the necessary systems engineering personnel. Later events suggest that
the commitment was not firm across the centers. The designated lead center, Johnson, certainly provided
the lion's share of personnel resources for the program, much to the chagrin of Gerry Griffin, Johnson's
director.
Why was the degree of commitment uneven? Griffin's actions can perhaps be explained. Having
persuaded the Johnson institution and lobbied headquarters for the lead center assignment, he staked
his professional reputation and credibility on making it work. He also had formal responsibility for the
performance of the program manager. This was a personal commitment not merely to the program but
to its major premises. It was doubtful that such a commitment could be expected from his successor.
Lewis was different. Stofan assumed the directorship of Lewis with the commitment to reestablish
the center. He firmly believed that the space station should figure prominently in Lewis' future. This
belief was further strengthened by the strategic planning process he undertook for the center. As a
result, both the director and the institution supported the space station because it fit into Lewis' renewed
mission.
The center directors at Goddard and Marshall had no personal stake in the matter, and neither
institution was dependent on the station for its continued existence. Goddard was in the midst of
reformulating its mission and was unclear how the space station fit into that new mission. The
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enthusiasm for the space st ttion among the rank and fde at Goddard was considerably less than at
headquarters. By all account:i, Marshall shunned dependence on any single program, so the institutional
stakes in the space station at Marshall were not as pressing as they were for Lewis. 5
In fight of future events, one may ask if the task force's strategy to involve the center directors was
effective. How could a stratt:gy based on good intentions yield such mixed results? Why did the center
directors' recommendations reflect conditional agreements rather than firm commitments? There are
several plausible reasons. First, in NASA, where headquarters promoted competition among the field
centers even in the technical arena, it might be unrealistic to expect collaboration to occur naturally, e
Second, when the field center directors quasi-autonomously set missions for their respective centers
(without coordination of inter-center priorities at headquarters), the center priorities may have deter-
mined their support for major programs. Third, the primary reason invoked by the center directors in
the lead center recommendation was their resistance to headquarters control, z This overshadowed the
details of implementation, such as how much resources would be actually needed, how much would be
shared, and how conflicts would be negotiated. Fourth, when the Langley meeting occurred, several
program-related details wele unclear: configuration, work packages, and reasonable estimates of per-
sonnel requirements. Indeed, many of the center directors had expressed a need to understand the
program details when Mark inquired as to the readiness of the field centers to undertake the program.
How could center directors engage in rational discussion about implementation when important program
details remained unclear? Finally, the short meetings may have precluded careful deliberation. This
might have been the case even had the program details been carefully delineated.
During work package deliberations, institutional considerations began to exert considerable influence
on program decisions. To a large extent, Culbertson tried to tailor the work packages according to the
skill mix available in the four field centers. Headquarters allocated test beds based on its perception of
the relative expertise of the centers. Solely from a programmatic perspective, four work packages
increased management complexity during the detailed definition period, but since Stofan had made a
successful case for Lewis to Beggs and Mark on institutional grounds, Culbertson had to contend with
four work packages rather than a smaller number.
In the work package decisions, when distribution of resources among field centers became the
focus, active intervention by headquarters was necessary to integrate field center and program con-
siderations. The details of _:he work package decision created considerable problems in matching work
packages to field center skiJls. For example, allocation of power to Lewis was perceived by Marshall per-
sonnel to be at their exper.se. The center directors attempted to solve the work package problem, but
with no success. In the end, Culbertson himself had to recommend work package splits to Beggs, and
his recommendations were implemented. Although the initial work package splits in 1984 indicate that
Marshall had a skill mix problem (partly created by the earlier test bed assignments), Culbertson's
attempt to prevent redistribution of skill mix within NASA only succeeded in increasing the program
management complexity.
There was a widespread perception at headquarters that as the space station program moved into
the detailed definition peri, _d under the lead center form of organization, the institutional considerations
at the field centers woulc begin to dominate the program at the expense of overall programmatic
integrity. Some field centers saw Hutchinson as captive of the Johnson institution. On the other hand,
Johnson personnel believed Hutchinson deviated from the lead center organization as they knew it from
the shuttle program. At headquarters, the ambiguous role of the associate administrator and what many
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perceived to be a weakening of the space station organization at headquarters could not prevent the
erosion of the integrity of program guidelines.
The revisiting of the work package decisions in 1986, first by Hodge and later by the Phillips
Committee, was NASA's response to the need to restore program integrity. During this reexamination,
program factors outweighed institutional skill mix considerations in the final recommendations. However,
Fletcher's decision to abandon the lead center and realign work packages created problems at Johnson
and Marshall. Both centers already suffered from low morale as a result of the Challenger accident.
Because of Fletcher's decision Marshall feared it would lose its structural engineering expertise to
Johnson, and morale at Marshall hit rock bottom. At Johnson the abandonment of lead center status
and its possible loss of environmental controls and life support systems to Marshall resulted in low
morale at Johnson as well.
During the period 1982-86, NASA continually struggled with how to negotiate differences between
the programmatic and institutional perspectives. Will the differences between program and institution
resurface in major new initiatives involving multiple centers.'? Other things being equal, we think so. The
space station story suggests that headquarters will have to act as the final arbiter in multicenter pro-
grams; further, since the differences are rarely if ever resolved, headquarters will have to actively
intervene in these negotiations.
Evolution of the Program
Programs that involve technological development evolve over distinct phases. This evolution has been
observed in public agencies as well as in private enterprises, a It is well understood in NASA. These
phases are concept development, definition, design, development, launch, and operations. The early
phases--concept development, definition, and design--are primarily conceptual tasks and deal with the
formulation of the program. Although most of the program budget is devoted to the hardware
development phase, the initial phases determine the evolution of the program in terms of both schedule
and costs.
Management tasks also vary over the phases. Modern management theory holds that to be effective,
organizational forms should adapt to the demands of the tasks and the environment. This idea is not new
to NASA. Hans Mark and Arnold Levine, for example, emphasized this in their work on high technology
research institutions. 9 In the case of the space station, this idea was reinforced when Philip Culbertson
and John Aaron visited with Peter Drucker in early 1985 to discuss the station's management challenges.
Since formulation (giving shape) precedes implementation, contemporary management theory
stresses that different forms of organization are necessary during the two stages. 1° Whereas a
bureaucratic form of organization is appropriate for implementation, the formulation stage requires the
organization design to enhance information flow. This implies that the organizational form should allow
individuals to focus on the whole task (not parts of it), encourage open communication (free of status
trappings), insure coordination at multiple levels (not at single points in a bureaucracy), and, in general,
facilitate operations. Further, the effort required to achieve coordination is greater in the early phases,
and bureaucratic mechanisms by themselves are inadequate.
In the years 1982 to 1986, NASA worked to arrive at an appropriate organizational structure for the
space station program within the agency. As we have noted, over the years NASA had evolved into a
decentralized organization, and the field centers had become more or less autonomous. The institu-
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tionalforcesat the field centers tended to pull the entire organization toward decentralization.
Consequently, NASA's leadership sought to balance existing decentralization and demands for
coordination in the space .,_tation program.
This balance was accoraplished with relative ease in the Space Station Task Force organization. The
task force was centralized and led from headquarters. The physical separation of the detailees from their
respective field centers and the informal structure that John Hodge created allowed the task force to
operate smoothly. Further: the personnel requirements did not unduly tax the field centers.
In 1984, after the Pr,_sident approved the space station, NASA embarked upon the extended
definition phase of the program. The major management task during this period was to formulate a
program which could be intplemented during the ensuing design and development phases. Although the
task force had begun delint'.ating the program, the extended definition period needed a non-bureaucratic
organization. Technical aspects of the program lacked specificity. The program elements were highly
interdependent, a fact underscored by various groups that worked on the work package splits. As a
result, individual roles within the program could not be delineated. Finally, the program guidelines
formulated by the task force were not defined in operational terms because the priorities remained
unclear.
The extended definition phase required technical resources that were typically available at the field
centers. NASA consequently faced the problem of relocating personnel, and field center personnel
stressed the difficulty of technical management at headquarters. Some top executives at headquarters
(Hans Mark, for example) and the field center directors believed that the program management would
eventually be located at a field center. NASA thus confronted the issue of embedding a program within
its decentralized field centers.
Although program proponents stressed the need for strong coordination, NASA management
adopted the lead center form of organization and placed the program management (Level B) at
Houston. In the process, the program manager was denied formal access to the associate administrator
for the space station; further, the project officers who reported to their respective field center directors
were also denied formal a:cess to the program manager. A spirit of cooperation among the field centers
thus became the primary coordination tool.
The extended definition period dictated two levels of' coordination. The first level was between
headquarters and program management so that policy guidelines formulated by Beggs and the task force
were maintained. The second level was between program management and the project offices so that
the interdependent technology of the program elements would be integrated. Coordination problems
persisted from 1984 to 1986, the time that the lead center was in effect. Initially, the skunk works held
at Houston in ].984 retair_ed many characteristics of the task force. As we had seen, individuals drawn
from various field centers came to Houston to work on the skunk works. Since NASA had had previous
experience with this type of organization, it was not new to many of those involved. Skunk works itself
was organized into working groups, promoting a free flow of information and facilitating coordination
of tasks. It was not surprising that most field center personnel had favorable experiences in the skunk
works. However, coordination between headquarters and the skunk works may not have taken place at
multiple levels. Some associated with the task force believed that skunk works did not take advantage
of the concepts developed by the Space Station Task Force or the Concept Development Group. In
addition, those associated with the Office of Space Station at headquarters had difficulty getting
operational details-somc_ mandated by Congress-into the program.
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As the skunk works folded into the program office at Houston, coordination problems intensified
at both Level A and Level B. By then the initial work package splits had already been decided. Work
packages, by their very nature, emphasized division of work to the detriment of program integration at
a time when integration was still extremely important. In the competitive climate of NASA, cooperation
among the field centers did not occur automatically. Furthermore, as the Phase B studies progressed,
the work package splits revealed overlaps and redundancies, although some had been anticipated. The
need for constant communication between Levels A and B existed, and the panels and boards set up at
Level B were in response to this need. The geographic separation of the field centers also created
communication problems. With resource competition among the field centers, a free flow of information
would have provided Johnson a competitive advantage over other field centers.
The coordination between headquarters and program management also suffered. The associate
administrator's span of authority set the stage for problems. In addition, many at the headquarters were
unclear about their roles. Although NASA had begun to build the headquarters organization for the
space station, by most accounts it had not been completed.
By the time NASA revisited the work package decisions in 1986, many of the field center directors
had concluded that the lead center form of organization was not functioning effectively. Bill Lucas at
Marshall had always believed in strong central direction from headquarters because he felt that lead
center in Apollo and the application of a similar concept on a more limited scale at Marshall (prior to
the shuttle) had both been unsuccessful. Based on their own experiences in the program, Andrew Stofan
and even Noel Hinners, who had enthusiastically endorsed the lead center form of organization during
the 1983 Langley meeting, had also come to view the concept as dysfunctional. The Challenger accident
and the Rogers Commission Report on the shuttle further discredited the lead center concept.
Many viewed the lead center organization for the space station program as an experiment that would
be evaluated before the development phase. As we have seen, this tentativeness regarding the program
management decision had earlier dissuaded Don Hearth from accepting the lead center assignment.
With the experience accumulated in the detailed def'mition phase, the Phillips Committee successfully
persuaded the administrator to abandon the lead center concept. NASA thus affirmed the need for
centralized direction from headquarters in the early phases of the program.
* It tt
The management of the formative years of the space station program provided many individuals with
an opportunity to learn about NASA's organizational heritage. This included management styles,
organizational models, influence of external constituencies, and the delicate relationships among field
centers and headquarters.
NASA had a reputation for management excellence dating back to the Apollo days. This reputation
rested on the effective use of such techniques as task forces, which focused agency-wide attention on
large-scale projects. As NASA became increasingly decentralized and the field centers gained increasing
operational autonomy, only a few within the agency had direct experience with running agency-wide
programs. Following the shuttle, NASA did not pursue another major manned program until Beggs and
Mark proposed the space station. The Space Station Task Force helped to rekindle earlier memories,
showing many individuals (who had not been involved in earlier task forces) how task forces operated
and how they could be effectively managed. Also the way Beggs and Hedge chose to manage was very
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conducive to intrapreneu'ship. The task force left a strong imprint on the evolution of the space station
program, even as late as 1986, as the program moved into the preliminary design phase.
During this period, NASA also reevaluated organizational models that it had previously used for
managing multicenter programs. Since the shuttle was considered to be the major manned project, many
had accepted lead center as the natural option for program management. As we have seen, the Program
Planning Working Group discussed the Apollo model of organization as well. The ensuing discussions,
the lead center experiraent, and its evaluation, brought into sharp focus the complexity of all
management decisions. NASA learned the problems of establishing intercenter cooperation without
strong central direction from headquarters.
During the Apollo era, James Webb had emphasized the importance of external constituencies. Over
time, as budgets shrank and Congressional oversight intensified, dealing with external constituencies
became headquarters' primary responsibility. Many within NASA came to understand that the program
guidelines (e.g., building the station by the yard, or no single prime contractor) reflected the need for
constituencies. Even fiel,_! center personnel developed an appreciation of the power of constituencies.
For example, W. Ray Hook, who first tackled the work package issue, quickly came to realize the power
exerted by forces outsid,'. NASA.
Many in NASA learned, for the first time, the kinds of relationships that existed among the field
centers and headquarterg. Ron Browning of Goddard, for instance, came to appreciate the uniqueness
of his center, especially Low scientists were accustomed to working within specified boundaries, not like
the interdependent situal ion created by the lead center ext,eriment. The work package negotiations also
created an awareness of the delicate historical relationships between Johnson and Marshall. Lewis, under
a dynamic leader, renewed its mission and enhanced its credibility among the field centers and at
headquarters.
Thus, in the midst of the problems, challenges, and tangible achievements of the space station
program during the peri,_d from 1982 to 1986, NASA accomplished a major task. It provided a new and
relatively young (by NASA standards) cadre of personnel perhaps the best means of development--on-
the-job training. Many associated with the space station during this period have undoubtedly built
agency-wide relationships that will serve them well. Many had the opportunity to discover how task
forces could be effectively managed. They saw how circumstances outside the agency impacted all
programs within the agency. And many witnessed the design and results of a grand management
experiment, "keeping tht_ dream alive" and establishing the space station program as a major program
within NASA.
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-- Space Station Project Office (Level C) Engineering and Operation Safety Panels
-- Space Station Program Management Office (Level B) Correspondence and Reports
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> > Marshall Space Hight Center
-- Space Station Project Office (Level C) Correspondence and Reports
-- Space Station Memo/Minutes, Progress Reports, System Design, and Concept Studies
-- Space Station Press Releases
-- Space Station System Requirements
-- Space Station Needs Requirements
> > Langley Research Center
-- Space Station Project Office (Level C) Correspondence and Reports
-- Critical Evaluation Task Force Report
> > Lewis Research Center
-- Space Station Systems Directorate
-- Space Station Project Office (Level C) Correspondence
> > Goddard Research Center
-- Space Station Project Office (Level C) Correspondence
-- Organizational Charts
> > Kennedy Space Center
-- Space Station Project Office (Level C) Correspondence
-- Organizational Charts
From Other Sources
>> Manfred "Dutch" von Ehrenfried, Vice
Corporation, Washington, D.C.
-- Space Station Documents, 1982-86
President,
> > E. Lee Tilton Personal Files on the Space Station
-- CDG Workshop Files
VoL I -- 10/24-27/83
Vol. lI -- 10/24-27/83
Vol. III -- 10/24-27//83
Techmcal and Administrative Services
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APPENDIX C
BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILES
John Aaron joined NASA in 1964 and has served in several positions in the nation's space program. He
served as Special AssistaJlt to the Director of Johnson Space Center. In February 1986 he became Acting
Manager of the Space Station Program Office and continued as Deputy Manager of that office. In July
1987 he was named Acting Assistant Administrator for Exploration at NASA Headquarters.
General James A. Abrahamson was named Associate Administrator for Space Transportation Systems
in November 1981, on assignment from the Air Force. lie succeeded John Yardley. In 1979 he was
chosen by NASA for a special team charged with asse_ing the management of the Space Trans-
portation System. He served on the Staff of the National Aeronautics and Space Council in the Executive
Office of the President.
Lew Allen was appointed Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in October 1982. He previously
served as Air Force Chief of Staff and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Peter M. Banks, Director of Stanford University's Space Telecommunications and Radio Science
Laboratory, was selected by NASA to head a 16-man task force of U.S. space scientists to assist NASA
in defining the scientific uses and requirements for the planned manned space station.
James M. Beggs joined I'qASA first in 1968 when he became Associate Administrator in the Office of
Advanced Research and Technology. From 1969 to 1973 he served as Undersecretary in the Depart-
ment of Transportation. He went to Summa Corporation as Managing Director of Operations, and
joined General Dynamics in 1974. Before joining NASA again he worked for Westinghouse Electric
Corporation for thirteen years. He became Administrator of NASA on July 10, 1981, took a leave of
absence starting December 4, 1985, following his indictment. He resigned February 25, 1986 from the
space agency.
David C. Black was Chief Scientist of the Space Research Directorate at the Ames Research Center,
and served as Chief Scizntist for the Space Station from the time the position was created in 1984,
through the reorganization, until June 1987.
Ronald Browning was Project Officer (Level C) at Goddard Space Flight Center for the Space Station
Program.
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Aaron Cohen came to NASA in 1962 and joined the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office at Johnson Space
Center. From 1970 to 1972 he served as Manager for the Command and Service Module in the Apollo
Program. From 1972 to 1982 he was Manager of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Project, and from 1982 to
1983 he was Director of the Engineering and Development Directorate at Johnson. In October 1986 he
replaced Jesse Moore as Director at Johnson.
Clarke Covington came to Johnson Space Center in 1962. He held positions of increasing responsibility
within Johnson prior to his selection to be Manager of the Engineering and Operations Office for the
Space Station project. He was subsequently chosen to be the Manager of the Space Station Project
Office at Johnson.
Jerry W. Craig joined Johnson Space Center in 1969 and by 1973 had become the Chief of the Systems
Integration Branch of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office. From 1973 to 1984 he held positions of
increasing responsibility within Johnson. In 1983 he moved to NASA Headquarters and subsequently
became the Chairman of the Program Planning Working Group of the Space Station Task Force. In
1984 he returned to Johnson and became Manager of the Project Engineering Office in the Space
Station Project Office. In 1987 he became Deputy Manager of the SSPO, and is presently Manager of
the Crew Emergency Return Vehicle Office.
Philip E. Culbertson headed the Space Station Program when it In'st started as its Manager, and later
as the first Associate Administrator. He served as a high level member of the Space Shuttle design and
development team. After working at NASA for 22 years, he retired in January 1987 to become President
of the Lew Evans Foundation, which was established in 1983 in tribute to the former President and
Board Chairman of the Grumman Corporation who died in 1972. His position in NASA at the time he
retired was Associate Administrator for Policy and Planning.
Burton I. Edelson came to NASA as Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications in
February 1982. Before coming to NASA, he spent fourteen years with the Communications Satellite
Corp. (COMSAT), in Washington, D.C., rising to the position of Senior Vice President. He left NASA
in 1987.
Maxime A. Faget joined the science staff of Langley Research Center in 1946. He was assigned to the
Applied Materials Physics Division and was named Head of the Performance Aerodynamics Branch of
that division. He served as Director of Engineering and Development at Johnson Space Center and was
replaced by Aaron Cohen.
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Margaret "Peggy' Finare_ll served as chief of the International Planning and Programs Office in the
International Affairs Div_fion at NASA Headquarters. In September 1986 she became Director of the
Policy Division at Headquarters. In December 1988 she was appointed to the position of Deputy
Associate Administrator for External Relations.
Terence T. Finn, a policy :malyst, was reassigned in September 1981 as Deputy Director of Government
and Industry Affairs. In 1982 he joined the Space Station Task Force, which studied the pros and cons
of the space station program.
James C. Fletcher became Administrator of NASA on April 27, 1971 and held that position until May
1, 1977. He left NASA to become the Whiteford Professor of Technology and Energy Resources at the
University of Pittsburgh. In March 1986 Dr. Fletcher was nominated to be Administrator, succeeding
James Beggs. He was the fourth and seventh administrator of NASA.
Robert F. Freitag came to, NASA in 1963, and served 23 years, beginning in the Office of Manned Space
Flight. He first served as Director of Launch Vehicles and Propulsion in the OMSF from March to
November 1963. He then became the Director of Field Center Development for OMSF from November
1963 to January 1971. Hc completed his work with OMSF as Deputy Director of the Advanced Pro-
gram Office. In 1981 he focused his efforts on the space station initiative and became Deputy Director
of the Space Station Task Force. He completed his career with NASA as the Director of the Policy and
Plans Office of the Offic_ of Space Station at Headquarters. He retired from NASA in early 1986.
Robert A. Frosch was appointed NASA Administrator from June 1977 to his retirement in January 1981,
at 52 years of age. Prior to his appointment as Administrator, he was Associate Director for Applied
Oceanography at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute.
Ernst D. Geissler joined NASA in 1960 upon the formation of Marshall Space Flight Center although
he had been part of the Marshall "team" since January 1940. In 1960 he was the Director of the
Aeroballistics Division at Marshall. During the 1960s he worked on the booster for the Saturn rocket
series. For the Space Station Program he was involved in meetings in anticipation of Kennedy Space
Center's involvement whe.n the station became operational.
Robert C. Goetz joined NASA's Langley Research Center in July 1959. He was a U.S. Air Force officer
from late 1959 to 1962, assigned to Langley. In 1979 he was assigned to NASA Headquarters to head
structures and dynamics _:esearch. He returned to Langley in 1980 as Special Assistant to the Chief of
the Structures and Dynamics Division. He was appointed Director for Structures in June 1980. In July
1983 he became Deputy Director at Johnson Space Center. and was named Acting Director of Johnson
upon Gerald Griff'm's departure in January 1986.
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William IL Graham became Deputy Administr_itor of NASA on November 15, 1985, replacing Hans
Mark. He served in that capacity until October 1986, when he became Director of the Office of Science
and Technology Policy. He also served as Science Advisor to the President. Prior to his appointment at
NASA he was an executive of R&D Associates, Marina Del Rey, California, which he co-founded in
1971. In 1980, Graham served as an advisor to Ronald Reagan and was a member of the President-
Elect's transition team. He was also Chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control
and Disarmament, having been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate in 1982.
Gerald D. Griffin joined NASA in 1964. He served for more than 20 years in a number of key positions
at three NASA centers and in Washington, D.C. In August 1982 he became the Director at Johnson
Space Center and held that position until his departure in January 1986 to become President of the
Houston Chamber of Commerce.
Donald P. Hearth held several senior management positions at Headquarters and was Deputy Director
of Goddard Space Flight Center before being named Director of Langley Research Center in 1975. He
left Langley in February 1985 to become Director of Space Science and Technology at the University
of Colorado in Boulder.
Daniel H. Herman served as Director of the Engineering Division, Office of Space Station and was on
the Space Station Task Force. He was named Senior Engineer in December of 1986, a new staff position
created under the reorganization of the Space Station Program.
Noel W. Hlnners first joined NASA in 1972 as Deputy Director of Lunar Programs in the Office of
Space Science. From 1974 to 1979 he was Associate Administrator for Space Science. He was Director
of the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum prior to being appointed Director of
Goddard Space Flight Center in 1982. In October 1988 he was appointed Associate Deputy
Administrator, continuing in his function as chief scientist and supervising the institutional manage-
ment in NASA.
Francis T. "Frank" Hoban joined NASA in 1963 at Langley Research Center. He left Langley to serve
on the staff of the NASA Administrator in 1970. He served as the Executive Assistant to Dr. Wernher
yon Braun and later Dr. George Low, the former Deputy Administrator of NASA. He served on the
Space Station Task Force which was established on May 20, 1982. He subsequently became the Acting
Director of the Program Support Office for the Office of Space Station.
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John D. Hodge was born and educated in England, joining NASA in 1959 after a distinguished career
in England and Canada. He was named Chief of Flight Control. He left NASA in 1970 for the
Department of Transpor_.ation, but returned in 1982 to become Director of the Space Station Task
Force. He was appointed Deputy Director of the Interim Space Station Program Office in April 1984
when the Task Force completed its work. He then became Deputy Associate Administrator for the
Space Station, became Acting Associate Administrator for Space Station in December 1985, and
Associate Administrator for Operations in August 1986.
Paul F. Holloway joined the staff at Langley Research Center in June 1960. He became Head of the
Applied Physics Division of the Systems Analysis Section in 1969 and Head of the Space Systems
Division of the Aerospa_:e Operations Analysis Section in 1970. He served as Director for Space at
Langley from 1975 until ae was named Deputy Director of Langley in February 1985.
W. Ray Hook came to 1__ngley Research Center in 1955, served in the Air Force from November 1955
to April 1958, and returned to Langley when his tour was done. He served at NASA Headquarters as
Acting Director for Sp_tce Shuttle Technology Payloacts. He was also head of Langley's Shuttle
Experiments Office. He _,erved as Manager of Langley's Space Station Office, and was then named the
Director for Space at Langley, replacing Robert _Skip" Nunamaker.
Neil Hutchinson served as Space Station Program Manager at Johnson Space Center from April 1984
to February 1986. He wa., named Program Manager shortly after NASA formed the Program Office and
assigned overall responsibility to Johnson. He remained at Johnson as Assistant to the Director of Space
Operations.
James E. Kingsbury joined NASA in July 1960 when the Army Ballistic Missile Agency became the
nucleus for the establishment of Marshall Space Flight Center. He has served in various positions at
Marshall during that time. In June 1974 he became Associate Director for Engineering in the Science
and Engineering Directorate at Marshall, and in April 1975 became the Director. He retired from that
position on November 2_], 1986.
Thomas R. Kloves joined Johnson Space Center in November 1963 and served in various technical and
managerial positions in the Center. In September 1984 he was appointed Manager of the Program
Management Office for the Space Station.
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Christopher C. Kraft, Jr. joined the staff of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(forerunner to NASA) in 1945 and in 1958 became an original member of NASA's Space Task Group.
He served as Fright Director for Project Mercury form 1960 to 1963. He was named Deputy Director
of Johnson Space Center in 1969 and Director in 1972. He resigned from the Directorship on August
7, 1982.
Robert V. Lottman joined NASA as an attorney in the Office of Patent Counsel at Goddard Space Flight
Center in 1966. From 1967 to 1972 he served on the staff of the Assistant General Counsel for Patent
Matters at Headquarters. In 1972 he joined the Legislative Division of the Office of Legislative Affairs.
He was named Director of the Congressional Liaison Division of the Office of Legislative Affairs in
March 1979.
Allen J. Louvtere joined Johnson Space Center in April 1963 and served in various technical and
managerial positions in what became the Engineering Directorate. In August 1981 he was designated
Manager of the interim Space Operations Center Program Office at Johnson. In July 1983 he was
assigned to be Assistant for Program Development to the Director of Research and Engineering. In
September 1984 he was appointed Manager of the Systems Engineering and Integration Office for the
Space Station Program.
William IL Lucas became Director of Marshall Space Flight Center in June 1974, after having served
three years as Deputy Director. He was with Marshall and its predecessor organizations for more than
30 years in various scientific and program management positions. He retired as Director of Marshall on
July 3, 1986.
Hans M. Mark served as director of Ames Research Center in California from 1969 until 1977. Dr.
Mark had left NASA in 1977 to serve in the Department of the Air Force, first as Undersecretary (1977-
1979) and then as Secretary (1979-1981). He returned as Deputy Administrator in July 1981 under James
Beggs. He left NASA in September 1984, to become Chancellor of the University of Texas System. He
co-authored a book with Arnold Levine, published in 1984, entitled The Management of Research
Institutions: A Look at Government Laboratories. He was born in Germany June 17, 1929, and became
a citizen of the United States in 1945.
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Jesse W. Moore came to NASA Headquarters in 1978 as Deputy Director of the Solar Terrestrial
Division in the Office of _pace Science. He also served as Director of the Space Flight and Earth and
Planetary Exploration Divisions. He was appointed Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Fright in
1983 and served as Actiag Associate Administrator for Space Flight from April 1984 until he was
appointed Associate Adm inistrator on August 1, 1984. He was named Director of Johnson Space Center
on January 23, 1986 anj was reassigned as Special Assistant to the General Manger at NASA
Headquarters on October 12, 1986.
Thomas L. Moser came to Johnson Space Center in 1963. From 1966 to 1971 he was the Structural
Subsystems Manager for the Apollo command module and subsequently became Project Manager for
the Shuttle Structures and Mechanics Division. In 1972 Moser was named Head of Structural Design
and Manager for Orbiter Structural and Thermal Projection Systems. He became Technical Assistant
to the Director of Johns:m in 1981 and was named Deputy manager of the Orbiter Project Office in
1982. He assumed the position of Director of Engineering in 1983. He came to NASA Headquarters
in February 1983, when he was appointed Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Flight. He was
serving as Director of the Space Station Freedom Program when he was selected as Deputy Associate
Administrator for the Sg ace Station in December 1988.
James B. Odom began _ais government service in 1956 at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. When
Marshall Space Flight ('.enter was established in 1960, he transferred there. In 1972 he was named
Manager of the Extermd Tank Project in the Shuttle Projects Office. In 1982 he became Deputy
Manager for Production and Log/stirs in the Shuttle Projects Office. In Apr/l 1983 he was appointed
Manager of the Space Telescope Office. In November 1986 he was named to succeed James Kingsbury
as Director of the Science and Engineering Directorate at Marshall. He subsequently became Head of
the Space Station Office at NASA Headquarters.
It. General Samuel C. Phillips directed the Apollo Program from 1964 to 1969. He retired from the
Air Force in September 1975. He headed the post-Challenger studies that led to a reorganization of
NASA.
Robert O. Piland returm'_d to Langley Research Center in late 1988 to assume the duties of Chief of the
Space System Division. He was formerly National Aero-Space Plane Director for NASA in the NASP
Program Management Office at Headquarters.
Luther Powell joined Mz_rshall Space Flight Center in 1960. He worked on the Saturn I and IB projects,
Skylab, and Spacelab. He served as Manager of the Space Station Projects Office at Marshall from 1982
until his retirement from NASA on August 5, 1988.
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William P. Raney joined NASA in 1978 as the Chief Engineer for the Office of Space and Terrestrial
Applications. On December 31, 1978, he was named Assistant Associate Administrator of the same
office. He had served as Director of the Utilization and Performance Requirements Division, and
became Special Assistant to the Associate Administrator after the reorganization of the Space Station
Program in 1986.
William Eugene Rice joined Johnson Space Center in October 1962 and served in various technical and
managerial positions. In April 1983 he became Assistant to the Director of Research and Engineering.
In September 1984 he became Manager of the International and External Affairs Office and Director
of the International Programs Group Space Station Program Office (JSC and NASA Headquarters).
Carl B. Shelley joined Johnson Space Flight Center in November 1964. At the beginning of the space
station initiative he was Deputy Chief of the Training Division, and became Deputy Director of the
Mission Operations Directorate in 1983. In September 1984 he was selected to be Manager of the Space
Station Customer Integration Office, which he held for three years. In 1987 he became Manager of the
Operations Integration office of the Mission Operations Directorate, and in 1988 he became Deputy
Manager of the Space Station Projects Office at Johnson.
Richard G. Smith came to NASA in 1960 when the Development Operations Division of the Army
Bani._tic Missile Agency became the Marshall Space Flight Center. He served in positions of increasing
responsibility at Marshall and was appointed Deputy Manager and later Manager of the Saturn Rocket
Program. In January 1974 Smith became Director of Science and Engineering and was appointed Deputy
Director of Marshall later that year. In August 1978 he accepted a one-year assignment as Deputy
Associate Administrator for Space Transportation Systems at NASA Headquarters. He also served as
Director of the Skylab Task Force. He retired as Director of Kennedy Space Center on July 31, 1986,
to become President and Chief Executive Officer of General Space Corp.
Andrew J. Stofan began his professional career at Lewis Research Center in 1958 as a research engineer.
From 1966 to 1978, Stofan managed a variety of technical projects at Lewis. In 1978, Stofan was
appointed Deputy Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Science and Applications at NASA
Headquarters, and held the title of Acting Associate Administrator for that office from 1980 until 1982,
when he was appointed director of Lewis. He became Associate Administrator for the Space Station on
June 30, 1986 and directed the Space Station Program through a difficult period marked by significant
progress. He retired from NASA April 1, 1988, at the age of 53.
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Ron Thomas joined Lewis Research Center in 1961. He worked on production and generation of
electricity from solar :_ources at Lewis and managed the Wind Energy Program for the Department of
Energy (also at Lewis). He was the Project Officer (I_x:vel C) at Lewis Research Center for the Space
Station Program.
Richard A, Thorson joined Johnson Space Center in June 1966 and served in various technical and
managerial positions in what became the Mission Operations Directorate. In September 1984 he was
appointed Manager of the Space Station Operations Office.
E. Lee Tilton, lII, joined NASA in 1964 and held a number of positions within the agency, including
Deputy Director of the Earth Resources Laboratory flora 1974 to 1981. He held various positions at
NASA Headquarters including Deputy Director of Advanced Program Development, Acting Assistant
Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight, and Acting Director of the Commercially
Developed Space Facility. He was named Director of the Science and Technology Laboratory at the
John C. Stennis Space Center in September 1988.
James E. Webb served as NASA Administrator from February 14, 1961, to October 7, 1968. He was the
second Administrator in the history of NASA. He returned to the private sector as a lawyer and
consultant.
John F. Yardley joined NASA in 1974 as Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight. He became
Associate Administrator for Space Flight in 1976, and was Associate Administrator for Space
Transportation System,_ from 1978 until 1981. Prior to joining NASA he was Vice President and General
Manager of the Easter n Division, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. in St. Louis. He returned to
McDonnell Douglas in May 1981 to become President of the company.
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